Philodemus - On Methods of Inference (De Lacy)
Epicurean Focus
Section titled “Epicurean Focus”Philodemus of Gadara (about 110 to about 40 BC) led an Epicurean school at Naples and Herculaneum in the time of Cicero. His treatise On Methods of Inference (often called On Signs, Greek Peri Sēmeiōseōn, “On Inferences from Signs”) survives on a charred papyrus roll from the library of the Villa of the Papyri at Herculaneum. It is the fullest surviving Epicurean account of method: how we can know things we cannot see, such as atoms, void, other worlds, and the nature of divine beings, from the things we can see.
The book is a record of a debate. Stoic critics, chief among them a Stoic named Dionysius, argued that the Epicurean method of reasoning by similarity (Greek homoiotēs, “similarity” or “analogy”) can never give certain knowledge. Only a formal test, which De Lacy translates “contraposition” (Greek anaskeuē, “elimination”), can do that: suppose the hidden thing is not there, and see whether the visible sign disappears with it. Philodemus collects the answers of three Epicurean teachers, Zeno of Sidon, Bromius, and Demetrius of Laconia, and of one more whose name is lost.
For Epicureans the book matters for four reasons.
First, it shows Epicurus’ method at work. Epicurus wrote that “as regards the imperceptible we must draw inferences from phenomena. For all thoughts have their origin in sensations by means of coincidence and analogy and similarity and combination, reasoning too contributing something” (DL X.32). On Methods of Inference is that sentence worked out in detail and defended against the strongest objections of the day.
Second, it reverses the order the Stoics assumed. The Stoics held that logic comes first and that experience at best confirms what reason already knows. The Epicureans answer that even the formal test depends on experience: “If the method of analogy is not cogent, the method of contraposition is not cogent” (Col. VIII). We know that “If there is motion, there is void” only because we have observed that nothing in our experience moves without empty space to move into.
Third, it shows that knowledge does not need to be all or nothing. The Stoics demanded necessity or nothing. The Epicureans answer that “certainty and probability are both derived from the observation of appearances” (Col. XXV), that sometimes one case is enough and sometimes many are needed (Col. XXVI), and that a well-made inference deserves the same trust as the evidence it comes from: “nor mistrust the facts proved through apparent objects according to analogy, but trust them just as one trusts the facts from which the inference is made” (Fragment II).
Fourth, it shows that the Epicureans reasoned from limits in nature. Variation is real, but “there is always a limit to variations, and that this limit holds universally,” as De Lacy summarizes Bromius (Col. XXI). No one need ask whether there are “men with a nature of iron, who go through walls as we go through air” (Col. XXI). The limits we observe in nature, not a rule of logic, are what make it safe to reason from the seen to the unseen.
Key Points
Section titled “Key Points”-
The question. How can we know what we cannot perceive? The book’s examples are the void, the atoms, other worlds, the size of the sun, and the nature of divine beings.
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Two methods. The Stoics accept only “contraposition”: a sign is valid only if denying the hidden thing denies the sign. The Epicureans reason “by analogy” or “similarity”: what holds without exception in our experience holds also where we cannot see, unless something in experience conflicts (Cols. XI–XIV).
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Contraposition rests on analogy. “If there is motion, there is void” is known only because we have observed the conditions of all motion in our experience. So “contraposition is not by itself cogent” (Cols. VIII–IX), and “contraposition can be reduced to analogy, but not vice versa” (De Lacy’s summary of Cols. XXXI–XXXII).
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Inconceivability. The Epicurean test of a necessary connection is that we cannot conceive the one without the other, “just as it is impossible to conceive that Epicurus is a man and Metrodorus not a man” (Col. XIV). The test is empirical. We cannot conceive it because nothing in our experience has ever shown it.
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Unique cases support analogy. The magnet is the only stone that draws iron, but it does so every time, so the magnet strengthens analogy rather than refuting it. “If other stones were similar to or identical with the stones that draw iron, and some drew iron, and some did not, the method of analogy would be destroyed” (Cols. XIV–XV).
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Not every similarity counts. The inference “ought not to be made from any chance common quality to any other, but from that quality which does not admit a spark to the contrary” (Col. XIII), and “from objects that are most closely related” (Col. XVIII).
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Atoms and the qualities of bodies. Bodies in our experience have color and perish, “but not as bodies” (Cols. XVII–XVIII). Bodies in the dark have no color yet are still bodies, so we do not infer color in the atoms.
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We need not examine every case. “We must consider many homogeneous and varied ones” and the records of history (Cols. XX–XXI). Others’ observations count too: “Do those who have never been there doubt that Crete and Sicily are islands?” (Col. XXXII).
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No conflicting evidence. Every inference must be checked so “that no other appearance or previously demonstrated fact conflicts with the inference” (Col. XXXII). Even the swerve of atoms must be shown not to conflict “with any other appearance” (Col. XXXVI).
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The Stoics refute themselves. Their arguments against analogy are themselves analogies from experience (Cols. XXIX–XXX), and they know that there are “no Centaurs or Pans” only by analogy (Col. XXXI).
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The meanings of “in so far as.” The last section distinguishes four meanings of “as such,” “according as,” and “in so far as,” and argues that every one is established by observation, not by definition (Cols. XXXIII–XXXV).
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The fragments name the four criteria, “perception, anticipations, mental perceptions, and feelings” (Fragment I), and refer our notion of divine beings to mental perception (Fragment VIII).
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Signs are not marks. A Stoic “mark” (Latin nota, Greek idiōma, “peculiar feature”) is a feature of a perception that is supposed to certify the perception as true: the mark of the “kataleptic impression,” “propria veri, non communi veri et falsi”, “peculiar to truth, and not common to what is true and false” (Academic Questions II.33–34). The Stoics grounded it in the claim that no two things are alike, “not a single hair or a single grain” (II.85), each “stamped” (signatum) by the divine craftsman with its own pattern (Seneca, Letters 113.16). A sign (Latin signum, Greek sēmeion), in this book, is something perceived from which we infer something unperceived. The Stoic distinction between “common” and “particular” signs (Col. I) carries the demand for a mark over from perception into inference. The Epicureans rejected marks altogether, because they held that every presentation is true and that error lies in opinion: they “consider that every appearance and notion is necessarily true” (Col. VII).
Passages That Bear Most Directly on Epicurean Canonics
Section titled “Passages That Bear Most Directly on Epicurean Canonics”- Col. VIII–IX — Motion and void. “Establishing by induction all the constant conditions for things that are moved within our experience, apart from which we see nothing moved, we judge by analogy that all objects that are moved are moved in every case under these conditions; and by this method we infer that it is not possible for motion to exist without void.” Compare Epicurus: “that bodies exist, sense itself witnesses in the experience of all men, and in accordance with the evidence of sense we must of necessity judge of the imperceptible by reasoning” (DL X.39).
- Col. VII — “Sufficient … to base our belief on probability.” The Epicureans grant that in some matters “it will be sufficient for us to base our belief on probability … just as we do in regard to what is learned from trial; for example, that we shall be safe sailing in summer.” Knowledge comes in degrees, and the degree depends on the evidence.
- Col. XIV — Inconceivability. An inference is “not by contraposition, but by analogy” when “it is inconceivable that the appearance exists or is such as it is and the unperceived object does not exist.”
- Col. XV — Appearance cannot be contradicted. “It is ridiculous that anything inferred from appearance about the unperceived should contradict appearance.” Compare Principal Doctrine 23: “If you fight against all sensations, you will have no standard by which to judge even those of them which you say are false.”
- Col. XXI — The limit of variation. “Let no one oppose us or be so stubborn as to question whether there are, beyond such differences, men with a nature of iron, who go through walls as we go through air.” Compare Lucretius on the fixed limits of nature: “a fixed limit to things marks the extreme on either side” (Lucretius II.507–521).
- Col. XXII — Identity and similarity, men and gods. Bromius answers the Stoic dilemma of identity and similarity, and applies the method to divine beings: “nothing prevents god from being similar in body to man, since man alone of living beings in our experience is capable of thought.”
- Col. XXIV — Bounded peculiarities. There will never be a peculiarity “that it will appear possible in any way that a man be invulnerable or that we see any finite object not bounded by another object.” Compare Epicurus: “the extreme point is seen against something else” (Letter to Herodotus 41).
- Cols. XXV–XXVI — Certainty and probability. “Certainty and probability are both derived from the observation of appearances.” There is “a determinate limit to what men can eat,” and “sometimes when you chance on one instance you say that a thing is of such and such a character, and often you use two cases and sometimes more.”
- Col. XXVII — Feelings and appearances. “In stating our views we do not in any way contradict ourselves, if feelings and appearances have confirmed our statements.”
- Col. XXXII — Others’ observations. “We collect not only the signs appearing to us or tested by our experience, but also the appearances taken from observation by others.”
- Col. XXXV — How necessity is learned. “We say that man according as and in so far as he is man is mortal, on the ground that we have examined systematically many diverse men, and have found no variation in respect to this characteristic and no evidence to the contrary.”
- Col. XXXVI — The swerve must not conflict. “It is not sufficient to admit the very slight swerves of the atoms because of chance and free will; but we must also prove that this swerve does not in any way conflict with any other appearance.”
- Fragment IV — Different tests for different things. We must not “think that we know objects temporally unperceived by the absence of conflicting evidence.” Compare Epicurus on opinions “waiting to be confirmed or not contradicted” (Letter to Herodotus 50–51) and the tower seen from afar (DL X.34).
Outline Of The Argument
Section titled “Outline Of The Argument”Editor’s note: The numbers below (1, 2, 3 …) are this outline’s own numbering, in Arabic numerals so that they are not confused with the papyrus column numbers (I, II, III …). Each entry links to the column where its topic begins. Column and line references such as XIV.28 follow De Lacy. Entries marked Epicurean note are our own commentary.
Section One: Zeno of Sidon’s Account (Cols. Ia–XIX)
Section titled “Section One: Zeno of Sidon’s Account (Cols. Ia–XIX)”1. The Stoic Objections Begin: Pomegranates and Common Signs (Cols. Ia–I)
Section titled “1. The Stoic Objections Begin: Pomegranates and Common Signs (Cols. Ia–I)”Begins at Col. Ia
- The text begins in the middle of a list of Stoic objections. If analogy were valid, we could infer that since there are pomegranates and figs here, they exist everywhere.
- Analogy rests on “common signs,” which can exist whether or not the hidden thing exists, like inferring that a man is good because he is rich. Only “particular” signs are cogent (Col. I).
2. Unique and Rare Cases (Cols. I–II)
Section titled “2. Unique and Rare Cases (Cols. I–II)”Begins at Col. I
- The magnet, amber, and the square of four are unique. Why then could there not be “some exceptional race of men who do not die when the heart has been pierced”?
- Rare things in experience: the dwarf of Alexandria, the person of Epidaurus who became a man, the giant of Crete, the pygmies Antony brought from Syria (Col. II).
3. Analogy Assumes What It Proves (Cols. II–IV)
Section titled “3. Analogy Assumes What It Proves (Cols. II–IV)”Begins at Col. II
- “Since men in our experience are mortal, all men are” is valid only if we assume that unseen men are like ours “in all respects.”
- Unless mortality belongs to men “in so far as and according as they are men,” the inference fails. The Acrothoites are not short-lived just because some men are (Col. IV).
4. Atoms Should Have Color; Which Similarity? (Cols. V–VI)
Section titled “4. Atoms Should Have Color; Which Similarity? (Cols. V–VI)”Begins at Col. V
- By analogy, atoms should have color and be destructible like all bodies we see.
- From which similarity should we infer: men to men, animate to animate, bodies to bodies, beings to beings?
- The dilemma of identity and similarity: identical things leave nothing to infer, and merely similar things may differ in the very respect that matters (Col. VI).
5. Dionysius’ Sophistries, and “Whenever Nothing Conflicts” (Cols. VII–VIII)
Section titled “5. Dionysius’ Sophistries, and “Whenever Nothing Conflicts” (Cols. VII–VIII)”Begins at Col. VII
- Dionysius charges the Epicureans with using “analogy” in two senses, and jokes that he will deny by contraposition that the Epicureans exist.
- The Epicureans answer that some beliefs rest on probability, as a sailor trusts summer winds.
- Dionysius says no one can establish that nothing conflicts (Col. VIII).
6. Contraposition Depends on Analogy: Motion and Void (Cols. VIII–IX)
Section titled “6. Contraposition Depends on Analogy: Motion and Void (Cols. VIII–IX)”Begins at Col. VIII
- “If the method of analogy is not cogent, the method of contraposition is not cogent.”
- “If there is motion, there is void” is known only by induction from all moving things in our experience.
- Epicurean note: this is the method of DL X.39 and the void argument of Lucretius I.329 and following.
7. The Size of the Sun (Cols. IX–XI)
Section titled “7. The Size of the Sun (Cols. IX–XI)”Begins at Col. IX
- Dionysius argues that the sun is larger than it appears, because it reappears slowly from behind obstacles.
- The Epicureans answer that the sun is unique, like the magnet, and that Dionysius’ own argument is an analogy from experience.
8. The Epicurean Replies: Analogy Meets the Formal Requirements (Cols. XI–XII)
Section titled “8. The Epicurean Replies: Analogy Meets the Formal Requirements (Cols. XI–XII)”Begins at Col. XI
- The replies begin. “If not the second, then not the first” can be proved by mere denial, as with motion and void, or because it is “inconceivable” that the first should be without the second.
- “Plato is a man, and Socrates is a man”: it is inconceivable for one to be a man and not the other (Col. XII).
9. Discrimination in Choosing Similarities (Cols. XII–XIV)
Section titled “9. Discrimination in Choosing Similarities (Cols. XII–XIV)”Begins at Col. XII
- We do not infer “from any chance common quality to any other.” Beheaded men everywhere stay dead, but plants differ from place to place.
- The pomegranate argument is “weak and refuted by the facts.”
10. Particular Signs, Inconceivability, and Unique Cases (Cols. XIV–XVI)
Section titled “10. Particular Signs, Inconceivability, and Unique Cases (Cols. XIV–XVI)”Begins at Col. XIV
- Not every particular sign is a case of contraposition. Inconceivability is another, “just as it is impossible to conceive that Epicurus is a man and Metrodorus not a man.”
- Unique cases strengthen analogy. The magnet always draws iron, and the square of four always has its perimeter equal to its area, “in the infinite universes” as here (Col. XV).
11. Mortality Is Learned, Not Assumed (Cols. XVI–XVII)
Section titled “11. Mortality Is Learned, Not Assumed (Cols. XVI–XVII)”Begins at Col. XVI
- We do not presuppose that unseen men are mortal. We find that all men in our experience, and in history, are mortal, “with no case drawing us to the contrary” (Col. XVII).
- Life spans vary by country, so we do not infer that the Acrothoites are short-lived.
12. Atoms, Color, and Destructibility (Cols. XVII–XVIII)
Section titled “12. Atoms, Color, and Destructibility (Cols. XVII–XVIII)”Begins at Col. XVII
- Bodies perish “not as bodies, but in so far as they partake of a nature opposed to the corporeal.” They have color “but not as bodies,” for bodies in the dark have no color (Col. XVIII).
- Epicurean note: compare Lucretius II.730–841 on why atoms have no color.
13. Infer From the Most Closely Related (Cols. XVIII–XIX)
Section titled “13. Infer From the Most Closely Related (Cols. XVIII–XIX)”Begins at Col. XVIII
- Inference is best made “from objects that are most closely related and from those that are as similar as possible,” from men to men like them, from species to species, from the generic to the generic.
Section Two: Bromius’ Report of Zeno (Cols. XIX–XXVIII)
Section titled “Section Two: Bromius’ Report of Zeno (Cols. XIX–XXVIII)”14. Eight Stoic Arguments (Cols. XIX–XX)
Section titled “14. Eight Stoic Arguments (Cols. XIX–XX)”Begins at Col. XIX
- Must we examine all appearances, or only some? May there be variations beyond our experience? Identity or similarity? Does induction presuppose its conclusion? Peculiarities, unique cases, variations in digestion, and the charge that Epicurean gods and atoms are unlike anything we see (Col. XX).
15. Many and Varied Cases Are Enough (Cols. XX–XXI)
Section titled “15. Many and Varied Cases Are Enough (Cols. XX–XXI)”Begins at Col. XX
- “We must consider many homogeneous and varied ones” together with “accounts of history,” and from them take “the inseparable constituent of each.”
- All men “are liable to old age and disease,” so those who say “Men were formerly invulnerable” state a falsehood (Col. XXI).
16. The Limit of Variation (Cols. XXI–XXII)
Section titled “16. The Limit of Variation (Cols. XXI–XXII)”Begins at Col. XXI
- Variations confirm the method. “An object deprived of all similarity with appearance is inconceivable.”
- No “men with a nature of iron, who go through walls as we go through air” (Col. XXII).
- Epicurean note: see the Epicurean doctrine of limits in Lucretius II.478–521 and Letter to Herodotus 41–42.
17. Identity, Similarity, and the Gods (Col. XXII)
Section titled “17. Identity, Similarity, and the Gods (Col. XXII)”Begins at Col. XXII
- We infer from identical objects when circumstances differ, and from non-identical ones “in so far as they share the same community of similar attributes.”
- God is like man in body, “since man alone of living beings in our experience is capable of thought,” and “god cannot be conceived apart from thought.”
18. Induction Does Not Presuppose Its Conclusion; the Nature of Fire (Cols. XXII–XXIV)
Section titled “18. Induction Does Not Presuppose Its Conclusion; the Nature of Fire (Cols. XXII–XXIV)”Begins at Col. XXII
- “By inductive inference from appearances I shall arrive at the view that similarity must exist in respect to mortality” (Col. XXIII).
- The universal nature of fire: its common qualities are kept, its peculiarities set aside (Cols. XXIII–XXIV).
19. Unique Objects, and Bounded Peculiarities (Cols. XXIV–XXV)
Section titled “19. Unique Objects, and Bounded Peculiarities (Cols. XXIV–XXV)”Begins at Col. XXIV
- No peculiarity could make “a man be invulnerable” or show “any finite object not bounded by another object.” No beast could be wise.
- The soul and time are unique, yet we still reason about them by analogy (Col. XXV).
20. Certainty and Probability; the Limit of What Men Can Eat (Cols. XXV–XXVII)
Section titled “20. Certainty and Probability; the Limit of What Men Can Eat (Cols. XXV–XXVII)”Begins at Col. XXV
- “Certainty and probability are both derived from the observation of appearances.”
- There is “a determinate limit to what men can eat,” so no men eat hay (Col. XXVI).
- One case, two cases, or more, “in accordance with the manifold nature of signs.”
21. The Gods and the Elements Are Not Inconsistent With Analogy (Col. XXVII)
Section titled “21. The Gods and the Elements Are Not Inconsistent With Analogy (Col. XXVII)”Begins at Col. XXVII
- We do not contradict ourselves “if feelings and appearances have confirmed our statements.” The gods and the first elements “appear to be indestructible and unborn.”
- Philodemus apologizes for repetition and promises a systematic list of the Stoics’ errors (Col. XXVIII).
Section Three: Demetrius on the Errors of the Stoics (Cols. XXVIII–XXIX)
Section titled “Section Three: Demetrius on the Errors of the Stoics (Cols. XXVIII–XXIX)”22. Five Pervasive Errors (Cols. XXVIII–XXIX)
Section titled “22. Five Pervasive Errors (Cols. XXVIII–XXIX)”Begins at Col. XXVIII
- The Stoics ignore inconceivability, infer from any chance similarity, misread unique cases, ignore the tests of inference, and think that “in so far as” statements are all tested by contraposition (Col. XXIX).
Section Four: Another Epicurean Teacher on the Errors of the Stoics (Cols. XXIX–XXXVIII)
Section titled “Section Four: Another Epicurean Teacher on the Errors of the Stoics (Cols. XXIX–XXXVIII)”23. The Stoics Refute Themselves (Cols. XXIX–XXXI)
Section titled “23. The Stoics Refute Themselves (Cols. XXIX–XXXI)”Begins at Col. XXIX
- Their objections from variation and unique cases are analogies from experience (Col. XXX).
- Bad inferences, like “all men are white,” are “corrected by the appearances themselves.”
- “Those who reject the method of inference by analogy make all unperceived objects unsignified,” yet the Stoics know there are “no Centaurs or Pans” only by analogy (Col. XXXI).
24. One Method, Others’ Observations, No Conflict (Col. XXXII)
Section titled “24. One Method, Others’ Observations, No Conflict (Col. XXXII)”Begins at Col. XXXII
- Analogy is one method, though there are three kinds of signs.
- We use others’ observations: “Do those who have never been there doubt that Crete and Sicily are islands?”
- Analogy is sound “with this condition, that no other appearance or previously demonstrated fact conflicts with the inference.”
25. The Best Test, and the Origin of the Cosmos (Col. XXXIII)
Section titled “25. The Best Test, and the Origin of the Cosmos (Col. XXXIII)”Begins at Col. XXXIII
- “The best test of the hypothetical proposition and the particular sign is established whenever we are not able to conceive that the first exists and the second does not.”
- The good reasoner “considers it impossible that the nature of things and their generation from each other should be inconsistent with appearances. Thus he expounds the origin of the cosmos.”
26. Four Meanings of “In So Far As” (Cols. XXXIII–XXXVI)
Section titled “26. Four Meanings of “In So Far As” (Cols. XXXIII–XXXVI)”Begins at Col. XXXIII
- The four meanings: necessary consequence, “the particular definition of that, i.e., … the anticipation of that,” property, and consequence of an attribute (Col. XXXIV).
- All four are learned the same way: “from the fact that this has been observed to be a property of that in all cases that we have come upon” (Col. XXXV).
- Even the smoke-and-fire contraposition rests on the observation that “always in all cases smoke has been observed to be given off by fire” (Col. XXXVI).
- Epicurean note: the second meaning is “anticipation” (prolēpsis, “preconcept”), formed from repeated experience, not a definition fixed in advance (compare DL X.33).
27. No Conflicting Evidence, and the Swerve (Col. XXXVI)
Section titled “27. No Conflicting Evidence, and the Swerve (Col. XXXVI)”Begins at Col. XXXVI
- “It is not sufficient to admit the very slight swerves of the atoms because of chance and free will; but we must also prove that this swerve does not in any way conflict with any other appearance.”
- Antecedent, generic, and specific signs differ.
28. Two Senses of “Sign” and Two Kinds of Consequence (Cols. XXXVI–XXXVIII)
Section titled “28. Two Senses of “Sign” and Two Kinds of Consequence (Cols. XXXVI–XXXVIII)”Begins at Col. XXXVI
- “Sign” means both the appearance and the inference, and the Stoics confuse the two.
- Consequence from elements, and consequence by similarity: “As a consequence of the fact that bodies in our experience rebound, we judge that atoms are heavy and solid” (Col. XXXVII).
- “If there is motion, there is void” and its converse rest on the same inconceivability as “If men in our experience are vulnerable and mortal, men everywhere are vulnerable and mortal” (Col. XXXVIII).
29. The Stoics’ Myths, and a Promise About the Physicians (Col. XXXVIII)
Section titled “29. The Stoics’ Myths, and a Promise About the Physicians (Col. XXXVIII)”Begins at Col. XXXVIII
- The Stoics build arguments on myths and opinion.
- The treatise ends with a promise to discuss the physicians’ views of analogy “if we have the stomach for it.”
The Fragments
Section titled “The Fragments”30. Eight Fragments of Uncertain Place
Section titled “30. Eight Fragments of Uncertain Place”Begins at Fragment I
- The four criteria: “perception, anticipations, mental perceptions, and feelings” (Fragment I).
- Trust well-made inferences “just as one trusts the facts from which the inference is made” (Fragment II).
- Different tests for things temporarily unseen and things unseen by nature (Fragment IV).
- Images “cannot be false” (Fragment VI). Our notion of the gods rests on mental perception (Fragment VIII).
The Translation and Essays (De Lacy)
Section titled “The Translation and Essays (De Lacy)”Phillip Howard De Lacy and Estelle Allen De Lacy, Philodemus: On Methods of Inference. A Study in Ancient Empiricism, Philological Monographs of the American Philological Association, Number X (Philadelphia, 1941). The scanned volume is at the Internet Archive: philodemus-on-methods-of-inference-de-lacey. A revised edition with a new Greek text was published at Naples in 1978.
How to read the references. In the translation, the bold labels in brackets, such as [Col. XIV], mark where each column of the papyrus begins, and each is a link target: #col-14 goes to Column XIV, and #col-1a to Column Ia. Fragments are linked as #frag-1 through #frag-8. The small page links, such as [p. 25], mark the start of each page of the 1941 volume and open the scanned page. Column references in De Lacy’s introduction link to the columns.
About the text. The translation was checked word for word against the scanned 1941 volume. The Greek text and critical notes, De Lacy’s footnotes to the translation, and the index are omitted. The footnotes can be read on the scanned pages through the page links.
De Lacy’s Text, Translation, and Chapters
Section titled “De Lacy’s Text, Translation, and Chapters”Contents: Chapter I: The Life and Works of Philodemus · Chapter II: Introduction · Chapter III: Text and Translation · Chapter IV: The Sources of Epicurean Empiricism · Chapter V: The Development of Epicurean Logic and Methodology · Chapter VI: The Logical Controversies of the Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics · Bibliography
Chapter I: The Life and Works of Philodemus
Section titled “Chapter I: The Life and Works of Philodemus”p. 1 The popularity of Epicureanism at Rome in the first century before Christ is indicated by many works, including the great poem of Lucretius, the lost prose works of Amafinius, Rabirius, and Catius, and the several discussions of Epicureanism contained in Cicero’s philosophical writings. In view of this interest, it is not surprising to find that an Epicurean school at Naples, under the leadership of Philodemus and Siro, established itself as one of the main intellectual centers of Italy during the last years of the Roman republic.
The existence of this Epicurean school at Naples is attested by a reference in Cicero, by a poem in the Vergilian Appendix, and pre-eminently by the discovery of a large library of Epicurean literature at Herculaneum. This library contains about 1800 papyrus rolls, among which are included not only many works of Epicurus and his early associates, but in addition the writings of Philodemus and other later Epicureans. In some of his less formal writings Philodemus refers to his colleague Siro, his pupils, and the discussions held at Naples and Herculaneum. A picture of the way in which the school was conducted may be gained from his work on educational methods. .
The dates of the school can only be approximated. There is no certain evidence for its existence after 40 B.c., though p. 2 the fact that the Epicurean library at Herculaneum was preserved until the eruption of Mt. Vesuvius in A.D. 79 may indicate that the Epicurean group at Naples did not entirely disappear under the early Empire. The existence of the school in the 40’s is attested by a reference in one of Philodemus’ works to the tyranny of Antony in Rome—a statement that would best apply to the year 44 B.c.*—and a poem in the Vergilian Appendix containing a reference to the small estate and possibly the death of Siro. This poem has been dated about the year 42. It is not likely that the school survived the accession of Augustus.
Notes to page 1: 1. Cf. Cicero Acad. Post. I.5; Tusc. Disp. IV.6-7; Ad Fam. XV.16.1; 19.2. 2. De Fin. II.119. 3. Catalepton 5. 4. Cf. A. Rostagni, Virgilto Minore, 176-177. 5. n Free Speech (ed. A. Olivieri). Cf. N. W. DeWitt, “Epicurean Contubernium,”” T’rans. Am. Philol. Assoc. LXVII (1936), 55-63; “ Organization and Procedure in Epicurean Groups,”’ Class. Philol. XXXI (1936), 205~ 6. , ‘
The date of the founding of the school is equally uncertain. Our only evidence comes from our meagre knowledge of the early life of Philodemus, who was probably the founder, as he was later the leader, of the school. Philodemus was born in Gadara in Syria; ὃ but he was probably of Greek parentage, and he received a thoroughly Greek education. He studied Epicureanism at Athens under Zeno of Sidon and Demetrius the Laconian and subsequently went to Italy. He may have arrived in Italy about the year 80 B.c., for his Rhetoric, addressed to a Roman, Gaius, and therefore perhaps written in Italy, was composed before the death of Zeno (soon after 78 B.C.). It is possible that Philodemus went to Italy even earlier, the only limitation being that he was still active as p. 3 late as 44 B.c. He probably built up a school gradually by attracting students from the sons of wealthy Romans and joining to himself other Epicurean teachers. Siro, the only other teacher in the school that we can name, appears to have been less important than Philodemus. Yet he was known to Cicero, and he was later famous as the teacher of Vergil and other Augustans.
Notes to page 2: 7. See H. Diels, “ Philodemos Uber die Gétter” (Abhandl. der K. Preuss. Akad. der Wiss. [1916], No. 7), 99-100; R. Philippson, “ Zur Epikureischen Gotterlehre,” Hermes VLIII (1918), 381-384. Antony is also mentioned in Philodemus On Music, in a context which suggests his first meeting with Cleopatra, and may therefore belong to the year 41 B.c. See Philodemus ᾽ On Music (ed. van Krevelen), 66, 69. Τ Catalepton 8; cf. Τ. Birt, Jugendverse und Heimatpoesie Vergils, 86; Τ. Frank, Vergil, 48, 95. 8. Strabo XVI.2.29 (C. 759). The most recent discussion of Philodemus’ life and works may be found in Pauly-Wissowa-Kroll, R.E. s.v. “Philodemus,”” XIX.2444-2482 (Philippson). 9. Philod. Rhetoric (ed. S. Sudhaus), Suppl., 44-45; cf. H. Hubbell, “ The Rhetorica of Philodemus,” Trans. Conn. Acad. of Arts and Sciences XXIII (1920), 259.
Under Philodemus and Siro the school had an eventful history during its comparatively short existence. Situated on the bay of Naples, the recreation center of many wealthy Roman families, it had contacts with some of the most famous figures of the time. One of its earliest and most enduring contacts was with Lucius Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus, the father-in-law of Caesar. One of Philodemus’ works on politics 15 addressed to Piso, and in the Greek Anthology is preserved an epigram which Philodemus wrote inviting Piso to a dinner at the school and promising him good company, if not much . food.’> The friendship of Philodemus and Piso was defamed by Cicero in his bitter speech against Piso (delivered in 55 B.C.); for Cicero attempted to disgrace Piso by associating his name with Epicureanism.” Accordingly he represented Philodemus as a clever, but unprincipled, parasite who played up to the worse 5166 of Piso’s character. Cicero’s portrayal, however, occurring in an invective against Piso, must be discounted in view of the evidence from more reliable sources. That Philodemus was, or wished to be, under the patronage of Piso, is certainly true and is only in keeping with the social position of philosophers and educators of that period; that he was an unscrupulous parasite is inconsistent both with his work as a leader in the school at Naples and the genuine interest in philosophy shown in many of his writings. In his defense we p. 4 may further point to the respect with which he is elsewhere mentioned by Cicero and Asconius.’ The defamation must therefore be discounted as mere rhetoric intended to arouse invidia against Piso by attributing to him the moral degradation that even then in common opinion was associated with the name of Epicureanism.
Notes to page 3: 10. Cf. W. Cronert, Kolotes und Menedemos, 125-127. 11. On the Good King According to Homer (ed. Olivieri), p. 66. 12. Anth. Pal. XI.44. 13. Cic. In Pisonem 68-72. 14. Cf. W. Allen, Jr. and P. De Lacy, “The Patrons of Philodemus,” Class. Philol. XXXIV (1939), 59-65.
Through his friendship with Piso Philodemus may have known Caesar and his associates. There is no proof of a relation between Philodemus and Caesar, but it is possible that Philodemus accompanied Piso on a mission to Caesar in Gaul in 55, and perhaps the Epicurean tendencies in Pansa, Cassius, and other contemporary political igures, were derived from the school at Naples. Philodemus’ casual mention of Antony, which suggests his intimacy with political circles, might be taken to corroborate this conjecture.’
Somewhat more tangible is the evidence linking Philodemus
and Siro to Cicero and Torquatus. In the second book of the De Finibus, whose dramatic date 15 50 B.C., the two Epicureans are mentioned as familiares of the two Romans. This passage suggests, furthermore, that Cicero and Torquatus would not hesitate to consult Philodemus and Siro on any difficult points in Epicurean doctrine. A further connection between Cicero and the school at Naples may be seen in the fact that part of the Epicurean exposition in Cicero’s De Natura Deorum is almost exactly parallel to a passage in Philodemus’ On Pirety. Either both used a common source, or, as is more likely, Cicero took his passage from Philodemus.’ There are 1 addition other passages in Cicero’s works which do not p. 5 Tae LiFE AND WORKS OF PHILODEMUS S mention Philodemus by name but could easily refer to him and his school. Likewise a passage from Philodemus mentioning a governor of Cilicia has been taken to refer to Cicero. Unfortunately there is no known evidence of any relation between Philodemus and Cicero’s friend Atticus.
Notes to page 4: 15. Cic. De Fin. II.119; Asconius Scholia ad In Pisonem (ed. Stangl), p. 20. 16. The Roman Epicureans of the period included such figures as Atticus, L. Papirius Paetus, Vibius Pansa, Cassius Longinus, Trebatius; see Cic. Ad Fam. VII.12.1; IX.25.2; XV.19.1-3; Plutarch Caesar 66, Brutus 37, 39. Cf. R.E. “Philodemus,’’ 2447; Τ. Frank, Vergil, 51. 17. Meth. of Inf. Col. II.17. 18. De Fin. II.119; cf. Ad Fam. VII.11.2. : 19. Cf. R. Philippson, “Die Quelle der Epikureischen Gotterlehre in Ciceros erstem Buche De Natiura Deorum,” Symbolae Osloenses XIX (1939), 15-40.
The Gaius to whom Philodemus dedicated his Rhetoric was probably a member of a prominent Roman family; and he must have been a pupil or patron of Philodemus. Gaius Memmius may be the person concerned; for from Cicero we know that Memmius was connected with the Epicureans in his youth, and it was to him that Lucretius dedicated the De Rerum Natura. Another possibility is Gaius Calpurnius Piso Frugi, a relative of Lucius Piso, Philodemus’ later patron. Attempts have been made to show that Lucretius belonged to Philodemus’ school; . but as yet no conclusive evidence has appeared. The school at Naples, to judge from the extant remains, was not much interested in physics, and it was definitely opposed to philosophic poetry. Lucretius’ poem, on the other hand, dealing primarily with physics, is based on Epicurus’ own works and shows no indisputable trace of later Epicureanism. It is therefore unsafe to assume any specific connection between Philodemus and Lucretius.
Besides being a philosopher, Philodemus was a writer of occasional poems and epigrams; and as a poet he exerted his influence in yet another phase of Roman life. One of his epigrams was imitated by Catullus, who also had dealings with the circles of Memmius and Piso. There may even have been some personal contact between Philodemus and p. 6 Catullus. Much more important, however, 15 the influence of Philodemus and Siro on Vergil, who studied at the school of Naples in his youth.?” The Vergilian Appendix shows pronounced Epicurean tendencies, and even mentions Siro by name. The period of Vergil’’s membership in the school fell between 50 and 42 B.cC.
Notes to page 5: 20. E.g.De Fin.1.31, 65. Cf. also Δ. Rostagni, ‘ Risonanze dell’ Estetica di Filodemo in Cicerone,’”’ Atene e Roma 111 (1922), 28-44. 21. Cf. Diels, op. cit., 99. 22. Rhetoric I.222-223. 23. Ad Fam. XIII.1.2. 24. Cf. Philippson, R.E., ‘Philodemus,’’ 24435. 25. E.g. Guido della Valle, “L’Amore in Pompeii e nel Poema di Lucrezio,” Atene e Roma XXXIIX (1937), 139-175. 26. Catullus 13 imitates Anth. Pal. XI.44; cf. T. Frank, Catullus and Horace, 29, 83-84.
Among other students of Philodemus and Siro who later belonged to Augustan literary circles were L. Varius Rufus and Quintilius Varus, both closely associated with Vergil.2? It iis also possible that Horace studied at Naples; for one of the papyrus fragments from Herculaneum contains a name that may be restored to read Horatius. VYet the fragment
᾿ more probably refers to Plotius Tucca, another of Vergil’s companions. An attempt has been made to show that Horace’s Ars Poetica was derived from Philodemus’ discussions of literary criticism. This hypothesis is not very attrac-
tive, however, since the views of Horace on literary criticism
are just the reverse of Philodemus’, and it would therefore
be necessary to assume that Horace based his work on views p. 7 our evidence, that the Epicurean school at Naples was an extremely important factor in Italy in the first century B.cC. Philodemus and Siro were linked in one way or another with many of the leading figures of the period. Our next consideration is the literary and philosophical activity of Philodemus.
Notes to page 6: 27. that Philodemus could have presented only to refute. However that may be, it is certain that Horace came under the influence of Philodemus; for several of his poems imitate Philodemus, and once he even mentions Philodemus by name.3 Thus it 15 apparent, in spite of the uncertainty of much of 28. See Probus’ Life of Vergil and Servius on Vergil’s Aeneid VI.264 and Eclogue VI.13. ΄ 29. Cf. Catalepton 5,8; Ciris 1-8; Culex 58-97. 30. See A. Korte, ‘“ Augusteer bei Philodem,” Rhein. Mus. xLv (1890), 172-177; Crénert, Kol., 127. 31. Cf. A. Rostagni’s edition of Horace Ars Poetica, xxvii—xxix. 32. t Cf. Probus’ Life of Vergil; Frank, Vergil, 52, 140; N. W. DeWitt, Vairgil’s Brographia Litteraria, 36—46. 33. Rostagni, op. cit., xxxiv—xxxv, Ixxxili—xciv, cviii—cxii. 34. Horace Sat. I.2.121; cf. , Philippson, ‘“Horaz’s Verhiltnis zur Philosophie,’” Festschr. des Kaiser Wilhelms Gymn.; G. L. Hendrickson, “An Epigram of Philodemus and Two Latin Congeners,” Am. Journ. Phlol. XXXIX (1918), 27-43; Ε. A. Wright, “Horace and Philodemus,” ihd., XXLII (1921), 168-169; Frank, Catullus and Horace, 260.
Besides the few short poems of Philodemus preserved in the Palatine Anthology, we now know of a large number of prose works that have been preserved more or less fragmentarily in the Herculanean Papyri. Many of the papyri have not yet been satisfactorily deciphered and published; yet those that have been made available provide a basis sufficient for understanding the general character of Philodemus’ work. One remarkable feature of his literary activity is the wide range of subjects that he treated. He wrote an extensive work on the history of philosophy which Diogenes Laertius used and of which we have fragments dealing with the Pre-Socratics, Academy, and Stoa. Closely related to this work are his biographies of Epicurus, Philonides, and Socrates. The most numerous of his works are diatribes in the field of practical ethics, including such titles as On Wealth, On Household Management, On Anger, On Flattery, On Vices. The work On Anger also involved a certain amount of psychology, as did the work On Death. In the field of religion Philodemus wrote On Piety and On the Gods. Politics is the main subject of his On the Good King According to Homer and his On the Stoics. In the field of aesthetics and literary criticism we may mention his works On Poems, On Music, and On Rhetoric. Finally, he wrote several logical works, the most important of which 15 the treatise On Methods of Inference.’”
The philosophical works tend to be very polemical. In fact it was an established tradition among Epicureans to p. 8 devote much of their time to the refutation of the philosophers of other schools; and we find as early as the third century before Christ that the Epicurean Colotes undertook to prove systematically that every philosopher was wrong except Epicurus. This constant emphasis on refuting opponents sometimes gives to Epicurean works a rather unpleasant tone; yet it must be recognized that for the most part the Epicureans were very fair in their presentation of opposing points of view. Though they sometimes despised and ridiculed their opponents, they did not ignore opposition; and by their careful study and refutation of opposing views they were able to give a clearer and more precise expression to their own beliefs.
Notes to page 7: 35. Collected and edited by G. Kaibel, Greifswald, 1885. % Diog. Laer. X.3; cf. Cronert, Kol., 75-81, 127-133. 36. The ascription of this work to Philodemus has been questioned by Philippson. 37. ” The more important editions of Philodemus’ works are listed in the bibliography. ΄ ,
Philodemus’ principal opponents were the Stoics and Peripatetics. In some cases it is not clear whether he read his opponents’ works himself, or knew them only through earlier Epicurean sources. In the work On Methods of Inference, for example, he gives the Stoic position as stated by Bromius, Demetrius the Laconian, and Zeno of Sidon—all of whom were Epicureans. It is probable that much of the significant material in Philodemus’ works was taken from his teacher Zeno, and that Philodemus made compilations of Zeno’s teachings for the use of his students in the school at Naples. Yet Philodemus was not merely a slavish copyist; his first-hand knowledge of other systems of philosophy is attested by the presence of several Stoic volumes in the library at Herculaneum, and all of his works reveal characteristic touches of his own. In any case, even it Philodemus is primarily only a transmitter, he has preserved for us a large amount of valuable material, in regard to both the Epicureans and their opponents.
Philodemus shared with other Epicureans a marked dis- p. 9 regard for literary style. In ancient times the Epicureans had a reputation for carelessness in their writing, and modern editors of Philodemus have bitterly complained of this same fault. Yet there is a certain justification for his plain and unadorned prose. He purposely avoided a rhetorical style because he believed that an elaboration of language obscures the thought; and he wished above all else to be clear and unambiguous. When allowances have been made for the mechanical difficulties attendant on the deciphering and restoring of the papyrus fragments, his writings appear on the whole to express his thought in a clear and straightforward way, and often with slight touches of humor.%
Notes to page 8: 38. See Plutarch Adversus Coloten 1 (1107 E). 39. See Τ. L. Stocks, “Philodemus,” in New Chapters in the History of Greek Laterature, 22-23. 40. See Ε, Bahnsch, Des Epicureers Philodemus Schrift, ἹΠερὶ Σημείων καὶ Σημειώσεων, 5; R. Philippson, De Philodemi Libro qui est Περὶ Σημείων, 7. 41. E.g. Chrysippus’ Logic; cf. W. Crénert, “Die Λογικὰ Ζητήματα des Chrysippos,” Hermes xxxvi (1901), 548-579.
Notes to page 9: 42. (Cf. Cic. De Fin. I.14; Tusc. Disp. II.7-8; Dionysius of Halicarnassus De Compositione Verborum 24.188. : 43. Cf. C. Jensen, ‘“ Ariston von Keos bei Philodem,” Hermes XLVI (1911), 44. ; Hubbell, “The Rhetorica of Philod.,” 260; Philippson, De Philodem1 Lzbro, 5-6. 45. See below, 151-152. 46. Philodemus’ style is defended by Sudhaus, Rhetoric, Suppl., vi; cf. R.E., ‘“Philodemus,’”’ 2476.
Chapter II: Introduction to Philodemus’ On Methods of Inference
Section titled “Chapter II: Introduction to Philodemus’ On Methods of Inference”p. 10 Philodemus’ treatise On Methods of Inference is one of the better preserved Herculanean papyri. Thirty-nine columns of continuous text have been restored with remarkably few lacunae. In addition there are eight short fragments whose place in the work as a whole has not been determined. The original length of the treatise is unknown, since the extant portion begins abruptly and ends with an indication that there is more to follow. The preserved copy, No. 1065 of the Herculanean library, was probably written during the lifetime of Philodemus.
The Greek text was published by T. Gomperz in 1865, and subsequently improved in many passages by R. Philippson. It has been the subject of two German dissertations, and it has received passing notice in a few works of a more general nature. On the whole, however, it has remained practically unknown, especially in America.
The exact Greek title of this treatise is a matter of considerable doubt. According to W. Scott, the title in the Oxford facsimile of the papyrus, made about 1810, reads:
Φ.ΛΟΔΗΜΟΥ ΠΕΡΙ || ΦΑ..Ν…Ν Ι..CΗ..ΙΩCΕΩΝ
John Hayter, who brought the facsimile to Oxford, read the title as Περὶ Φαινομένων Σημειώσεων, which he translated Upon Apparent Indications. Scott restored it as Περὶ Φαινομένων καὶ Σημειώσεων, On Appearances and Inferences from Signs. Gomp. 11perz, however, in his 1865 edition, used the title Περὶ Σημείων καὶ Σημειώσεων. He did not defend this reading, but probably he based it on the extensive discussion of signs (σημεῖα) in the text. Philippson, following the Oxford reading, has suggested Περὶ Φα[ντ]α[σιῶ]ν κ[αὶ] Ση[με]ιώσεων. As a result of this disagreement it has become customary to use the convenient but admittedly incomplete title, Περὶ Σημειώσεων.
The subject matter of the main body of the preserved text is very fittingly entitled Περὶ Σημειώσεων, for it deals with the controversy between the Stoics and Epicureans regarding methods of inference by signs. The fragments, however, suggest that the work also contained other material. They include references to Epicurean empirical epistemology, a theory of perception, the methods of direct and indirect verification of propositions about unperceived objects, and the familiar division of things into present appearances, future objects, and naturally unperceived objects. Thus they indicate that the treatise contained a general discussion of Epicurean “Canonic,” prefatory to the more specialized discussion of inference. It is probable, therefore, that Philodemus wrote this work as an organon, including a theory of perception, an epistemological theory, and an elaboration of an empirical method. The restoration of Φαινομένων, “appearances,” or Φαντασιῶν, “perceptions,” to the title would serve to cover the more extended subject matter indicated by the fragments. However, inasmuch as the MS reading is uncertain, we have retained the accepted title Περὶ Σημειώσεων.
The date of composition can be determined only approximately, by a reference in the text to the pygmies which Antony had recently brought back from Syria, or Hyria. The name of the place is uncertain, and may be read either way. Philippson, reading Syria, argues that the reference p. 12 here is to Antony’s return from Syria to Rome in 54 B.C., after his journey to that province as magister equitum under Gabinius in 57. Philippson, therefore, would date this treatise in the year 54. H. M. Last disagrees with Philippson, pointing out that Antony was not magister, but only praefectus equitum under Gabinius, and that he did not return to Rome in 54 B.C. He also claims that in 54 Antony would not have been sufficiently famous to justify the casual way in which Philodemus refers to him. Last maintains that if the reference is really to Antony’s departure from Syria it must refer to his later visit to Syria in 42 B.C., and his return in 40. The date of this treatise, then, would be 40 or shortly thereafter, as Bahnsch had originally suggested. Last raised a further point, moreover, in arguing that it is not likely that pygmies would come from Syria; they would much more probably come from Egypt. He suggests that the true reading of the passage may be not Syria, but Hyria, a town in southern Italy near Brundisium. In 40 B.C. Antony won a cavalry skirmish near this town, and he may have captured some pygmy deliciae at that time. To Last’s arguments Philippson replies that pygmies could very well come from Syria, since Suetonius mentions Syrian dwarfs possessed by Augustus. Philippson also points out that Antony, being one of Caesar’s party, and hence politically allied with Piso, might very easily have been known to Piso’s friend Philodemus as early as 54. He considers the reading Hyria very improbable. His conclusion is that there is no decisive argument against the earlier date.
Since there is no conclusive evidence, it is impossible to fix the date of the work with any exactness. The two possible dates are 54 B.C. or 40 B.C., the two years in which Antony returned to Italy from Syria. The earlier date seems more p. 13 probable, since it fits in with our other information about Philodemus’ life. We are quite sure that Philodemus was writing in Italy between 70 and 44 B.C.; but in the absence of any references to him thereafter we hesitate to say that he was still active in 40.
Philodemus seems to have written the work On Methods of Inference as a source book. The extant portion contains at least four different discussions of empirical inference, the first from Zeno, the second from Bromius, the third and perhaps the fourth from Demetrius. These four discussions, of course, overlap; and where they treat the same subject they are not always consistent with one another. So far as we know, Philodemus nowhere tries to give the final word in the controversy; he merely reports to his readers the views of the leading Epicureans on the problem of empirical inference. The statements of the Stoic position are also taken from the same Epicurean sources.
The preserved section of the work On Methods of Inference defends the Epicurean system of empirical inference against the attacks of the Stoics. The Stoics hold that sign relations are a priori and rational, whereas the Epicurean view is that signs are based entirely on sense perception. According to Philodemus, the only process of inference through signs which the Stoics accept as valid is the method of contraposition. The rational character of this method is revealed in the Stoic distinction between the common sign and the particular sign. The common sign exists whether the unperceived object which it signifies exists or not; hence it is not a reliable basis of inference. The particular sign, on the other hand, exists only when the unperceived object exists, in such a way that if the existence of the object signified is denied, the existence of the sign must be also. Thus particular signs, which provide the only reliable grounds for inference, are established through the purely formal test of contraposition.
The Epicurean position, on the other hand, is that the relation between sign and thing signified is learned only from perception, through the method of induction or analogy. Unless a constant connection between objects has first been established by perception, the Stoic test of contraposition is not possible. According to the Epicurean method we infer the nature of unperceived objects by analogy with the objects in our own experience. The Epicureans agree with the Stoics in rejecting inference from common signs; yet they differ in saying that particular signs-–i.e., signs that cannot exist if the unperceived objects which they signify do not exist–do not have a logically necessary connection with the objects that they signify. In place of logical necessity the Epicureans use inconceivability as a criterion of the particular sign. An inference from signs is valid if it is inconceivable that the sign exists when the thing signified does not. Inference based on inconceivability, according to the Epicureans, is as valid as inference based on contraposition. But inconceivability is an empirical criterion, based on past experience; hence inference from particular signs may be empirically derived.
This brief statement indicates the basic difference between Stoics and Epicureans in respect to inference from signs. The rest of the treatise On Methods of Inference amplifies the positions of the two schools. Because of the repetitions in the work, it seems desirable here to give an outline of its subject matter. Of the four sections which compose the extant portion of the treatise, the first two consist of lists of Stoic arguments which attack empirical inference, along with the Epicurean answers to these arguments. Of the first section, which was taken from Zeno, the two opening Stoic arguments are lost, but the Epicurean answers to them, which have been preserved, show that they both dealt with the formal requirements of valid inference. In answering them Philodemus claims that the method of analogy fulfills these formal requirements (XI.29–XII.36).
The third Stoic argument tried to refute analogy by adducing palpably invalid inferences, e.g., that since there are figs within our experience there must be figs beyond our experience (Ia). In reply Philodemus points out that some discrimination must be used in the construction of analogical inferences (XII.36–XIV.2).
Next comes the argument from particular signs (mentioned above), after which Philodemus takes up the problem of unique cases. The Stoics argue that the method of analogy is made invalid by the existence of unique cases within our experience. These unique cases, they say, destroy the uniformity of experience; and since it is possible that objects beyond our experience may also be unique, we are not justified in supposing that what is true in our experience is true everywhere (1.19-II.25). To this argument the Epicureans reply that the unique cases mentioned by the Stoics do not destroy analogy, but rather support it. Differences are as important as similarities for inference, as long as the differences are uniform (XIV.28–XVI.4)
Philodemus next gives the Stoic argument that contraposition is the only method of inference that is formally valid (II.25–IV.37). The Epicureans contend in opposition that arguments by contraposition are valid only in so far as they are supported by analogy. All formal principles are empirically derived (XVI.4–XVII.28).
The Stoics claim that Epicurean physics is inconsistent with empirical method. The qualities that the Epicureans assign to atoms are not the same as the qualities of objects in our experience (IV.37–V.7). The Epicureans defend their atomism by an empirical distinction between primary and secondary qualities (XVII.28–XVIII.17).
The Stoics ask on what grounds some similarities are accepted and used in empirical inferences, while others are rejected (V.8–36). The Epicureans reply that inference must be made only between objects that are closely related and as similar as possible (XVIII.17–XIX.4).
Two Stoic arguments are presented but not answered in the first section. First, the Stoics raise the dilemma: Empirical inference cannot be established between identical objects, for if objects are identical there is nothing to infer; yet inference cannot be made between objects that are merely similar, for the difference present might be such as to destroy the inference (V.37–VI.36). Second, they argue that induction is incomplete. It is impossible to examine all appearances, and it is inadequate to examine only some (VI.36–VII.5).
Philodemus next mentions and answers two sophistic arguments of the Stoic Dionysius: The Epicureans use the word “analogy” ambiguously; and unless the Epicureans can show that they conform to things in experience, we shall deny by contraposition that the Epicureans exist (VII.5–38).
Dionysius also maintains that it is impossible to be sure that there is no evidence to the contrary, since it is impossible to examine all possible cases (VII.38–VIII.15). The Epicurean reply is that an inference is sufficiently verified if it is found valid in a large number of cases (VIII.16–IX.8).
Finally, Dionysius points out that by analogical inference the sun should be considered very large; to which the Epicureans reply that the sun is unique and therefore not subject to analogy (IX.8–XI.8).
The second section, beginning with Col. XIx.4, gives Bromius’ enumeration and refutation of the Stoic arguments against analogy. Bromius was following the teachings of Zeno, and some of his arguments are very similar to previous ones in the first section.
First, the Stoics say that it is impossible to exhaust all appearances (XIX.12–19); to which Bromius replies that it is sufficient to examine many homogeneous and varied appearances (XX.31–XXI.16).
Second, the Stoics point to the wide variations within our experience, and ask whether the unperceived objects may not vary still more, in which case empirical inference will be destroyed (XIX.19–25). The Epicureans respond that there is always a limit to variations, and that this limit holds universally. By observing the limits of variation we come to know empirically the necessary and essential qualities of objects. At the same time we do not ignore the variation and relativity within our experience (XXI.16–XXII.2).
Third, the Stoics argue that neither identical objects nor the merely similar provide a basis for empirical inference (XIX.25–36). If the sign and thing signified are identical, there is no occasion for inference; if only similar, the difference present may vitiate the inference. Bromius’ reply is that under certain specified conditions inferences can be made from both identical and similar objects (XXII.2–28).
The fourth Stoic argument on Bromius’ list is that all inference, in order to be formally valid, must be analytic (XIX.36–XX.4). Bromius counters by asserting that empirical inferences do not presuppose their conclusions (XXII.28–XXIII.7).
The existence of peculiarities provides the fifth subject of controversy. The Stoics hold that the peculiarities of objects invalidate analogical inference (XX.4–10). Bromius claims that it is possible to find common qualities underlying individual differences; and these basic similarities provide a basis for inference (XXIII.7–XXIV.10).
To the Stoic argument from unique cases, mentioned in the sixth place (XX.10–11), Bromius again states that the differences among objects outside our experience must be analogous to the differences found within our experience (XXIV.10–XXV.23).
Very close to the preceding is the argument from variations, e.g., in digestion (XX.11–21). The relativity found in experience invalidates empirical inference. Bromius replies that there are certain constants in experience which provide a sound basis for inference (XXV.24–XXVII.9).
Finally, the Stoics argue that Epicurean metaphysics is not consistent with empirical inference, for it assumes that unperceived objects, e.g., gods and atoms, are not like the perceived (XX.21–30). Bromius’ answer is in XXVIL10-28. This concludes the section taken from Bromius.
In the short transitional paragraph that follows (XXVII.28–XXVIII.14), Philodemus states that he will now set forth the fundamental and pervasive errors of the Stoic arguments against empirical inference. He gives two accounts of these fundamental errors. The first, taken from a work of Demetrius, forms the third section of the treatise. The errors are as follows:
- The Stoics do not recognize inconceivability as a criterion of inference distinct from contraposition (XXVIII.15–25).
- They fail to recognize that not any chance similarity is used for inference (XXVIII.25–29).
- They do not recognize that even the variations and unique objects in experience are revealed by appearances, and support analogical inference (XXVIII.29–37).
- They do not recognize the empirical tests of inference (XXVIII.37–XXIX.4) .
- They do not recognize the possibility of establishing empirically the nature of things as such (XXIX.4–15).
The second account of the basic Stoic errors is apparently taken from the oral discussions of some Epicurean teacher. His name has been lost, but Philippson suggests it may again be Demetrius. This second account is much more detailed than the first, and it forms the fourth and last section of Philodemus’ treatise. The errors are these:
- The arguments that the Stoics use to refute analogy are themselves analogical arguments, e.g., if there are variations within our experience, there are variations beyond our experience (XXIX.24–XXX.15).
- The Stoics ignore the empirical tests of inductive inference (XXX.15–33).
- In rejecting analogy the Stoics make the unperceived unknowable, for there is no other method (XXX.33–XXXI.36).
- Contraposition can be reduced to analogy, but not vice versa (XXXI.36–XXXII.8).
- Although there are three kinds of signs, there is only one method of analogy (XXXII.8–13).
- The Stoics ignore the social basis of analogical inference (XXXII.13–31).
- They disregard the criterion of inconceivability, which is more basic than contraposition (XXXII.31–XXXIII.9).
- They do not appreciate the empirical basis of cosmology (XXXIII.9–20).
- They have not analyzed the four meanings of the terms “according as,” “in so far as” (XXXIII.21–XXXVI.7).
- They overlook the condition that there must be no evidence to the contrary, and they fail to discriminate antecedent from generic signs (XXXVI.7–24).
- They use the term” “Sign” ambiguously (XXXVI.24–XXXVII.1).
- They do not realize that there are two types of consequence, only one of which can be tested by contraposition (XXXVII.1–XXXVIII.8).
- They base their views on false opinions (XXXVIII.8–22).
The work closes with a proposal to discuss medical empiricism (XXXVIII.22–32).
The fragments of the On Methods of Inference are closely related to the subject matter of the longer text, but they are written from a more general point of view. They include problems of epistemology as well as logical inference. Hence we may suppose that they were part of a more general discussion of the Epicurean position.” Among the topics mentioned are the four empirical criteria of truth: perception, anticipation, mental perception, and feeling. Mental perception is defended, and its use in reference to knowledge of the gods is indicated. There are also general remarks on the possibility of knowledge beyond immediate experience and on the various uses of signs. Finally, the distinction is made between things temporally unperceived and things naturally unperceived.
The first critical edition of the Greek text of this papyrus was made by Gomperz in 1865. Gomperz did not see the papyrus itself, but based his text on the Oxford and Naples copies. Philippson’s restorations, also, are based on these copies, though Philippson received readings of a few passages in the papyrus through W. Crönert and D. Bassi. The present editors hope that some day they may have the opportunity of examining the papyrus, but at the present time such a project is hardly feasible. Through the courtesy of the Bodleian Library we have been able to secure photostats of the Oxford copy, which is by far the better of the two copies. These photostats reveal traces of many letters which were bracketed by Gomperz and Philippson. These letters have accordingly been removed from the brackets. In the critical notes are indicated all departures from the text of Gomperz, with the exception of those changes which merely involve the position of brackets.
Because of the excellent preservation of this papyrus the restorations are for the most part reasonably certain. There are a few passages, however, such as Col. Ia, that have been restored, not with any claim to complete accuracy, but merely as an indication of the probable course of the argument. Such passages may be easily recognized by the extent of the bracketed portions in the Greek text.
Chapter III: Text and Translation
Section titled “Chapter III: Text and Translation”The Greek text, De Lacy’s notes to the translation, and the critical apparatus are omitted. They can be read on the scanned pages through the page links.
Section One: Zeno of Sidon’s Account (Cols. Ia–XIX)
Section titled “Section One: Zeno of Sidon’s Account (Cols. Ia–XIX)”The surviving text begins in the middle of a list of Stoic objections to Epicurean inference, as Zeno of Sidon reported them. The Epicurean replies begin at Col. XI.
…
p. 23 [Col. Ia] “Is it not true that by the method of analogy it is possible to say that since there are pomegranates and figs in our experience, they exist everywhere? Yet both are unperceived, and it is not necessary that because they exist in our experience they exist also in places that are not perceived. And is it necessary to infer about all other plants, in whatever places they may be, that if they do not exist in our experience, they do not exist elsewhere? On the contrary, a method which infers that since something does not exist in our experience it does not exist in unperceived places is not cogent.
“(The analogical inference of the Epicureans is invalid because it is based on common signs, not on particular signs.) [Col. I] We (Stoics) shall question elsewhere the validity of common signs; and indeed a sign is common for no other reason than that it can exist whether the unperceived p. 25 object exists or not.
We say that anyone who thinks that a certain man is good because he is rich is using an unsound and common sign, since some men who are rich prove to be bad and some good. Therefore if the particular and cogent sign cannot exist except along with the unperceived object which, we said, is by necessity connected with it, and of which it is the sign, it would never be possible to reveal that which is unperceived by means of the analogical method of inference.
“Furthermore, the synthesis of similars seems to conflict with unique cases. For the method of analogy does not seem to be cogent: If there is among the great variety of stones one kind of stone that draws iron, which is called the magnet or the Heraclean stone; and likewise if only amber is capable of attracting chaff; and if the square of four is the only square which has its perimeter equal to its area, how, then, can we p. 27 say that there is not some exceptional race of men who do not die when the heart has been pierced? Therefore, [Col. II] proceeding from the fact that men in our experience die when the heart has been pierced, we cannot conclude by necessity that all men do. There are also in our experience some exceptional things, as for example, the man in Alexandria half a cubit high, with a colossal head that could be beaten with a hammer, who used to be exhibited by the embalmers; the person in Epidaurus who was married as a maiden and then later became a man; and the person in Crete who was forty-eight cubits tall, according to those who examined the bones that were found; and further, the pygmies that they show in Acoris, who are quite analogous to those which Antony recently brought from Syria. If these examples are exceptions to all things with which we are familiar or if they are not similar to things in our experience, we can ask whether any one of the things about which we make our inferences (is not abnormal), because there are some things to which it does not conform. For certainly some things in this world deviate from the normal.
“Whenever we judge:
‘Since men in our experience are mortal, all men are,’
p. 29 the method of analogy will hold if we assume that men who are in unperceived places are similar to men in our experience in all respects, so that they will be similar also in respect to mortality; without this assumption it will not be valid. For if they are similar in all respects, we shall be correct in inferring that they are similar in respect to mortality. The correct form of the argument will be of this kind:
‘Since the men in our experience are mortal,
[Col. III] ‘If there are men in other places who are similar to men in our experience in all respects, including mortality, ‘They are mortal.’
This method of inference is identical with the method which we ourselves use. If we assume the similarity and say something like this:
‘Since the men in our experience are mortal,
‘If there are mortal men anywhere,
‘They are mortal,’
(the inference will be valid). But if we do not assume that those about whom we infer are similar also in being mortal, but do assume that those in unperceived places vary in this respect and differ from the men in our experience, the inference will not be necessary. Therefore it will not be necessary that p. 31 men in unperceived places also be mortal; they may be similar in all other respects to men in our experience but different in respect to mortality, and not in this respect like men in our experience. And generally, if one judge:
‘Since men in our experience are mortal,
‘If men exist anywhere,
‘They are mortal;’
and if this is equivalent to the following:
‘Since the men in our experience, in so far as and according
as they are men, are mortal,
‘Men everywhere are mortal,’
he will make a valid judgment. But if on the other hand the property of being mortal is an accident of men in our experience, and if one should judge:
[Col. IV] ‘Since men in our experience are mortal,
‘Men everywhere are mortal,’
his judgment will be invalid. For, by Zeus, not because men in our experience are short-lived shall we say that the Acrothoites also are short-lived. Therefore one must demonstrate that men, in so far as and according as they are men, are mortal, if we are going to establish the above-mentioned inference as logically necessary. Since we are able to demonstrate this by contraposition, we shall disregard the method of analogy; and if we use the method of analogy in making a p. 33 synthesis of signs, we shall fall again into the same error…
“And therefore we maintain that the analogical method of inference is not cogent; and on the whole if it is cogent, it must assume that unperceived objects are like those in our experience.”
“According to the method of analogy one ought to infer [Col. V] that since all bodies in our experience have color, and atoms are bodies, atoms have color; or since all bodies in our experience are destructible, and atoms are bodies, atoms must be admitted to be destructible.”
“From what kind of similarity to what other kind ought we to infer? From men to men, for instance? And why is it better to infer from men to men rather than from the animate to the animate? But ought we to infer from the animate to the animate? And why thus rather than from bodies to bodies? But again ought we to infer from bodies to bodies? p. 35 And why thus rather than from beings in general to beings?
… Shall we infer from the narrowest to the broadest (classes) of the same genus, or from those men most similar in bodies and souls to those of the same class? We shall not, therefore, use the analogical argument:
‘Since men in our experience are mortal,
‘Men in Libya are also mortal,’
in preference to the argument:
‘Since living creatures in our experience are mortal,
‘If there are any living creatures in Britain,
‘They are mortal.’
[Col. VI] “And when you try to apply these inferences to objects, shall we take identity as the basis of signification, or similarity, or what degree of resemblance? It is ridiculous to say identity. For why will the appearance be the sign of the unperceived rather than the reverse? No longer will the one be apparent and the other unperceived if there is identity. If we base the inference on similarity, how shall we be able to say that the unperceived object does not, by virtue of its distinct nature, differ from the apparent object from which we make the inference? …
p. 37 If we take things completely alike, no longer will the one be unperceived and the other apparent. But if in some cases, on the other hand, relying on a quality that happens to be present we infer some similarity and from that make an inference about the unperceived, even if the nature of a thing as such be grasped in the proper way, our argument is inconclusive. For the nature of a thing as such is established by rational inference. If we proceed by [Col. VII] similarity, an infinite regress will always result, since we do not perceive the nature of things as such; therefore the inference will be incomplete. But if we proceed by the method of contraposition we shall establish that it alone has certainty.”
Dionysius tries to refute by sophistry the answers which our school makes; for while we claim that the method of p. 39 analogy pervades completely the method of contraposition, and that the latter is confirmed by the former, he says that we err because of the ambiguity of the word, since we use the word “analogy” first of the common qualities of the apparent and the unperceived, and second, of the process of inference. Furthermore, he charges, in some cases we infer about objects by our own method of analogy, and sometimes by contraposition, so that we use both principles; and (he charges further) we consider that every appearance and notion is necessarily true and suppose that that which is called analogy in any sense is useful.
Again, when we Epicureans say that monstrous things are similar to something, Dionysius says: “Unless the Epicureans conform to things in our experience, we shall deny that the Epicureans exist, and deny it by contraposition.” But (we answer) it will be sufficient for us to base our belief on probability in these matters, just as we do in regard to what is learned from trial; for example, that we shall be safe sailing in summer, since we have had experience of favorable winds in that season. [Col. VIII] Dionysius says that the qualification is pointless, that p. 41 whenever nothing conflicts we ought to use the method of analogy.” For how will it be possible to establish that no appearance or previously demonstrated fact conflicts? If we make an inference, it is clear that we do so either through analogy or through contraposition. If we use analogy, the question will again be asked, how shall we establish that not one of the things previously mentioned conflicts with the inference? But if we infer by contraposition, we must not deny the validity of this method.
Yet if anyone uses the argument from analogy properly, he will not fail, and we consider that our statement is true even if we find the analogy only in a large number of cases. We shall continually say in behalf of this theory: If the method of analogy is not cogent, the method of contraposition is not cogent. The proposition:
“If there is motion, there is void,”
we do not establish in any other way than by the method of analogy, by proving that it is impossible for motion to take p. 43 place without void. Establishing by induction all the constant conditions for things that are moved within our experience, apart from which we see nothing moved, we judge by analogy that all objects that are moved are moved in every [Col. IX] case under these conditions; and by this method we infer that it is not possible for motion to exist without void. Therefore, if this method (i.e., analogy) does not have the force to prove this inference, neither does the method of contraposition, which is entirely confirmed by and through analogy; hence contraposition is not by itself cogent.
Inference according to partial similarity is in some cases just as valid as inference by the sign which is identical with the thing signified. Though objects in our experience indicate that the things in the universe are such as we see them, Dionysius thinks that the sun is much larger than it appears because of its distance from us. Indeed, other things that are seen at a distance appear to be smaller and to move slowly, but the sun has a contrary appearance and movement. Furthermore, all objects in our experience are observed to have less color when seen at a distance because the coloring appears p. 45 shadowy or hazy; but the sun has a very bright sphere, and it is not subject to the principle that for the most part distance naturally decreases size, and that distant objects are many times greater than they appear. Thus the sun differs from all the objects in our experience, just as the magnet differs from all other stones in being the only stone which draws iron.
[Col. X] In attacking our argument that the sun is as large as it appears, Dionysius uses an inference of this kind:
“All objects in our experience that reappear slowly from behind objects that eclipse them have this character either because they move slowly, or because they are very large.
“Since the sun reappears slowly, it must of necessity have one of these two characteristics.
“But it does not move slowly, since it completes the path from sunrise to sunset in twelve hours, passing through a very great distance;
“(Therefore, it must be very large).”
Surely he is not using the method of contraposition, nor is the statement that a thing appears changed to the spectator because of distance an argument for our opponent. Indeed his argument, which is itself derived from analogy with things in our experience, will likewise be overturned if the method of p. 47 analogy is not cogent? For he uses the analogical inference that things in our experience which are slow to reappear either move slowly or are very large. Why is it necessary that the sun reappear slowly because of these particular causes? Its motion is the result of another cause which is unique and different from things in our experience. For is it not true that while all other bodies in our experience having bright [Col. XI] colors admit of change of degree, the sun does not have this characteristic? Is it not also the case that whereas objects which reappear slowly in our experience can do so through the two causes mentioned, the sun will be able to produce this effect through another cause different from the causes in our experience?
Nor does the fact that the magnet is the only stone which draws iron prove that our method of inference is not cogent. Nor will it be overthrown through the refutation previously p. 49 brought forward by Dionysius. Not merely because he questions whether the method of analogy is cogent, will analogy be refuted as a method of inference. For to every part of his refutation it could be very fittingly said that the inference that he uses is according to the method of analogy rather than the method of contraposition. The method of inference which seems to be more cogent is not established in this way by those who confirm its cogency.
It happens, indeed, that his arguments are easily dissolved by anyone who examines them closely. The first two have the same force and are refuted in the following way. Granted that the proposition,
“If the first, then the second,”
is true whenever it is true that,
“If not the second, then not the first;”
it does not follow from this that only the method of [Col. XII] contraposition is cogent. The proposition,
“If not the second, then not the first,”
sometimes is proved true when the second may be denied by hypothesis and from the mere denial of it the first is also p. 51 denied, as in the proposition,
“If there is motion, there is void.”
For when void is denied by hypothesis, by the mere denial of it, motion will also be denied. Such an example, therefore, belongs to the class of contraposition. But sometimes the proposition is not proved in this way, but rather, when it is not possible to conceive that the first is or is of a certain character, and the second is not or is not of such character. For example,
“Plato is a man, and Socrates is a man.”
If this is true, it is true also that,
“If Socrates is not a man, neither is Plato a man,”
not because by the denial of Socrates, Plato is denied along with him, but because it is inconceivable for Socrates not to be a man and Plato to be a man. But this inference is derived from the method of analogy. Therefore, neither the first nor the second argument proves that the analogical method of inference is not cogent.
Nor does the third argument establish this, since Dionysius [Col. XIII] judges wrongly that the specific kinds of analogy are not valid. For the inference ought not to be made from any chance p. 53 common quality to any other, but from that quality which does not admit a spark to the contrary or exhibit even a breath in opposition to appearances. How is it similar to infer that since all men beheaded in our experience die and do not grow new heads, men decapitated everywhere will have this characteristic, and to infer from the existence of pomegranates or figs in our experience that these exist everywhere? Though men in our experience are necessarily like men in unperceived places, plants even in the same regions do not appear to correspond; but those of the same genus differ in odor, color, form, size, and other characteristics. Therefore, his argument does not prove that the method of analogy is not valid, but is itself weak and refuted by the facts. Nor is his argument based on an inductive inference from the similarity and difference in appearances unless one could say:
p. 55 [Col. XIV] “Since we see hairs plucked out and others growing back in the same places, we ask if eyes may not have this character, and since nails removed grow again, if heads might not do so.”
The argument based on the distinction between the common and particular sign is also inconclusive. It is not necessary to suppose that since the common sign exists whether the unperceived object exists or not, whereas the particular sign exists only when the unperceived object exists, and does not exist when the unperceived object is non-existent, for this reason every particular sign is an instance of the method of contraposition. Rather, we should say that if by the very negation of the non-apparent the appearance is denied, the inference must be made according to contraposition. But if there is another method according to which it is impossible for the one to exist and the other not to exist, — as for example, whenever it is inconceivable that the appearance exists or is such as it is and the unperceived object does not exist – such an argument is not by contraposition, but by analogy. According to analogy, it is not possible that the appearance be conceived to exist or to be such as it is and the unperceived object not exist or be such as it is – just as it is impossible to conceive that Epicurus is a man and Metrodorus not a man.
The argument from unique cases is also weak. No one of our school denies such peculiarities, and yet the method of p. 57 analogy does not become invalid because one class of stones draws iron. There is only one sun and one moon in our world; and there are a number of constant peculiarities in every class of objects; nor does any one class have the same [Col. XV] peculiarities as the other classes. If other stones were similar to or identical with the stones that draw iron, and some drew iron, and some did not, the method of analogy would be destroyed. Since this does not happen, but since among the many different varieties of stones the magnet has a certain peculiarity of a specific kind, and it shows from the outset its particular nature, in no way is the method of analogy shaken. And the fact that the square of four is the only square having its perimeter equal to its area does not hinder us from inferring by analogy; for all the square numbers tested by trial have shown that this distinction exists among them, so that one who denies it contradicts appearances. It is ridiculous that p. 59 anything inferred from appearance about the unperceived should contradict appearance. When appearance has once revealed a square number of this kind, one who infers from such numbers in our experience to those in the infinite universes will make a valid inference that every square of four has its perimeter equal to its area, on the ground that it is inconceivable for those in our experience to be of this nature [Col. XVI] and those elsewhere not of this nature.
Dionysius’ argument in regard to rare cases is also inconclusive, especially if he has invented outright falsehoods.
Nor does the argument next in order advance his case. Whenever we infer from the proposition,
“Men in our experience are mortal,”
to the proposition,
“Men everywhere are mortal,”
we do not presuppose that the men about whom we infer are like those in our experience in respect to mortality, nor that they are like them in all other ways but are different in respect to mortality; but from the fact that all men in our experience p. 61 are similar even in respect to mortality, we infer that all men universally are liable to death, since nothing opposes the inference or draws us a step toward the view that men do not admit of death. Appealing to this similarity we declare that in respect to mortality the men outside our experience are similar to those within our experience.
Moreover, Dionysius misunderstood the next argument also. When a person infers from men in our experience and concludes about men everywhere, that they are mortal – from the fact that men who lived in the past according to history and men that have fallen under our observation are all mortal, [Col. XVII] with no case drawing us to the contrary – he makes his inference according to analogy. And the argument that men in our experience as men are mortal, which is equivalent to the statement that men with this characteristic are men, is confirmed by this same analogical method. No philosopher who uses the method and procedure of contraposition provides such a confirmation. And we shall not say that the Acrothoites p. 63 are short-lived because men in our experience are short-lived. Perhaps those who dwell there do not all appear to be similar in respect to old age, for men in our experience are observed to differ much in longevity and brevity of life according to countries and places. Therefore it is not inadmissible that there are some people surpassing others in length of life. Furthermore, the length of life among us varies even more than among the Acrothoites.
Nor is the next argument a sound one. He does not know in what cases the analogical method is not appropriate, when we search out similarities by inductive inference in the proper way; for one ought not infer from any chance common qualities about any chance objects. The simple truth is that bodies in [Col. XVIII] our experience are destructible not as bodies, but in so far as they partake of a nature opposed to the corporeal and non-resistant. Similarly, bodies in our experience have color, p. 65 but not as bodies; for tangible objects in so far as they resist the touch are bodies, but in so far as they are tangible they reveal no color. Indeed, bodies in the dark have no color, yet still are bodies. Therefore, from these qualities we do not infer concerning all bodies; but from other similarities, such as lightness and heaviness, we shall not be prevented from making inferences, provided that we use the method of analogy properly.
Inferences should be made from objects that are most closely related and from those that are as similar as possible; and one should not use broad similarities, disregarding those qualities which correspond more closely. For example, the inference is best made from particular men to those especially similar to them, and from the class of men to the class of things which follows the whole class of men, nothing inclining us the slightest bit to the contrary; from animals of a certain species to those especially like them, and from a class to the classes close to it; and from a body of a certain kind to another of the same kind, and from the generic body to the generic; p. 67 from an entity of a certain nature to those especially like it, [Col. XIX] and from the generic entity, that which is a constant attribute of the greatest number of things, apart from which we are not able to conceive a common existence, to the generic.
Zeno, in his discussions with us, used to set forth the arguments of our opponents, and he made use of the answers that have been given.
Section Two: Bromius’ Report of Zeno (Cols. XIX–XXVIII)
Section titled “Section Two: Bromius’ Report of Zeno (Cols. XIX–XXVIII)”Bromius, however, used to say that Zeno expounded the beliefs of our opponents and the answers to them in the following way:
“How will one infer from appearances to the non-apparent? Is it by including all appearances or only some of them? If the former, the task is impossible; if the latter, no one could make a synthesis of signs when only a limited number of cases concur.
“If there are variations of atmosphere, food, and natural constitutions, why might there not be, besides, variations not related to our experience, which add other such differences?
“Will one make an inference from objects that exhibit an identical nature and power, or from those that are not identical, but have only similar powers and natures? The view p. 69 that a sign-relation is based on identical things is untenable, for they will differ only in number; inference from objects not identical will not be trustworthy because of the differences present.
“Again, either assuming the point about which you are inquiring, you will say:
[Col. XX] ‘Since all men are similar to men in our experience even in respect to mortality,
‘All men must be mortal;’
or omitting this assumption, you will not proceed according to the rules of the syllogism.
“And if the unperceived itself has certain peculiarities as compared with the apparent object, how can you rightly make an inference by associating similar accidental qualities with those which differ in some respect?”
Next Bromius presented the argument from unique cases and the argument that variations and differences weaken inferences by analogy. For example, from the fact that some people digest goats’ flesh more easily than other food which seems to be more digestible, our opponent says that objects have no fixed or consistent nature for us, and that there are differences even among similar objects.
“Is not the unperceived different from the apparent, and cannot the Stoics violently attack us on the ground that p. 71 although we observe living beings in our experience to be destructible, we say that the gods are indestructible; and although all things are created and destructible, we judge that the elements of all things are uncreated and indestructible?”
To the first of these arguments our answer (according to Bromius) is that it is not necessary to include all appearances in our experience, and we should not rely merely on chance appearances. We must consider many homogeneous and varied ones, so that from our experience of them and from the [Col. XXI] accounts of history concerning them we may take the inseparable constituent of each of them individually, and from these we may infer to all the others. For example, if men are found to differ in all other respects, but in one respect they have been observed to have no difference, why shall we not say confidently on the basis of the men that we have ourselves met with and those of whom we have historical knowledge, that all men are liable to old age and disease? When this has been established and there is no conflicting evidence, we shall say that they state a falsehood who say:
“Men were formerly invulnerable.”
To the second argument we shall say that the inference p. 73 would not be shaken by differences of constitutions, but that by using them for the investigation of the unperceived we confirm the apparent variations which first called our attention to this problem. And we shall ask, if need be, on what ground and from what starting-point a person raises an objection to anything whatsoever, or considers an investigation futile, if not from the principle that an object deprived of all similarity with appearance is inconceivable. Concerning atmosphere and differences of nature we shall make the same argument, not rejecting all difference. Let no one oppose us or be so stubborn as to question whether there are, beyond such [Col. XXII] differences, men with a nature of iron, who go through walls as we go through air.
To the third argument Bromius answers that sometimes we shall infer from identical objects, whenever there is a distinction in accompanying circumstances. When one object is apprehended from appearance and another is not apparent, we shall use the sign which is confirmed by the apparent. And sometimes we shall infer from non-identical objects, in so p. 75 far as they share the same community of similar attributes, as for example, that some attributes are peculiar to men alone, and some are common also to the gods. Thus we shall use successfully the inference from living beings, when we consider that nothing prevents god from being similar in body to man, since man alone of living beings in our experience is capable of thought. For god cannot be conceived apart from thought; and even though god was not born, yet he is composed of soul and body and with this nature he is necessarily a living creature.
To the fourth argument we answer that we do not need to presuppose the conclusion in our premiss, so as to say:
“Since men, in whatever places they are, are similar to men in our experience even in being mortal,
“All men must be mortal.”
Nor shall I anticipate the opposite of this statement; but by inductive inference from appearances I shall arrive at the [Col. XXIII] view that similarity must exist in respect to mortality. For since this attribute is common to all men in our experience, I shall judge in every case that it is an attribute of all men p. 77 everywhere, and confirm by induction that in this respect also there must be similarity.
To the next argument we answer that in so far as the things which are not apparent to the senses are different, he who infers well will attribute this difference to them, and in so far as they have qualities in common with appearances, he will not deprive them of these. According to this method I would be able, inferring from fires in our experience to fire in any other place whatever, to establish with certainty the universal nature of fire. For example, it is a property of fire, in so far as it is fire, that combustible materials are kindled by drought or friction or lightning; and this peculiarity, which is confirmed by objects and by the appearance of this variation, prevents fuels from admitting of other forms of combustion. Moreover, on the basis of appearances in our experience, one would say that the fuels of fires have different powers in respect to the length of time they burn, for some are of long and some of short duration. And the same fuels do not burn all in the same way in particular cases. Some fires are easily quenched, while others are not. Fires also exhibit p. 79 differences [Col. XXIV] in change of brightness and duration, according to the different fuels. Therefore, on the one hand, one who makes a correct induction will dismiss the differences of appearances in so far as they are peculiarities; and on the other hand he will retain the common qualities of appearances, without which it is not possible to conceive that anything has the nature of fire. The same argument holds in the case of other things.
In answer to the argument about unique cases we say that one who infers well has noted rightly both the common qualities and the peculiarities, and he will use substances, powers, qualities, attributes, dispositions, quantities, and numbers as the inference requires. In some cases he will dismiss many differences in things homogeneous, when the differences correspond to the differences within our experience, and in some cases he will dismiss very few. Inferring in this way he will judge that men everywhere are vulnerable and have this peculiarity along with other differences analogous to the variations in our experience. There will not, however, be a peculiarity of such a kind, that it will appear possible in any way that a man be invulnerable or that we see any finite object not bounded by another object. For from the very fact that in p. 81 all cases the same qualities are joined to these objects, the study of appearances has given confirmation to our argument. Likewise, no beast could be wise, since beasts are without [Col. XXV] reason.
Further, man is called man with the quality of being destructible, just as number is number with the quality of being composed of units. In general, the soul is a peculiar thing, different from every other object, and time also is like nothing else. Will anyone then make use of these unique objects in order to argue that when we infer about unperceived objects we should not base our inference on similarities, even though the unperceived objects possess an analogy with objects in our experience? Indeed, someone seeing the manifold variety of our experience will judge that this exists also among unperceived objects, both in regard to common qualities and also in regard to peculiarities, e.g., that eyes do not grow again, but hair always grows again. Taking the identical, then, or the similar, we make the appropriate inferences from similar and analogous cases by means of peculiar and common qualities.
We shall dispose of the next argument by saying that those p. 83 who infer badly are corrected by the facts in individual cases, with the qualification that those who make declarations about anything whatsoever sometimes affirm confidently a universal proposition, and sometimes use probability. Certainty and probability are both derived from the observation of appearances. For appearances have established that relativity is important in some cases, and yet in other cases there are constant similarities, as in the case of certain deadly poisons, [Col. XXVI] purgatives, and drugs with other powers. It is not at all surprising that, although there is great and manifold variation in foods and in the beings nourished by them, there can be a determinate limit to what men can eat. For this reason we shall not admit that there are men who eat hay, easily digest it, and are nourished. Some things (mentioned by our opponents) are fabricated according to opinion and are taken from false records of the past; and, besides, nothing is accomplished by such inventions. For anyone who misrepresents any common features of appearances will destroy the whole method of inference.
In respect to differences in p. 85 digestion we shall say that he who infers by signs makes his inference from appearances, using analogies of both peculiarities and common qualities; and one who establishes by this method that one thing follows from necessity on another makes a correct inference. One who relies on appearances will not question the fact that it is the nature of the moon to wax and to wane, and it is the nature of man to die. Therefore, not in every case should a thing be denied, even when many instances have occurred (that support a denial). Sometimes when you chance on one instance you say that a thing is of such and such a character, and often you use two cases and sometimes more, forming the analogy in accordance with the manifold nature of signs. [Col. XXVII] For this reason, no one affirms confidently that since a thing is similar to a food in odor, color, and taste, it is nourishing. For many objects that are different in certain hidden powers have been observed to be similar to appearances in color, taste, and other qualities; and in many cases the opposite is true.
When the Stoics accuse us (of inconsistency), we shall remember first that their arguments have no weight against p. 87 the probability of our doctrine, and secondly, that in stating our views we do not in any way contradict ourselves, if feelings and appearances have confirmed our statements. Indeed, the gods and the first elements of things appear to be indestructible and unborn, since this is a condition of their being such as they are, and since inductive inference from appearances has proved it. Living creatures that are nourished in our experience are living creatures in so far as they have shared in a certain kind of fleshy nature and have been born from those that have possessed similar substances, and with this characteristic they are living creatures.
These, Bromius said, are the arguments brought forward by those who attack the common view that appearances are the signs of the unperceived, and by those who reject the method of analogy. Perhaps the views of our opponents (as Bromius gives them) appear to be different from those previously discussed (by Zeno), and to have received a different refutation. Or perhaps we have set forth only some of the arguments, and these not very well arranged, for those who [Col. XXVIII] wish to make use of them. Zeno presented them more systematically (than Bromius) by putting the Stoic arguments either before or after their refutation. Possibly it would be no better if we expounded repeatedly the Stoic arguments in the way that we have given them above. We shall now follow p. 89 a systematic order of inquiries by setting forth the common errors which pervade all their arguments, so that we may have the errors clearly marked, even of the arguments that have been overlooked, and of those that may be devised hereafter.
Section Three: The Errors of the Stoics According to Demetrius (Cols. XXVIII–XXIX)
Section titled “Section Three: The Errors of the Stoics According to Demetrius (Cols. XXVIII–XXIX)”In the work of Demetrius the errors are stated very briefly:
It is said in this book that it is a pervasive error of the Stoics not to have taken into account the peculiarity of the method of contraposition — viz., when the unperceived is denied, by this very denial the appearance is also denied, – as compared with the method of analogy of appearance and unperceived, according to which it is not possible to conceive that the appearance exists or is such as it is and the unperceived does not exist or is not such as it is.
And it is a mistake not to have taken into account the fact that we think one ought not to infer from any chance similarity to any other whatsoever, but only from constant similarities.
It is an error not to observe that appearances themselves have shown that there are some kinds of stones and numbers and other such objects which have certain peculiar characteristics, and that these appearances conflict in no way with inference by analogy, but on the contrary strengthen it.
It is also an error not to have taken into account the fact that we do not infer indiscriminately from things in our [Col. XXIX] experience to the unknown, but from facts tested in every way and not exhibiting the slightest evidence to the contrary.
p. 91 Further, it is an error not to have discerned that the statement, “In so far as something is such and such,” – as for example, that man in so far as he is man is destructible, and smooth and round atoms, in so far as they are smooth and round, are creative of pleasure, and statements of this type, in general, – are not all tested by contraposition, but many of them are tested by analogy. For example,
“A man who has been beheaded, in so far as he has been beheaded, does not grow a head again” …
Section Four: The Errors of the Stoics According to Another Epicurean Teacher (Cols. XXIX–XXXVIII)
Section titled “Section Four: The Errors of the Stoics According to Another Epicurean Teacher (Cols. XXIX–XXXVIII)”He presented to us nearly the same arguments, but he treated everything in his discussion, from the highest to the lowest and most fundamental arguments. And first he said that those who use dialectical reasoning do not know that they are shamefully refuting themselves. For the arguments that they devise to refute the method of analogy contribute to its confirmation. For when they attack the statement, for example, that
“If living creatures in our experience are destructible, those in unknown places are also;”
and when in the course of their argument they object p. 93 that animate objects, though similar in kind, differ from each other [Col. XXX] according to atmospheric conditions, foods, and many other circumstances, they are using appearances in our experience as the basis for making judgments about similarities among the unperceived. And when they say that, since there are some unique cases in our experience, it would not be at all surprising if among the unperceived there is some nature which differs from things which we have met with, they appear to be making the inference from similars. It is the same in other cases, so that as a result they refute themselves.
Moreover, in correcting those who infer badly about the unperceived … they fall into error. If, indeed, anyone says that all men are white, starting from those in our experience, or black, starting from the Ethiopians, or that everywhere the straight indices of the sundial at noon have no shadow at the summer solstice, will not his argument be futile? We shall say that the one who infers thus fails because he has not gone p. 95 through all appearances well, and indeed that he is corrected by the appearances themselves.
Those who reject the method of inference by analogy make all unperceived objects unsignified. For there is no other [Col. XXXI] correct method of inference besides this. But even if the antecedent signs are sometimes similar and sometimes dissimilar, one who proceeds according to analogy necessarily admits the synthesis of signs, if indeed he is going to construct a proof, as we have established in the previous arguments. Those who say that the method of contraposition depends upon the method of analogy would say virtually the same thing as we do, but they leave the suspicion by their teaching that there are two methods of signification opposed to each other.
They agree with us that the sign and thing signified are denied along with each other and that when the unperceived is denied the sign is also, but since they seem to use contraposition as p. 97 well as the method of analogy, they are completely wrong.
Our opponents even by their own method make the unperceived unsignified to themselves. Indeed, when they agree that all men are vulnerable and liable to disease, old age, and death, and that there are no Centaurs or Pans, or anything else of such a nature, they do not confirm these statements in any other way than by the method of analogy. Therefore, if analogy is not a valid method, they will have no ground for these views.
They further ignore the fact that we say that not all things [Col. XXXII] are inferred by analogy when the antecedent sign is used, but only some things. Indeed, they ask in instances of contraposition what kind of similarity is present, just as if they would not be asked to explain even more in the opposite cases how inferences from similarities can be instances of contraposition.
Further, they ignore the fact that we say the method of analogy is only one method of inference, not three. And when we say that there are three kinds of signs, we do not base the distinction on their analogy alone.”
In addition, they ignore the fact that we collect not only the signs appearing to us or tested by our experience, but p. 99 also the appearances taken from observation by others. Do those who have never been there doubt that Crete and Sicily are islands? And therefore we say that the method of analogy is a sound method of inference, with this condition, that no other appearance or previously demonstrated fact conflicts with the inference. Bringing forward a few dissimilar cases that conflict with things examined by us, they have set them forth as if they were refuting the whole method.
The Stoics err also in so far as they say bluntly that the so-called hypothetical proposition is true whenever the first term is denied by contraposition along with the second, and [Col. XXXIII] that the particular sign is established whenever the appearance is denied by the denial of the unperceived. But we say that the best test of the hypothetical proposition and the particular sign is established whenever we are not able to conceive that the first exists and the second does not, and conversely. Moreover, our opponents do not confirm by any other method than this the inferences made by contraposition.
Again, they do not know that everyone who infers well about the unperceived objects that accompany appearances p. 101 observes carefully the manifold variety of appearances in order to be sure that there is no conflicting evidence. He considers it impossible that the nature of things and their generation from each other should be inconsistent with appearances. Thus he expounds the origin of the cosmos.
And further the Stoics err in so far as they have not taken the trouble to understand the right method of analogical inference. Whenever we say,
“Since things in our experience are of such a nature,
“Unperceived objects are also of this nature in so far as things in our experience are of this nature,”
we judge that there is a necessary connection between an unperceived object and the objects of our experience. For example,
“Since men in our experience as men are mortal,
“If there are men anywhere,
“They are mortal.”
There are four things that the words “as such,” “according as,” and “in so far as,” signify:
First, that this follows from necessity on that. This statement is equivalent to the statement that that is a condition for [Col. XXXIV] this, with the implication that this is necessarily a consequence of that. According to this meaning we say,
“Men as men are made of flesh and are subject to disease and old age.”
Second, there is also the meaning that this is the particular definition of that, i.e., this is the anticipation of that, as in the statement
p. 103 “Body as body has mass and resistance,”
and
“Man as man is a rational animal.”
Third, this is a property of that. According to this meaning, we may judge rightly that
“Man as man dies.”
Fourth, this results from that taken according to some attribute, as we say that
“Men in so far as they are unwise are most miserable,”
and
“A knife cuts in so far as it is sharp,”
and
“Atoms in so far as they are solid are indestructible,”
and
“A body according as it has weight falls downward.”
Necessary consequence is involved in all these four meanings, but the terminology is assigned according to the particular cases. We infer in each case according to the meaning which the argument requires. But those who attack the inference from analogy do not indicate the distinctions just mentioned, namely, how we are to take the “according as,” as in the statement, for example,
“Man as man is mortal.”
[Col. XXXV] Hence they say that if the “according as” is omitted, the argument will be inconclusive; if it is admitted, the method of p. 105 contraposition is used? But we Epicureans take this to be necessarily connected with that from the fact that this has been observed to be a property of that in all cases that we have come upon, and because we have observed many varied living creatures of the same genus who have differences in all other respects from each other, but who all share in certain common qualities (e.g., mortality). According to this method, we say that man according as and in so far as he is man is mortal, on the ground that we have examined systematically many diverse men, and have found no variation in respect to this characteristic and no evidence to the contrary.
Therefore the inference is made according to analogy both in these cases and in all the others in which we use the terms “as such” and “according as,” and where the peculiar relation between objects is indicated by the fact that one does not occur without the other, and one follows necessarily on the other. We do not use analogy in those cases where inference is made by a sign tested only by contraposition. Yet even in these latter cases the discovery that all instances have the same property confirms the inference. From the fact that p. 107 all moving objects in our experience have other differences, but a [Col. XXXVI] common condition that they move through empty space, we maintain in every case that this condition of motion prevails even in unperceived places. And in order to make the contraposition,
“If there is or has been no fire,
“There is no smoke,”
we contend that always in all cases smoke has been observed to be given off by fire.
Our opponents also err in so far as they do not observe the fact that we establish through appearances that there is no conflicting evidence. For it is not sufficient to admit the very slight swerves of the atoms because of chance and free will; but we must also prove that this swerve does not in any way conflict with any other appearance. And they should not ignore the difference between antecedent, generic, and specific signs, since the difference is great and varied. For then they would not think that they should use only those signs whose existence is denied if the unperceived object does not exist.
They go astray also because of equivocal expressions; for the word “sign” is used of an appearance about which an inference is established, as in the case of motion and the p. 109 plenum, and “sign” is also used of the inference by which we reason that this unperceived object accompanies this appearance. Attacking the disparity between the antecedent appearances and the unperceived objects concerning which the inferences are made (i.e., “sign” in the first sense), they reject [Col. XXXVII] the method of analogy (i.e., “sign” in the second sense), confusing the two meanings with each other.
Since all things are the products of elements or of things derived from elements, or are related to elements in some other way, there is a peculiar connection between appearances and the unperceived, so that appearances are judged to be denied by contraposition if the elements are not posited. By this principle the consequence of the unobserved on appearances is established. But since there is another relation of consequence, as for example, whenever there is a certain similarity or analogy among similar and analogous objects, we shall make use of consequences of this sort. As a consequence of the fact that bodies in our experience rebound, we judge that atoms are heavy and solid, for we cannot conceive that objects in our experience are of this kind and that similar ones (unperceived) do not have this quality.
p. 111 Sometimes the inference is from perceptible things to perceptible things according to complete likeness, and sometimes to things contemplated by reason, which are analogous to appearance. Although there is this difference in inferences, they disregard the peculiarities of the relation of consequence, as if in both cases the second followed from the first in such a way that the first would be denied by the denial of the second. Therefore, the conversion,
“ If there is motion, there is void,”
and
[Col. XXXVIII] “ If there is no void, there is no motion,”
will be well stated if it is modelled on the following:
“If men in our experience are vulnerable and mortal, men everywhere are vulnerable and mortal,”
and
“If men in unperceived places do not have all the differences that we mention, neither do those in our experience.”
The inconceivability is identical in both cases.
Furthermore, the Stoics often invent peculiar and impossible arguments according to the construction of opinion. They seize upon the mythical inventions of some (poets, etc.); while at the same time they disbelieve those (poets) who, they think, have altered some of the myths used by the Stoics, yet who agree (with the Stoics) regarding other myths. In this way they try to strengthen their own belief. But he (Demetrius?) p. 113 who has established a test of controversies by the method of analogy differs (from the Stoics) in the highest degree.
The things said by the members of our school who have spent the most time in this study are such as we have already considered. What some of the physicians have said and have written about the method of analogy we shall now take note of in the last parts of the exposition, if we have the stomach for it and if nothing more important hinders us.
The Fragments
Section titled “The Fragments”Fragment I. The construction of inferences is not established by contraposition of the argument “in so far as this is such,” but by appearances which give the necessary evidence. Indeed, even if one does not know how mental perception will be judged, he thinks that inferences from signs should be constructed if they are verified by observation and do not conflict with present appearances, which are called the criteria of the unperceived: namely, perception, anticipations, mental perceptions, and feelings.
Fragment II. One ought not to stop with the apparent, but from the apparent make inferences about the unperceived; nor mistrust p. 115 the facts proved through apparent objects according to analogy, but trust them just as one trusts the facts from which the inference is made. In the same way, we necessarily differentiate the generic and specific differences of signs in each case.
For we are searching for the generic similarities.
Fragment III. We ought to reason through inference according to similarity or through analogy; and this being so, we should not depart from the analogy that is furnished by empirical facts. Further, let us posit some things as signs of the existence of unperceived objects, some of a determinate existence, some of non-existence, some of the absence of a determinate existence; and let us not reason from things whose signification varies. We do not infer from the signs tested by contraposition, except in the case of things unperceived by nature, about which we make inferences from the apparent.
Fragment IV. We should use previously demonstrated facts, together with p. 117 all facts derived from experience, in serious inductive inference, and not apart from inductive inference. And we should use the proper criteria, so that we shall not in any case think that we know objects temporally unperceived by the absence of conflicting evidence, and so that we shall not think that things which are subject to verification are unperceived by nature; and further, so that we may not consider a thing apparent on the ground that it does not seem to be unperceived by nature, or unperceived by nature on the ground that it does not seem to be apparent.
Fragment V. (Too fragmentary to translate.)
Fragment VI. He who recalls that mental perceptions occur in this p. 119 circumstance, namely, apart from perceptions and present objects, and he who says that it is doubtful whether this occurrence comes about through images or is illusory, will not prove that these perceptions are not what they appear. Images can exist either by chance or as products of solid bodies, but they cannot be false.
Fragment VII. (Too fragmentary to translate.)
Fragment VIII. We should refer our notion of the gods to the revelations which take place by mental perception and which guarantee clearly that heavenly and eternal beings exist.
Chapter IV: The Sources of Epicurean Empiricism
Section titled “Chapter IV: The Sources of Epicurean Empiricism”p. 120 Many systematic philosophies have been greatly influenced by science in the formulation of their methods. Philosophers often try to generalize a scientific method to handle the problems of philosophy. The early Greek philosophers adopted the method of mathematics as a model of their thought, and as a result they constructed their philosophical systems deductively from certain fundamental principles which they accepted as self-evident. Plato’s philosophy shows clearly the influence of contemporary mathematical science, and both Peripatetics and Stoics were influenced by the rationalistic procedure of the mathematicians.
The systems of philosophy based on the methodology of the empirical sciences did not appear until the Hellenistic period. The foremost of these was the Epicurean philosophy, which stressed a thoroughgoing empirical method in opposition to the rationalistic approach of the Stoics. The Empirical Sceptics also formulated an empirical method and a phenomenalism in direct contrast to rationalistic methodology and dogmatic metaphysics. Just as the Greek rationalists were influenced by mathematics, the empiricists adopted and generalized the methodology of the ancient empirical arts and sciences.
Greek empiricism was pragmatic in origin. [t grew out of the practical arts which required a reliable method for the acquisition of useful knowledge. Throughout the course of its long history it established contacts with almost every science or formal discipline that was known to the Greeks. Empirical investigation doubtless began long before the earliest preserved records of ancient science; and even in historical times the works of many empirical investigators have been lost without record. Yet as early as the fifth century B.C. the p. 121 empirical procedure had been advanced and refined to such a point that it was explicitly contrasted with non-empirical
method found in ancient writings on arts and sciences provides tangible evidence for the ancient empirical tradition. ‘
Empirical method was first formulated in ancient medicine. The works of the Hippocratic corpus, dating from the fifth to fourth centuries B.C., give a systematic and detailed expression of the nature of empirical science. The early empirical physicians realize the need for careful observation,” and they consider perceptible objccté the starting-point of their science. The limitations of empirical knowledge are also recognized. Sometimes the physician tends toward scepticism, emphasizing the uniqueness of each case that comes before him and despairing of finding any common elements which may be used in passing from one case to another. He contrasts the absence of fixed theory in medicine with the regularity and uniformity in the art of writing; for in the latter case one who masters the basic principles knows all there is to know about the subject. The sceptical approach to medicine is also characterized by an anti-metaphysical point of view and a criticism of reason as the instrument of knowledge. Those theorists who say that man is all air, or all fire, or water, or earth, or anything else that _ is not apparent in man, do not deserve serious consideration. Such theorists do not even agree among themselves, in spite of the fact that they all use the same kind of arguments. No one of them can establish his view more securely than the others, and in the end they refute themselves through their own ignorance.
p. 122 At other times, however, the empirical physician formulates a method by which he establishes empirical generalizations applicable to the particular cases with which he must deal. He remembers previous cases similar to the present, so that he can recall the treatment by which the previous cases were cured. He familiarizes himself with the signs or symptoms which indicate improvement or the opposite, so that he may give a correct diagnosis and predict with assurance.”
Notes to page 121: 1. G. Senn, Die Entwicklung der biologischen Forschungsmethode in der Antike, has found traces of empiricism before the Hippocratic writings; yet there is no evidence that these earlier empiricists tried to formulate their method. 2. See below, note 8. 3. Art 2. 4. On the Parts of Man 41. Prof. L. Edelstein called our attention to this passage. 5. On the Nature of ?7an 1.
Empirical method so formulated is based not on a dogmatic theory of causation, but on the observation of certain signs which in our past experience and in records of the past have regularly preceded or accompanied or followed certain other phenomena which we may say they signify. Thus the method 15 based on the observation of similarities and differences within experience, and the formulation of theories on the basis of these which will permit the inference of certain sequences and the use of treatment accordingly. Even causes may be determined empirically. The cause of a given disease, for instance, must be something common to the mode of life of all who suffer from the disease. If one disease attacks at one and the same time many people, young and old, men and women, drinkers of water and of wine, eaters of barley and of wheat, those who work hard and those who work little, the cause of the disease cannot be the particular mode of life of any of these men, but an element common to all; namely, the air that they breathe.
In observing and recording the similarities and uniformities of perceptible phenomena, the early empirical physicians used appearances as signs of imperceptible things. The physicians found that relatively few diseases can be observed directly. The majority of diseases, being internal and unobservable, are known only by auxiliary means. Clearness or roughness p. 123 of voice, heaviness of breath, and bodily discharges are used as signs of the patient’s condition.
Notes to page 122: 6. 0 Ari 1. 7. Prognostic 25. 8. On Surgery 1. 9. On the Nature of Man 9.
The view that the observable facts of experience may be used as signs of the nature of things that lie beyond experience leads, in its extreme form, to a dogmatic empiricism. The belief is expressed that medicine, and only medicine, can give us knowledge of nature. The study of medicine is a far more reliable method of knowing the nature of man than the speculations of such philosophers as Empedocles. By combining many perceptions through memory, the physician can establish p. 124 Ἐ
Notes to page 123: 10. reason (λόγος) and hence make systematic inferences from appearances. These inferences are not merely probable, but certain.!? It 15 clear that in the Hippocratic corpus there is great variation 1n the formulation of empiricism; but in general three types may be distinguished and classified more or less arbitrarily as follows: 11. . Sceptical empiricism, which holds that the scientist can know nothing beyond perceptions. This view reduces science to mere experience and practice, without the formulation of any theoretical principles. 12. . Methodological empiricism, which holds that by a rigid application of method the scientist may formulate generalizations and inferences which are highly probable, but not necessarily true. 13. . Dogmatic empiricism, the view that the scientist 15 able to derive from perception universal and necessary truths. These three types, though not always sharply distinguishable, are used here as a convenient division for the discussion of ancient empiricism. The subsequent development of empiricism in Greek science and philosophy is forecast by these varying formulations of empiricism found in the Hippocratic corpus. The earliest reaction of philosophy to empiricism WO Art 9, 11. L On Ancient Medicine 20. 14. Precepts 1.
seems to have been that empiricism can never progress beyond scepticism. Most of the Pre-Socratics, of course, had already attacked perception as inadequate for the attainment of knowl- . edge; 15. and the Sophists who, like Protagoras and Gorgias, rejected reason in favor of immediate sense experience, found themselves involved in an epistemological solipsism that made knowledge all but impossible. Yet even some of the PreSocratics believed that appearances may be used as indications of the imperceptible; 15 and according to Plato’s dialogues both Protagoras and Gorgias recognized the positive value of empirical observation in the practical arts. In Gorgias 448C Polus, the follower of Gorgias, states that art is based on ἐμπειρία, empirical investigation. In the Theaetetus Protagoras is represented as saying that the physician and farmer and sophist are differentiated from other men by their ability to control and alter appearances. Plato’s evaluation of empiricism, being subsequent to the formulation of empirical method in the science of medicine, 15. much less ambiguous and indecisive than the treatment found in the earlier philosophers. Plato is more fully aware of the issues involved ; consequently his criticisms of empiricism are much more explicit. In the Republic he expresses his disdain of those who merely observe appearances, noting what things precede, follow, or accompany other things, and who attempt to predict the future from memory of the past: 1 ““Now suppose they had rewards and honors there for one another, and prizes for the man who had the keenest eye for a passing 1mage, and who remembered best which images habitually came first, which last, and which of them came together, and who was thus ablest in divining which was about to come; 13 Cf. Sextus Adv. Math. VII.89-140. 4 Cf. ibrd. VII.60-87. At a later time the Cyrenaics adopted a similar view, ἐδτά. VII.190-195. 15 E.g. Anaxagoras and Democritus; see 7bid. VII.. Cf. H. Diller, “Oyus ᾿Αδήλων τὰ Φαινόμενα,᾽᾽ Hermes LXVII (1932), 14-42. 16 Theaet. 167A-C. 17 Republic VII.516C-D. The translations quoted in this and the following chapters are our own, p. 125 do you think that our friend is going to long for those rewards, and that he will be envious of persons who are honored there, and are in power? Will he not rather have the feeling Homer tells of, and desire exceedingly p. 126 ing and arithmetic typify the exact arts. From these passages it is clear that Plato believes that merely empirical investigation cannot give rise to scientific knowledge.
Notes to page 125: 15. To drudge on earth above as hireling to another, Lodging with a landless man,’ and be ready to endure all else in preference to having those opinions and living a life like that?” In the Phaedo Plato rejects the empirical view that knowledge arises from memory of many perceptions.!® In the Gorgias he says that those arts which rest on empirical observation are merely conjectural, for they know neither the cause nor the value of what they do.!® He contrasts with them the true arts, which proceed from a knowledge of causes and of the good. In the Laws, 720A-E, he makes an analogous distinction between the medicine of free men and the medicine of slaves. Likewise in the Phaedrus he contrasts the true and the false methods in rhetoric and medicine. The true method is based on a knowledge of causes and forms, the false method rests on mere familiarity and experience.?° The contrast between the mathematical arts and the arts resting merely on observation and experience plus careful conjecture 15 elaborated in the Philebus: ” “If from all the arts one should separate arithmetic and metric and the art of weighing, the remainder of each art would become inconsiderable… . For after that nothing would be left but probabilities and the careful study of perceptions through experience and a certain familiarity, and the use of the powers of conjecture, which many call arts, since they have acquired their strength by care and toil… .” The conjectural arts, which Plato considers far meaner and less exact than the mathematical, include music, medicine, farming, navigation, and military science. The arts of build- 16. Phaedo 96B. 17. Gorgias 465A; S00E-501B. 18. Phaedrus 2609E-272B. ! A Philebus SSE-56D; cf. Republic 5333B-C. This is our own translation.
Aristotle’s attitude toward empirical method is more favorable than Plato’s; for though Aristotle denies that empirical observation alone is adequate for knowledge, yet he does regard perception as the starting-point of all knowledge. In one passage he says that each sense organ has its distinctive objects of perception, and in regard to these objects it never errs. In the Metaphysics he traces the origin of art and science to experience and memory. The observation and memory of what is beneficial to a number of persons suffering from some disease provide the ground for a generalization about the cure of that disease. Experience is knowledge of particulars, while art is knowledge of the universal; yvet knowledge of the universal is derived from the determination of similarities in a number of particular cases. In the Topics Aristotle describes the method of deriving the universal from the particular as the observation of the similar; and he asserts that this method is useful in inductive arguments, in hypothetical syllogisms, where inference is made from one group of objects to other objects that are similar, and even in the formulation of definitions.
In spite of such statements as these, Aristotle does not formulate his own scientific method in purely empirical terms. He says that science requires the use of both reason and per- p. 127 Aristotle regards empiricism as inadequate because he believes that observation can never give necessary connections between objects. In the absence of causal knowledge the empirical scientist must base his knowledge on a study of signs, and inferences from signs are not reliable except in cases where the inferences may be converted into valid syllogisms. He says in one place that a science of physiognomy would be possible only if an invariable correlation could be established between physical qualities and mental traits, for instance between large extremities and courage. In that case one could infer syllogistically from the physical qualities as signs to the mental traits. Especially significant in this connection is Aristotle’s treatment of empirical method in rhetoric. Since rhetoric, according to Aristotle, is not concerned with truth, but only with conjecture of the probable or persuasive, this art may employ empirical arguments. For example, the orator should study matters of state finance both from his own empirical observation and from the records of the experience of others. The principal form of empirical argument that Aristotle attributes to rhetoric is the argument from signs and examples. Signs refer to the things they signify either necessarily or not necessarily. In the former case they can be converted into a syllogism of the first figure and are not entirely empirical. In the latter case they are asyllogistic and therefore refutable. An argument from example is an induction from one particular to another particular of the same genus.
Notes to page 126: 19. ception, and only once does he indicate that perception 18 the ultimate test.?® In the absence of rational explanation he refers to an empirical generalization merely as a probable conjecture.? 20. This does not mean that Plato failed to recognize the need for observation. In several passages, e.g. Phaedrus 249B-C, he indicates that percep- . tion contributes to a knowledge of the Ideas. 21. De Anima 418a.7-16; cf. 427b.11-14; 428b.18-19. # Metaph. A.1, 980b.28-981a.12; cf. Post. Anal. 81a.38-b.9; 97b.7-25. % Toprcs I.108b.7-23. 22. % De Gen. Animal. III.760b.27-33. 23. E.g. Hist. Animal. VI.571a.26-27.
Though Aristotle recognizes that observation is the ultimate source of knowledge, he believes that knowledge can be obtained only through a combination of observation and reason. Like Plato, he constructs and defends his philosophical system p. 128 on non-empirical grounds. He limits the use of empirical method to those fields of science and philosophy where certain and demonstrative knowledge cannot or need not be attained (e.g., rhetoric and biology).
Notes to page 127: 24. Prior Anal. II.70b.7-38. 25. In Rhet. I.1355a.17 Aristotle uses of rhetoric the phrase, πρὸς τὰ ἔνδοξα στοχαστικῶς EXELV. 26. Rhet. I.1359b.30-33. 27. Cf. Rhet. I.1357a.32-b.36; Prior Anal. II.70a.3-38.
There are indications that some of Aristotle’s students were more receptive to empiricism. G. Senn has found in Theophrastus’ later works a definite preference for observation over reason, though Theophrastus gives little in the way of formulation of empirical principles. Likewise, W. Jaeger has shown that there was a tendency among the Peripatetics to integrate empirical observation with philosophic method. It must be recognized, however, that the Peripatetics never freed themselves entirely from the influence of dogmatic rationalism.
A closer tie with empirical sciences is found in some of the more obscure philosophers of the fourth Cefltury, especially Nausiphanes the Democritean. Nausiphanes wrote a work entitled the Tripod, in which he probably set forth the three basic principles of empirical methodology: observation, history, and inference from similar to similar. His application of these principles to the art of rhetoric is recorded in Philodemus’ Rhetoric. Nausiphanes holds that the method of rhetoric is the same as the method of all the other arts and sciences, namely, the inference of the unperceived from the perceived by means of signs. He says that an argument is always useful from apparent and present things to future things, and the most able leaders of democracy, monarchy, or any other government use this kind of argument. In another passage which refers to Nausiphanes Philodemus states the view that rhetoric is the power ‘“‘according to which from practice and history of the affairs of a state one can 566 well what is beneficial p. 129 to the majority.”” * Nausiphanes’ emphasis on empirical method is further indicated in a passage where he states that the rhetorician must use systematic inductive inference, and not depend on isolated experiences.?” Following Aristotle, he says that the rhetorician bases his arguments on signs and examples; he goes further than Aristotle, however, in saying that the rhetorical method of inferring from appearances is no less cogent than philosophical method.
Notes to page 128: 28. ΟΡ. cit., 99 ff. - 29. Jaeger, Diokles, 25-30, 55-59, 224-236. In his chapter on the “Organization of Research’ in Aristotle, 324-341, Jaeger points to a shift in Aristotle’s later works toward empirical investigation. 30. See Philippson, De Philodemt Libro, 52-53. % Philod. Rhet. II.38-39.
Epicurus’ empiricism seems to spring from the teachings of Nausiphanes, Aristotle, and the empirical physicians. In the absence of detailed information it is impossible to say exactly what doctrines Epicurus took from each of these p. 130 was established in the third century B.C., and although our information about this school comes from much later writers, primarily Galen, we may be reasonably sure that from its inception it advocated an empirical methodology. According to Galen’s account, the three basic principles of the Empirical School were direct observation, records of previous observation, and inductive inference from similar to similar.#?2 Some of the technical terms used by the Empirics are identical with those in Philodemus’ works, and Philodemus’ acquaintance with the Empirics is attested by his reference to them in the conclusion of the Methods of Inference.
Notes to page 129: 31. sources; yet these sources contain striking parallels to Epicurean teachings. In the works of Aristotle, for instance, we find precedents for Epicurus’ statements that all perceptions are true, and that all knowledge 15 derived ultimately from perception; 29 the early physicians anticipated Epicurus’ use of perceptible objects as signs of the unperceived; and Nausiphanes’ formulation of the method of valid inductive inference is very close to the Epicurean position. The interest in empiricism continued to spread after the death of Epicurus, and the later Epicureans, including Philodemus, were strongly influenced by the later developments in the empirical tradition. The Empirical School of medicine 32. Jhid. 242-243. 33. Ibid. 47. 34. [014. 35-37, 40-41, 45. For further material on Nausiphanes 566 , Pauly-Wissowa-Kroll, R.E., s.. ‘‘Nausiphanes,” XVII.2021-2027 (von Fritz), and H. Diels, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker II.246-250. 35. Cf. Philippson, De Philodemi Libro, 43-57. Pyrrho, who was a 36. teacher of Nausiphanes and who was admired by Epicurus, did not exert any influence on Epicurean logic or epistemology. For a more detailed exposition of Epicurean empiricism, see Chap. V. 37. In his L’Aristotele Perduto e la Formazione Filosofica di Epicuro, I.40 Bignone holds that Epicurus could not have known the treatises of Aristotle that are extant today; yet even if Bignone’s argument is correct, there 15 no reason to believe that Epicurus could not have learned of the empirical tendencies in Aristotle’s thought from some other source, such as oral reports or written works of Aristotle’s pupils.
Yet the physicians were not the only scientists in Hellenistic times who were interested in formulating an empirical methodology. Almost all of the arts and sciences show some influence of the empirical tradition. Perhaps the most important after medicine was the art of rhetoric, which had already become involved in the controversy over the value of empiricism. Plato, Aristotle, and Nausiphanes all recognized that the rhetoricians used empirical arguments. Many later rhetoricians were impelled toward a study of method as a means of defending themselves against Plato’s charges that rhetoric 15 only a pseudo-science. The empirical method which they formulated passed on from rhetoric into philosophy and the other arts.
After Aristotle the controversy over rhetorical method gave rise to three main points of view. There were, on one side, those who accepted the judgment of Plato and, like Antonius in Cicero’s De Oratore, were content to maintain that rhetoric is merely a matter of experience and practice. Opposing these were the ‘“‘philosophical’ rhetoricians who held that rhetoric p. 131 requires universal knowledge. A third group was formed by the rhetoricians who were convinced that rhetoric had a scientific empirical method—not so rigorous, perhaps, as the method of mathematics, but at least as good as the method of most of the other arts and sciences. Our information about these champions of rhetorical method is very inadequate; at best we can only outline their position in general terms.
Notes to page 130: 38. The best work on the Empirics is K. Deichgraber, Die Griechische Empirikerschule. See also Philippson’s review of this work, Philol. Woch. LI (1931), 1201-1213. 39. See Galen, Subfig. Emp. (ed. Bonnet), 39. 40. E.g. ἐπιλογισμός, μετάβασις kaf’ ὁμοιότητα. 41. Cf. P. and Ε. De Lacy, “Ancient Rhetoric and Empirical Method,” Sophia v (1938), 523-530.
The empirical rhetoricians took from Aristotle their initial orientation: They agreed that rhetoric was based on empirical observation and probable arguments from signs. As Philodemus states their position, they held that in rhetoric “‘ there 15 a particular sign of what is to follow, just as in the case of diseases physicians have signs, and navigators in questions relating to sailing in storms.” ¥ ΠΘ inference from signs is, of course, not infallible, but it it is based on sufficiently broad empirical observation it will be highly probable: *‘ Just as the physician knows the probable outcome in the case of diseases and the navigator in the case of storms, so the rhetorician knows what will probably happen in the case of the state.”” 45
Thus rhetorical method was both empirical and positivistic, and as such itwas known technicallyas the method of conjecture (στοχασμός). The use of conjecture had been previously mentioned in the Hippocratic corpus,*” and Plato had attributed conjecture to rhetoric in a rather depreciatory sense. Furthermore, in the Philebus Plato had divided the arts generally into those which have an exact mathematical method and those that are merely conjectural. The rhetoricians accepted the distinction between exact and conjectural sciences, and they placed rhetoric in the latter group. Here again the evidence is mostly from Philodemus’ Rhetoric. Philodemus
% Philod. Rhet. I.. The translations of the passages from Philodemus are our own.
% Jbid. 373. p. 132 quotes the following passage from Alexinus, the Megarian philosopher:
Notes to page 131: 42. See below, 132-133. 43. Gorgias 464C. 44. Philebus 55E-56B.
““A rhetorician would agree that they (i.e., the rhetoricians) try to make the same kind of arguments about the good and most other things as those by which philosophical questions are judged; and even it they do not all proceed according to exact science, yet it is possible that the judgment of orators is according to a theory of probability and conjecture.”” δ0
ἰ In another place the view that rhetoric is a conjectural art 15 attacked by Philodemus:
““Epicurus wrote … that it (rhetoric) does not employ observation of what usually happens or make conjectures according to probability.” 5
From an independent source we know that Athenaeus, a rhetorician of the second century B.C., maintained the position that Philodemus here attacks:
“Athenaecus calls rhetoric the power of argument which conjectures what is persuasive to the audience.’’ %
The rhetoricians insist that conjecture is the method not only of rhetoric but of all empirical sciences:
““Not every artisan, it he is wise, claims that he will achieve his end in every case; neither the physician nor the navigator nor the archer nor in brief any of those who practice not exact, but conjectural sciences. Accordingly, either we must not call the others arts, or rhetoric is an art also.”’
The rhetoricians continually appealed to medicine, which Plato in the Philebus had called conjectural, but which certainly had a method. Analogies occur very frequently in Philodemus between rhetoric and medicine. It is probable that the rhetoricians took their conjectural method from p. 133 medicine; for even in the early Hippocratic work On Ancient Medicine the use of conjecture is discussed, and the fallibility of this method in medicine is recognized.” To be sure there is no evidence that the rhetoricians used precisely this passage; yet it is very likely that they derived some parts of their formulation of conjectural method from medical writers. Likewise the rhetoricians admit the restriction that the propositions of a conjectural art are only probable—they may on occasion be wrong; yet this, they say, is no more true of rhetoric than of medicine. Hence the rhetoricians, while renouncing a completely rigorous method, maintain that they do have the same method as the other sciences, and that this method 15 basic in all empirical science.
Notes to page 132: 45. Philod. Rhet. Suppl. 40. 46. Ibid. 27-28. 47. Sextus Adv. Math. II.62. 48. Rhet. Suppl. 14. E.g. 4διά, 12, 13, 14, 16, 27, 32. Plato, of course, had compared them in the Phaedrus and the Gorgias.
The Epicurean Bromius, a contemporary of Philodemus, was perhaps unique in believing that rhetoric has a rigorous and infallible empirical method:
p. 134 A specific application of the conjectural method may be found in a passage of the Rhetorica ad Herennium, which prescribes the method of argument in what is called a conjectural case, that is, a legal case where the point at issue is a question of fact. The conjectural method outlined there is nothing more than the systematic inference from empirically known facts to some fact that is not directly known. The result of the conjectural method, the passage states, is probable, not necessary; 5! vet there are degrees of probability, and if all of the various signs from which the inference is made are shown to agree, the conclusion appears practically certain.5?
Notes to page 133: 49. ““… the good politician has inferred by induction the things naturally capable of arousing anger and pity and attraction and aversion, and he uses these expertly.”’ %7 Thus the method of conjecture is at once empirical and positivistic. Conjectures are probable inferences or predictions from our own observations and records of the past; and these conjectures are made by means of signs. Arguments from signs were discussed in practically all of the ancient works on rhetoric; % and Hermogenes in the second century A.D. defined conjecture as an argument of this type: “Conjecture 15 the substantial proof of an unknown fact from some apparent sign.”” 5 % On Ancient Medicine 9. Prof. L. Edelstein called our attention to this passage. Jaeger (Diokles, 45-48) believes that this empirical element in Hippocratic medicine influenced Aristotle’s ethics. In later times Celsus said that the method of medicine is conjectural: Medicina 1, Proemium; II.6. % Cf. above, note 53. 50. Rhet. Suppl. 32-33. 51. Cf. G. Thiele, Hermagoras, 125-131 % Hermogenes De Statibus 2.11.
The rhetoricians differentiated degrees of probability according to the amount and consistency of the available evidence; just so the physicians recognized that the degree of probability depended on the confluence of signs or symptoms. These scales of probability are very similar to the Carneadean analysis of probability. Sextus specifically compares the Carneadean system with medicine, and doubtless Carneades drew his inspiration here from the empirical sciences. The Epicurean position is somewhat different; for the Epicureans held that while some empirical inferences are only probable, others (e.g., their own metaphysics) are absolutely certain. Hence they must be classed as dogmatic empiricists.
The method of conjecture received its most detailed formulation in rhetoric, yet it 15 found in essentially the same form in a number of other arts and sciences. Cicero tells us in the De Divinatione that divination makes conjectures by means of probable arguments from signs. These signs are not based on knowledge of causes, but on the observation that in the past p. 135 the same sequences have always, or almost always, occurred in the same way.%” Even Polybius says that military strategy requires empirical method, and that historians can predict the future by conjecture from the records of the past. In quite a ‘“modern’’ tone he states that empirical studies have progressed’ so far that the scientists can handle methodically almost everything that occurs.
Notes to page 134: 52. Rhet. ad Herenn. II.3-10; see P. and E. De Lacy, ‘ Ancient Rhetoric and Empirical Method,”” Sophia νι (1938), 527-528. 53. Rhet. ad Herenn. II.10. . 54. Iind. 11. 55. Galen Subfig. Emp. (ed. Bonnet), 55; Sextus Adv. Math. VII.179, 56. Sextus Adv. Math. VII.175-184. 57. 7014. 179. 58. Cf. Meth. of Inf. viI, XXXV-XXXVI.
The astronomers, also, were familiar with the traditional formulation of empirical method. Ptolemy tells us that the astronomy of Hipparchus was largely conjectural 7 (though he insists that his own is not conjectural, but certain), and Sextus Empiricus admits the astronomy of Eudoxus as a legitimate empirical science.”™ The astronomers carefully avoided metaphysical speculations, claiming that they were interested only in observing the heavens and formulating hypotheses to explain what they observed.”” They made it a principle that when two hypotheses explain the same phenomena equally well, the simpler hypothesis is to be preferred.” Clearly they recognized the three cardinal principles of ancient empiricism: direct observation, records of past observations, and inference from similar to similar. These same principles also appear in the section on meteorology in the works of the astronomer Geminus.™
These passages are sufficient to show that in the Hellenistic period essentially the same formulation of empirical method appears in a number of different arts and sciences. It is clear, p. 136 therefore, that there was an ever growing empirical tradition to which the individual arts and sciences were more or less closely related. The later Epicureans followed this tradition, and their whole treatment of the arts and sciences is based upon it. Philodemus again is the spokesman for this later Epicurean point of view.
Notes to page 135: 59. De Diwv. I.12-13, 15, 24—25. 60. Historiae I.84.6; VI.3.1-2. 61. Ibid. IX.2.4-5. 62. Ptol. Synt. Math. VII.1 (ed. Heiberg), Vol. 12, pp. 2-3. 63. Adv. Math. V.1-2. 64. Theon of Smyrna, Expositio Rerum Mathematicarum ΧΧΧιν (ed. Hiller), 188; Simpl. Comm. on Phys. 193b.23 (ed. Diels), 291-292. Cf. P. Duhem, Σώζειν τὰ Φαινόμενα, 3-27. 65. Synt. Math. III.1, Vol. 11, p. 201; xn1.2, Vol. 12, p. 532; Simpl. Comm. on De Caelo 292b.10 (ed. Heiberg), 487.25-27. 66. Geminus Elementa Astronomiae XViI.
Philodemus states in his Rhetoric that all arts and sciences are derived from observation plus a method of inferring common principles.”” Mere observation is not sufficient; for if it lacks method iit can make no inferences or predictions with any degree of probability. Philodemus says that rhetoric, for instance, 15 based merely on familiarity and practice without method, and hence it is not a science any more than woodcutting is a science.” But even among the sciences some have a much more rigorous method than others, and there is a corresponding variation in the probability of their principles. The inexact sciences are conjectural. They can establish probabilities but not certainties. They have a minimum of method, and rely heavily on familiarity and experience. Such are for instance medicine, navigation, poetics, and epideictic oratory.”” The exact sciences, on the other hand, which are also empirical, have a completely rigorous method and attain certain results. Such sciences are painting, music, and grammar.” Philodemus makes no mention of astronomy or divination; being a good Epicurean, he had no use for either one. Philosophy, for Philodemus, is also an empirical science, partly conjectural and partly exact. For example, the best course of action for any one person can be determined only probably; but the basic principles of good and bad are established with exactness.”
% Philod. Rhet. Suppl. 35.
% Ibid. 27-30.
p. 137 To conclude, the Epicureans knew and used the extensive empirical theory that was available to them in ancient times, and even after the death of Epicurus they kept abreast of the empirical development of arts and sciences. They took the stand that a rigorous empirical method will establish ‘‘necessary’’ truths, and that in their own philosophy they possessed such a method. The following chapter will trace the formulation and applications of empiricism within the Epicurean school, and the final chapter will discuss the Epicurean defense of empirical method against the attacks of the Stoics.
Notes to page 136: 67. Ind. 14, 27, 34, 61. B 1hd. 35. 68. [nd. I.248-249,
Chapter V: The Development of Epicurean Logic and Methodology
Section titled “Chapter V: The Development of Epicurean Logic and Methodology”p. 138 The historians of philosophy, following long-standing tradition, have generally assumed that the Epicureans despised the study of logic, and that they entertained a very naive view of the nature of philosophic method. Yet this traditional view is not consistent with the actual writings of the Epicureans, which reveal a lively and serious interest in logic and related problems. Both Epicurus and his followers devoted much of their energy to this part of their philosophy.
I. Epicurus
Section titled “I. Epicurus”The epistemological basis of Epicurean empirical logic and methodology appears in Epicurus’ letters preserved by Diogenes Laertius and η Sextus Empiricus’ discussion of Epicureanism. According to Epicurus, ‘“All perceived objects are true, and sensation is from an existent and is such as the existent which arouses the perception.” ! Truth is existence, which is never false. Nothing comes from non-being. The images of a mad man and the dreams of a sane man are true in 50 far as they affect or move them. The non-existent does not affect us. All perceptions are true, not in the sense that the things by which they are excited are such as they appear in perception, but because there are certain causes from which the perceptions naturally follow.
Those who assert that some perceptions are true and some are false, Epicurus says, err in not distinguishing belief and opinion, which are additions of the mind, from what is selfevident or given. In the case where Orestes thought he saw p. 139 the Erinyes, the perceptions aroused by the images were true (for there were such images), but the mind made a mistake in thinking these were real, solid objects. As all perceptions are true, error is due to opinion, which is added by the mind to the original sensation. This involves a judgment on our part as to the real nature of the perceived object. In this process the mind adds to or subtracts from the original perception, and thus alters it in some fashion. For example, if we 560 someone approaching from a distance, from the manner of his approach and certain clues or signs presented by the perception, we conjecture that it is Plato. Thereupon, we add the remaining signs of Plato to the perception. Ο again, certain features of the original perception may be neglected. When an oar is seen to be bent in water, the circumstance of the water may be neglected and the oar judged to be really bent or broken. In this case we actually subtract from the original perception, that is, disregard a part of the clues or signs it furnishes.
Notes to page 138: 1. Sextus Adv. Math. ντιι.63: cf. vir.203-204. The translations from Sextus are our own. N. W. DeWitt in a recent article, “ Epicurus, Ilepi Φαντασίας,᾽᾽ (Trans. Am. Philol. Assoc. Lxx [1939], 414-427), has made a different interpretation of the Epicurean theory of perception.
The view that truth is on the level of perception rather than on the level of opinion might seem to lead to epistemological solipsism or scepticism; yet Epicurus gave it a positive social significance through his analysis of language. Epicurus’ position is that words have the same meaning for all the members of a social group because their meaning is based on-the immediate experience of objects that are known to the members of the group. Words refer primarily to objects that are apparent; their cognitive meaning, which is purely extensional, can be determined by specific empirical reference to the objects of experience. It follows for Epicurus that language, like truth, 15 on the level of perception rather than opinion, and that any use of words to refer to non-empirical entities, such as the universals of the rationalists, should be rejected as p. 140 lacking cognitive meaning. Epicurus condemns also the rhetorical use of language, since by emphasis on the form of expression it obscures the cognitive meaning of words, and draws the attention away from the truth of what is being said. He ridicules those who believe that they have said something when they have applied to some unknown object a metaphor from another object equally unknown.” He holds that the only correct language for a philosopher is the language that has been gradually built up by society as a practical means of communication about the objects of experience; and if this language requires alteration because it is inexact or inadequate it should never be altered except in strict accordance with empirical facts.
Notes to page 139: 2. For further discussion of Epicurean epistemology, see C. Bailey, Greek Atomists and Epicurus, 236-274, and Philippson, De Philodemi Libro, 10-31. Bailey’s discussion must be used with caution. 3. Cf. P. De Lacy, “The Epicurean Analysis of Language,” Am. Journ. Philol. Lx (1939), 85-92. 4. Diog. Laer, X:33.
One of the younger contemporaries of Epicurus, Colotes, wrote several works on Plato, in the fragments of which we find an application of Epicurus’ analysis of language. Colotes attacks the use of poetry for the presentation of philosophical thought, maintaining that poetical expressions obscure thought, and that such devices as the myth in the tenth book of the Republic have no philosophical value. His stand here, of course, is in complete accord with Epicurus’ statement that words refer to something evident.
Epicurus elaborates further the empirical basis of language in his analysis of the origin and growth of speech. Originally men uttered emotional cries, expressing love, fear, and the like, which indicated naturally (as opposed to conventionally) to other men the feeling of the person uttering them, but which did not say anything specifically about external objects. From these cries, Epicurus says, there gradually arose a system of conventional sounds referring to objects. The development of p. 141 a conventional language was a purely practical evolution, and was not guided by any metaphysical considerations. The Epicureans thus rejected the various attempts of the rationalists to find some inner connection between language and ultimate reality.’ Yet the Epicureans maintained that on the empirical level language involves no distortion of reality. By a psychological and half-unconscious process based on accu- ’ mulated experiences, objects have been divided into classes according to their similarities and differences; and by virtue of this process, which produces what Epicurus called “‘anticipation,”’ or ‘‘apperception’’ (πρόληψις), the person who uses or . hears a word knows the sort of object to which that word refers. This is not to say that there is any sort of mental entity to which words refer; it is rather an approach to the later nominalistic view that words refer directly to objects and that the role of the person who relates words to objects is a purely functional one. The validity of this function is assured by the fact that the ‘‘anticipation’ 15 based on accumulated experience and thus represents a very broad induction.
Notes to page 140: 5. Epicurus On Nature xxviii (ed. A. Vogliano, Epicuri et Epicureorum Scripta, pp. 15-17). § Philod. Rhet. I.33 = II.257. “Epic. On Nature xxvir.11-12. 6. Cf. Cronert, Kol., 4-12. % Diog. Laer. X.75-76.
Epicurus believed that an empirical system need not be limited to objects immediately perceived, but may include also objects beyond present experience. Some objects are as they appear manifestly. Others we are prevented from knowing as they are in themselves because of their minuteness or magnitude, or distance from the perceiver.” These, then, are unperceived (ἄδηλα) as far as our experience is concerned. Knowledge of them involves an inference beyond immediate sense data. Additional criteria are necessary for this extension of knowledge in order to determine which conclusions about the unperceived are true and which are false. Perceptions, being our immediate sensations, are always true; but inferences concerning that which is not directly or completely experienced may be true or false.
p. 142 ᾽ !
Notes to page 141: 7. E.g. Plato’s Cratylus; cf. Origen Contra Celsum I.24. 8. L Cf. Bailey, Gk. Atom., 245-247, 557-558. 9. Sextus Adv. Math. VIII.207-216.
Knowledge of unperceived objects, being mediate, is acquired by means of signs. Using objects of immediate experience as signs, we make inferences concerning the nature of the things which are at least in part unknown to and not experienced by us. In order to analyze and formulate the different kinds of inference by signs, the Epicureans divide all things p. 143 offer no difficulty. Judgments concerning them are verified directly and easily by reference to the objects. ‘“When the object about which a judgment is made is evident and 1mmediately apparent, it is easy to refer back to the object judged, and to say that the judgment is true when it is verified by the thing, or false when it is not thus verified.” ’* In the language of modern empiricism, the judgment 15 ““confronted by the thing.” A false judgment cannot be so verified.
Notes to page 142: 10. into the following classes: 11. . Things immediately perceived. These are known without inference of any kind. 12. . Things not immediately perceived. This second class is broken up into: a. Things which can never be perceived or known through inference, regarding which we are doomed to eternal ignorance, because of our own limitations; e.g., whether the number of the 13. stars 15 odd or even. b. Things which can never be directly perceived, but which can be known through analogical inference from perception, e.g., atoms and void. c. Things which are not perceived at the moment, but which may be perceived at some other time or place. These things may also be known through signs; e.g., a scar is the sign of a wound, smoke 15 the sign of fire.’3 In each of these classes judgments are tested in a different way. Perceptible things are immediately present to us and 14. This classification is given twice by Sextus: in Adv. Math. VIII.316-320 and in Pyrrh. Hyp. B.97-99 (Adv. Math. VIII.145-147 is almost the same as Pyrrh. Hyp. B.97-99). Yet these two passages vary in terminology, and in neither case does Sextus say to what school he is indebted for the division. Of the two passages, Adv. Math. VIII.316-320 seems to be Epicurean, since it cites as examples atoms and void, and it leads into a discussion of direct and indirect verification. The terminology of the passage, however, does not fully agree with the Epicurean terminology found in Diog. Laer. X.34 and Meth. of Inf., Frag. IV. The passage in . Pyrrh. Hyp. bears even less resemblance to Epicureanism. Philippson (De Philodems Libro, 58-66, 69-70) thinks that neither of the passages in Sextus is Epicurean. He assigns the passage in Pyrrh. Hyp. to the physicians, the one in Adv. Math. to the Stoics. Cf. below, 161-162. In any case it is generally agreed that the Epicureans accepted such a classification.
When the object is unperceived, however, the verification cannot be so direct or so certain. Yet here, too, the criterion is always ultimately the sensible fact. In the case of objects which are temporally unperceived, because they lie in the future, or not completely perceived owing to certain circumstances in the present, the process is known as verification or confirmation (émpapripnois—Iiterally, ““witnessing’’ or ‘‘testimony’’). ‘“Verification consists in the direct perception that the object of judgment is such as it was judged to be.” ’ ἢ the judgment can be verified by actual experience, that is, by the appearance of the object or fact as it was designated in the judgment, 115 truth is established. The test is still the appearance of the object as predicted in the judgment. For example, when Plato is approaching at a distance, before I can determine certainly the identity of the person whom I 566 approaching, I conjecture that it is Plato. When the person has approached sufficiently, I see that it is Plato. When the factor of distance, which previously made recognition impossible, has been removed, then my conjecture is verified by the appearance of the object itself.
By admitting such a criterion Epicurus has not departed from his strictly empirical point of view. Sense data are still the origin, criternia, and basis of all knowledge.’ Nevertheless, he has extended his knowledge beyond his immediate experience and beyond present experience in general. Opinions p. 144 according to this method may be judged true when they are verified by the facts themselves in the present immediately, or by the appearance in the future of what was expected and predicted in the present judgment. We may make hypotheses ι{ they can be verified or supported by facts. But can we go still further? In other words, can our method be generalized 80 as to apply to objects that cannot ever be perceived?
Notes to page 143: 15. Sextus Adv. Math. VIII.324. 16. Ibid. VII.212. The process is somewhat analogous to certain pragmatic theories in which truth is defined as ‘‘ verified prediction.” 17. 7014. VII.216; cf. Meth. of Inf. XV.25-28; Plutarch Adv. Col. 4-5 (1109)
This point is important because it involves the validity of the doctrine of atoms and void, Epicurean metaphysics. The method here is a less direct form of verification than that of the preceding case—the proof that there is no evidence to the contrary (οὐκ ἀντιμαρτύρησιΣ). ‘‘Therefore verification and lack of evidence to the contrary are the criteria of the true, and lack of verification and evidence to the contrary are the criteria of the false.”” 7 Opinions or hypotheses about objects that are unperceived by nature are true in so far as they do not conflict with known appearances or present opinions. The Epicureans posit the existence of a void although it is not directly experienceable. Its existence, however, does not conflict with any known facts and is indeed supported by the empirical fact of motion, which requires a void for its possibility. Such indirect verification must be distinguished from the Stoic method of contraposition, according to which the existence of motion necessitates a priori the existence of a void, because it the existence of a void were denied, motion would be also. The Stoics base their argument on an a prior: principle according to which the opposite would be contradictory, while the Epicureans merely formulate hypotheses to explain empirical facts, on the principle that there is an analogy between the apparent and the non-apparent.
In the last analysis, the foundation of all proof for Epicurus is perception. By means of the two methods mentioned above p. 145 for transcending present experience, however, Epicurus has shown the possibility of a purely empirical method which 15 not limited to any immediate sense experience. This is a somewhat simplified, yet unmistakable, attempt to formulate an empirical theory of meaning. According to this view, meaning, as the verifiable, always outruns and precedes the limitation of the verified, which is truth.
Notes to page 144: 18. Sextus Adv. Math. VII.216. 19. This assertion on the part of Epicurus is similar to Newton’s statement of the method science is to follow in the Principia, 11, ‘‘ Regulae Philosophandi.” 20. Meth. of Inf. VIII.26-IX.3; see above, 43, note 24.
It has already been stated that Epicurus applied his empirical method in all branches of his philosophy. Some of these applications have been mentioned; e.g., in physics the atomic theory is an hypothesis based on inference from empirical observation, and indirectly verified by lack of evidence to the contrary. The presentation of alternative theories for the explanation of meteorological and astronomical phenomena is likewise in conformity with the methodological principle that when complete verification is impossible any hypothesis may be accepted which does not conflict with the available evidence. It is indeed a significant indication of Epicurus’ integration of his methodology with his physics that almost all of the rather extensive fragments of Book xxviii of his work On Nature deal with methodological and linguistic problems.
Epicurus applied his empirical method also in other fields, especially religion and ethics; but unfortunately among the extant fragments of his works there is not sufficient evidence to show how the application was made. It is not until we come to the works of later Epicureans that we find detailed information on the broader extension of empirical method. The analysis and formulation of empirical logic and methodology remained one of the central topics in Epicurean philosophy long after the time of Epicurus.
II. Polystratus
Section titled “II. Polystratus”The treatment of methodology and logic by other early Epicureans, including Metrodorus, is too fragmentary to p. 146 make any addition to our knowledge. The next significant application of Epicurean logic occurs in the work of Polystratus, an Epicurean scholarch of the latter part of the third century B.C. In his work On Irrational Contempt (Περὶ ᾿Αλόγου Καταφρονήσεως) 2 he defends certain Epicurean doctrines, among them the attack on the fear of the supernatural. In the course of the discussion he treats the relation of men to animals. The rationalists in Greek philosophy had made a very sharp differentiation between animals and men, but the Epicureans emphasized rather the similarities. Accordingly, Polystratus holds that one of the arguments against the supernatural is that animals other than man do not have omens and visions and do not fear the gods. Philodemus later used a similar argument in his work Ο the Gods. We may compare an analogous inference from the similarity of men and animals in Epicurean ethics; namely, the argument that animals as well as men naturally seek pleasure as the highest good. Lucretius also uses analogies between men and animals. A formal treatment of the validity of inferences between species of the same genus, as in the case of men and the lower animals, appears 1η the works of Philodemus. Polystratus makes it clear that he considers the argument
Notes to page 145: 21. Cf. R. Philippson, ‘‘Neues iiber Epikur und seine Schule,”” Nachr. der Gesell. der Wiss. zu Gittingen, Phil.-Hist. Klasse (1929), 127-149, esp. 148.
based on the similarities of men and animals as an application of empirical methodology. He reaffirms in his work the basic principles of Epicurean empiricism: Truth must be borne out by experience, and with no evidence to the contrary (ἀντιμαρτύρησι5); 51 dialectical word-choppings should be rejected in favor of the actual study of nature; and we should never
A Ed. C. Wilke (Leipzig, Teubner, 1905).
p. 147 )
Notes to page 146: 22. Frags. 5-). 23. Bk. 1 (ed. Diels), Cols. x—xv. 24. Cf. Sextus Adv. Math. XI.96. According to Aristotle, Eth. Nic. - 1172b.9 ff, Eudoxus used a similar argument. % E.g. III.296-307; IV.1192-1207. 25. % Meth. of Inf. XVIII.17-XIX.4. 26. Ὅ. cit., Col. 111. 27. Cols. 1v-v.
contradict appearances. Finally, he gives an empirical approach to the problem of relations. He attacks the stand that relativity has any metaphysical implications. Those who argue that beauty and ugliness are not real by nature because they vary with individuals and situations would also have to admit that largenéss, heaviness, and swiftness are unreal; but in doing so they would be going against the facts of experience. Polystratus’ own view is that we must recognize as equally real both objects which remain the same in all situations, such as bronze and stone, and relations which always vary with situations. Relations do not exist in the way that objects do, but they are none the less real; and it would be foolish to deny the existence of either objects or relations, or to try to reduce one to the other. Polystratus’ chief concern in this analysis of relations lies, of course, in the realm of value. He is defending the empirical view that values are not absolute in a Platonic sense, yet they are nevertheless real elements in human experience.
III. The Epicurean Mathematicians
Section titled “III. The Epicurean Mathematicians”After Polystratus there is again a break in our knowledge of Epicurean logical studies. One somewhat surprising movement that probably belongs to the late third or early second century is the introduction of mathematics into the Epicurean school. Basilides and his pupil Philonides became famous as Epicurean mathematicians, the latter being a friend of Apollonius of Perga. Whether these men tried to construct an empirical basis for mathematics is unknown, as their works are completely lost. We do know, however, that purely formal mathematics was attacked by Zeno of Sidon and Demetrius the Laconian, the teachers of Philodemus. They refused to recognize the validity of a system based on postulates; and apparently they maintained that mathematics is valid only p. 148 in 80 far as it is empirically grounded. Likewise Philodemus
Notes to page 147: 28. οἹ xva. 29. Cols. X11—-XXIX. 30. See Cronert, Kol., 87-89, 97.
fact that the square of four is the only square having its perimeter equal to its area does not hinder us from inferring by analogy; for all the square numbers tested by trial have shown that this distinction exists among them, so that one who denies it contradicts appearances.” In the Rhetoric also he says that the geometer, in common with other scientists, infers the unknown from the objects of perception. These passages clearly put mathematical truths on an empirical basis, and it is possible that Philodemus is here following a tradition established by the earlier Epicurean mathematicians Basilides and Philonides.
IV. Zeno of Sidon, Demetrius, and Philodemus
Section titled “IV. Zeno of Sidon, Demetrius, and Philodemus”From the end of the second century to the middle of the first century B.C. the Epicureans were much concerned with the problems of logic and methodology. They were stimulated by the controversies over methodology that were raised by the Middle Stoa, the New Academy, and the arts and sciences, especially medicine. Under the influence of the empirical sciences, and in opposition to Stoicism, they analyzed and formulated in more detail their own empirical method. Cicero refers to their activity in two passages, where he mentions the increased interest in methods of proof among the more recent Epicureans. It has been suggested that the Epicurean logicians, led by Zeno and Demetrius, were a small heretical group who did not have any lasting influence. There were, indeed, a number of factions within the Epicurean school in the time of Philodemus, but the issues involved are not very clear,?” p. 149 and it is often impossible to say which faction was closer to the teaching of Epicurus himself. In any case, the development of empirical methodology did not require any fundamental change of Epicurus’ principles, but only a further elaboration.
Notes to page 148: 31. Tbid. 109-111. % Rhel. II.38. . 32. De Fin.1.31; De Nat. Deor. I.46. % Cf. Philippson, De Philodemr Libro, 28-34; Bailey, Gk. Atom., 259, note 1. % Cf. Meth. of Inf. XXXI.8-16; Rhet. Suppl. 8, 24, 32-33, 44. 33. For instance, Philodemus apparently agrees with Bromius on the principles of inference, but disagrees with him on rhetoric.
The controversy between Epicurecans and Stoics on the validity of empirical inference will be treated in detail in the following chapter. It need only be mentioned here that Demetrius, Zeno, Bromius, and Philodemus all took part in the controversy. Besides the work On Methods of Inference Philodemus wrote several other works on logic, of which only brief fragments remain. Qutside of logic proper we find many indications that during this period the empirical approach was used also in the fields of aesthetics, rhetoric, the special arts and sciences, ethics, and religion.
A. Music, Poetry, and Rhetoric .
Epicurean aesthetics dates largely from the later period of ; Epicureanism. We have seen that the early Epicureans took a certain stand toward poetry and rhetoric, condemning them as unsuitable for the expression of philosophical thought; but in the works of Philodemus for the first time we find an appreciation of the intrinsic value of poetry, rhetoric, and also music. Philodemus follows the writings of his predecessors Demetrius and Zeno in this field.
Philodemus’ analysis of poetry and music is definitely empirical. It is closely united with his view of the nature of language and communication. He differentiates the relation of words to objects from the relation of words to the subjects who speak or hear them. The relation of words to objects 15 a purely conventional one, certain words being chosen for the sake of convenience to refer to certain objects. But the relation of words to subjects is a natural one. The actual sound of the word itself may express something to the hearer, even p. 150 it it does not belong to a language system at all. Animal cries are of this type. Now in the field of art, Philodemus points out that music is composed of sounds that do not refer to external objects, but derive their meaning and value entirely from their relations to the subjects that produce and hear them. He says further that the values presented by music are sharply distinct from all moral and practical values. Moral values are established by the empirical investigation of the relation of certain modes of conduct to the pursuit of the best life; and since music is not rational (ἄλογος), it could have no part in such an investigation. Any association in the hearer’s mind between songs and moral values is entirely a matter of opinion, and has no ground in the music itself. Likewise, music does not have the power to arouse men to action. For action is aroused by deliberation or impulse, both of which are outside the realm of music.*2 To be sure, laborers often sing at their work; but the song does not incite them to work, it merely produces some alleviation of their toil by bringing to them a certain amount of pleasure. It is clear that here Philodemus is denying the moral and practical values attributed to music by Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics.
Notes to page 149: 34. See Scott, Fragmenta Herculanen.sz’a, 27, 28-30, 32; Cronert, ‘“Die Λογικὰ Ζητήματα des Chrysippos,” Hermes xxxvi (1901), 548-579.
The art of poetry, according to Philodemus, differs from music 1η that its effect depends on both the sound of the words it uses and their reference to objects. In the best poetry these two elements are combined to give a single effect. It follows further that since the excellence of poetry lies in the success with which it accomplishes the synthesis of the expressive sound of the words with their reference to objects, it 15 wrong to judge poetry by any external standards, such as truth or morality. Philodemus also objects to saying that pleasure is the sole end of poetry, or that poetry must have p. 151 EPICUREAN LOGIC AND METIIODOLOGY 11 the double purpose of giving pleasure and instruction. All of these things he regards as irrelevant to the excellence of poetry as such.
Notes to page 150: 35. See above, 140; cf. P. De Lacy, ‘“The Epicurean Analysis of Lan- ᾿ guage,” Am. Journ. Philol. Lx (1939), 87-88. 36. Philod. On Music (ed. van Krevelen), 194. 37. Thid. 138-140. 38. 7014. 152. @ Ibid. 154.
The emotional and imaginative quality of poetry, Philodemus argues, makes impossible the use of poetry in philosophy. For philosophy strives after an empirical and scientific study of the world, and philosophical language should therefore have as little of the emotional element as possible. The poet, on the other hand, 15 not concerned with accuracy, but he selects from the world whatever he may best use to create his poetic effect. The philosopher makes a scientific description and classification of things according to their degrees of similarity; the poet confuses the most diverse things by emphasizing in his metaphors and similes points of resemblance that are for a philosopher very superficial. Therefore, Philodemus says, since poetry is not based on a sound empirical method it should be kept quite apart from philosophy. The philosopher should express his thought in simple prose, and the poet should not try to persuade by emotional appeal.
Philodemus’ discussion of rhetoric, or literary prose, also grows out of his basic empirical point of view. As in the case of poetry, he allows as legitimate any rhetorical composition which is written merely for display. The cultivation of fine writing, which he calls sophistic rhetoric, is a recognized art. Yet he finds that most rhetoricians write not merely for display, but for a practical purpose, namely, to persuade their hearers that something is true or good. That is, they are using expressive sounds of words and poetic metaphors and images to create an effect in the listeners that will lead to
τ belief or action. From an aesthetic point of view they destroy
See Philod. On Poems 11 (ed. Hausrath); v (ed. Jensen); A. Rostagni, “Filodemo contro I’Estetica Classica,” Rivista di Filol. LI (1923), 401-423; LII (1924), 1-28; “Sulle Tracce di un’Estetica dell’Intuizione presso gli Antichi,”” Atene e Roma 1 (1920), 46-57.
Section titled “See Philod. On Poems 11 (ed. Hausrath); v (ed. Jensen); A. Rostagni, “Filodemo contro I’Estetica Classica,” Rivista di Filol. LI (1923), 401-423; LII (1924), 1-28; “Sulle Tracce di un’Estetica dell’Intuizione presso gli Antichi,”” Atene e Roma 1 (1920), 46-57.”% Philod. On Poems 11 (ed. Hausrath), 254, 265; On Music (ed. van Krevelen), 202; cf. Rhet. I.149-154, 369. p. 152 the artistic unity of their work by introducing an external end. They try to unite a purely cognitive or moral problem with emotional expression.*” From the practical point of view Philodemus argues that they enchant their hearers by an emotional appeal and thus obscure the thought of what they are saying. They may intentionally increase the obscurity to cover the actual weakness of their argument. Rhetoric is therefore not a legitimate science, because it tries to establish true propositions without using an empirical scientific method. Rhetoric, like poetry, must be avoided by the philosopher and the scientist. B. Arts and Sciences
Notes to page 151: 39. Philod. Rhet. Suppl. 34, 61.
While discussing the unscientific nature of rhetoric, Philodemus outlines the empirical method which he considers fundamental to all of the special arts and sciences. Ηφ does not accept the trial-and-error empiricism that rests on mere familiarity and practice, but insists that the peculiar nature of art or science lies in ‘““method and the transmission of certain common principles applicable to particular cases.” . Philodemus recognizes that some arts are more exact than others, the less exact béing called conjectural. Here the word art (τέχνη), of course, 15 used in a very broad sense to refer to all organized bodies of knowledge. Among the exact arts he includes painting, music, and grammar; among the conjectural medicine and navigation. An essential quality of all arts 15 that they be derived entirely from experience. Even in the exact arts the basic principles are learned through familarity with a number of particular cases; this same condition prevails in the conjectural arts, which rest entirely on empirical probabilities. Hence it is essential that every art, even mathematics, have certain basic principles established by empirical p. 153 method. There is a methodological unity of all the arts and sciences; for though they have special subject matters and special techniques, they all use empirical inference from the apparent to the unknown. C. Ethics
Notes to page 152: 40. Cf. P. )ὲ Lacy, “The Epicurean Analysis of Language,” Am. Journ. Philol. Lx (1939), 89-90. 41. Rhet. I.156-158, 163; I.33 = II.257. 42. See above, 136. 43. Rhet. Suppl. 30.
Among the special ficlds amenable to empirical treatment Philodemus includes the study of ethics. He says in the Rhetoric that the Epicureans accept the common meanings of good and bad and suppoft them by inductive reasoning.% This statement is quite in harmony with the doctrine already mentioned that philosophy begins with the language of everyday life and works on from there. By an inductive inference which they themselves regarded as necessarily valid, the Epicureans established that pleasure is the greatest good. They based their inference on what they believed to be an empirical fact, namely, that all men and animals naturally seek pleasure. Here they also used their theory of ‘‘anticipation,”” arguing that the term good is naturally associated with pleasure. Once the greatest good was established, all other ethical study was reduced to the problem of what contributes to pleasure and what does not. The term good is always relative to the highest good,’” and the problem of finding out what is instrumentally good may be solved by inductive inference. Philodemus states that by careful and extensive observation, joined with a memory of similarities and differences and an empirical knowledge of consequences, one can avold those things which do not lead to happiness.’ Philodemus’ own writings reveal the extent to which he used an empirical method in treating ethical problems. In his work p. 154 On Anger, for instance, he declares his intention of establishing
Notes to page 153: 44. Ibid. Suppl. 35; II.38. 45. I’bid. II.37-39. 46. Ibid. I.254. 47. 7ρ14. I.248. % Sextus Adv. Math. XI.96; Cic. De Fin.1.30; II.32. 48. % See Cic. De Fin. I.42; Tusc. Disp. V.95-96. 49. Rhet. I.218. 50. Ibid. II.30-31.
by inductive inference the essential nature of this emotion.%
He starts from the evidence that is given (pavepér),’ and on
that basis he constructs his inferences. Often when the text
of the work is too fragmentary to be fully understood, the empirical orientation may be recognized by the occurrence of
the words ἐπιλογισμός (inductive inference), ἀδιανοησία (inconceivability), and other technical terms of Epicurean logic.%
Further evidence of empirical method in ethics may be seen in the work On Household Management, where Philodemus discusses the ethical value of the accumulation of wealth. Here Philodemus reduces the problem to one of ambiguity of terms. He then rejects dialectical definitions, and by fixing ὑ the meaning of good by an appeal to the ‘“anticipation’’ that good is pleasure, he argues that the best manager is not one who is most skillful at amassing wealth, but rather the one who acquires only such wealth as is conducive to the best life. Philodemus points out that it is a fact of experience that wealth and happiness are not necessarily correlative.5?
Among the empirical elements in Philodemus’ ethical writings should also be mentioned the criticism of Platonic dialectic in the work On Vices. This criticism is quite in the spirit of the remarks of Colotes already mentioned. In another place Philodemus suggests the possibility of determining empirically that which is most detrimental to friendship. In view of the uniformly empirical orientation observable in even the short fragments of Philodemus’ ethical works, it is perhaps not impossible that when the Herculanean papyri are more fully understood we shall find that Philodemus undertook to formulate a comprehensive ethical system on empirical grounds.
p. 155 1). Religion
Notes to page 154: 51. On Anger (ed. Wilke), 25. 52. 7014. 16, 18, 24. ) 53. E.g. ib2d. 23, 89, 91, 92; cf. also Philippson, ‘“Philodems Buch Uber den Zorn,” Rhein. Mus. LXXI (1916), 431-432, 441, 451, 458. 54. On Household Management (ed. Jensen), 43-59. 55. On Vices (ed. Jensen), 39. 56. Usener, Epic., Frag. 552.
Finally, Philodemus’ works on religion provide an excellent example of his use of empirical method. He tells us that the gods are known in two ways, by immediate experience through mental perception, and by analogical inference. From mental perception of the gods we know that they exist; but their nature, which is unperceived, must be “‘inferred from appearances.”’ % Τῃ conformity with this principle Philodemus deter-
i mines the shape, wisdom, and activity of the gods by analogy with men.” The formulation of an empirical basis for knowing the nature of the gods is undoubtedly much older than Philodemus. The same procedure was probably followed by Epicurus himself. Not only in Philodemus, but also in Book 1 of Cicero’s De Natura Deorum empirical inferences occur and even the technical terms of Epicurean logic. Whether similitudine et transitione in I. is a free translation of μετάβασις καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα 15 a disputed question; yet apart from that we may see clearly the appeal to inconceivability and the use of analogical inference from signs.5?
This brief survey of the works of Philodemus has shown the extent to which the later Epicureans employed their empirical method in all the branches of philosophy. Certain technical terms and forms of argument stand out as the characteristic marks of this empirical approach. One of the most basic is the insistence on the empirical extension of terms, with the consequent exclusion of art and dialectic from the realm of philos- p. 156 ophy. Another is the appeal to ‘“‘anticipation,” the common meaning that has come to be empirically associated with a term η the ordinary language of the people. Closely related with this is the use of inconceivability as a basis for rejecting any doctrine that does not accord with experience. In the construction of empirical inferences the need of wide observation of similarities and differences is constantly emphasized, and inferences about unperceived objects are verified, when possible, by reference to immediate experience.
Notes to page 155: 57. On “the Gods 1 (ed. Diels), Col. 11; cf. Philippson, ‘“Zu Philodems Schrift Uber die Frommigkeit,”” Hermes LVI (1921), 374; De Philod. Libro, 71-78. 58. On the Gods 111 (ed. Diels), Col. viir; cf. Col. xi1r, frags. 13, 48. 59. Cf. E. Bignone, ‘Philodemea,’” Riv. di Filol. XLVII (1919), 414-422; also Philippson, *“Zur Epikureischen Gotterlehre,” Hermes LI (1916), 568~ 60. ; “Die Gotterlehre der Epikureer,” Rhein. Mus. Lxxxui1 (1934), 171- 61. . A few important ancient texts, besides those already mentioned, are Philod. Meth. of Inf. XXII, XXVII; On the Gods 1, Col. vir; Usener, Epic., Fr. 356. 62. Cf. Bailey, Gk. Atom., 590-594. 63. E.g. )ὲ Nat. Deor. I.24, 25, 30, 36, 43, 46.
The empirical method which we find fully elaborated in the works of Philodemus appears in a rudimentary form in the works of Epicurus himself. Epicurus speaks of inconceivability and inductive inference,” although there is no detailed account of method in the preserved fragments of his work. It is probable that the later Epicureans added much to the development of this method, and on the more technical side they were led to analyze and clarify their point of view further by a prolonged controversy with the Stoics on the correct method of inference. The main issues in this controversy will be discussed in the following chapter.
™ Cf. Diog. Laer. X., 47, 59, 60, 68, 71-73, 97, 133.
Chapter VI: The Logical Controversies of the Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics
Section titled “Chapter VI: The Logical Controversies of the Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics”p. 157 The treatise of Philodemus On Methods of Inference presents in a clear fashion the basic issues involved in the conflict between the rationalists of the Stoa and the empiricists of the Garden. This material, added to fragments of Chrysippus and the material given by Sextus Empiricus in his account of the Sceptic polemic against both the dogmatic schools, enables us to reconstruct in some detail the basic principles of Stoic logic. As we have already noted, both Epicureans and Stoics built their logic on inference from signs; and their divergent treatment of signs reveals the fundamental difference between the two systems of philosophy.
I. Stoic Logic
Section titled “I. Stoic Logic”Chrysippus defines logic as the science about signs and things signified. Logic in this broad sense includes grammar as well as logic, since words are signs. Logic in the narrow sense is limited to the analysis of the things signified, or concepts (λεκτά), which form the basis of propositions and syllogisms.
The Stoics 1solate three factors of the symbolic relation in their analysis of truth:
“They (the Stoics) say that there are three factors joined to each other, the thing signified, the sign, and the object. Of these, the sign is the word, for example the word ‘Dion’; the thing signified is the thing indicated by the word, which we grasp in our concept of a co-existent entity, but which the barbarians do not understand although they hear the word; and the object, that which exists externally, as Dion himself. Two of ! Diog. Laer. VII.; see E. De Lacy, ‘“Meaning and Methodology in
Hellenistic Philosophy,” Philos. Rev. XLVII (1938), 390—409. p. 158 these are material, the word and the object; and one imma-
terial, the thing signified, or concept, which is true or false.” 2 The Epicureans, on the other hand, deny the existence of the intermediary concept, and insist that words have only the objective or extensional reference.
Again, the Stoics emphasize the hypothetical proposition rather than the categorical syllogism of Aristotle. This distinction is of importance in the analysis of signs and signrelations in the Stoic system. Aristotle used the term ‘‘sign”’ for a certain type of defective argument. The Stoics, however, define the sign formally as ‘““the proposition in a sound condition which is antecedent and reveals the conclusion.” ? Here the relation between sign and thing signified is expressed in the form of the hypothetical proposition, “If p, then q.” If such a relation holds, p may be said to be the sign of q.
The reason for this new emphasis on the part of the Stoics lies partly in an analysis of the nature of reason and the reasoning process, and partly in their metaphysical scheme. Man differs from animals in his power of conception, and in the combining and synthesizing power of his reason. The sign-relation, ‘‘If this, then this,”” expresses the essence and character of reason. In the Stoic metaphysical scheme, reason rules the world conceived of as a completely deterministic system. All things are connected rationally in a necessary causal chain. Natural events must be necessary as expressions of the universal reason. The contingency of matters of fact is only apparent, in that the finite mind has only a partial view of the interrelatedness of things.
The predominance of the hypothetical proposition in the Stoic scheme indicates their emphasis on the necessary connec- p. 159 tion betwcen concepts and propositions on the logical level, and between the parts of an interrelated whole on the metaphysical level. The shift in stress from the terms themselves in the categorical propositions and syllogisms of the Aristotelian logic to the relation existing between the terms and propositions expressed by the hypothetical proposition results in the recognition of the relation of necessary consequence, which allows for the inference of one proposition from another.
Notes to page 158: 1. Sextus Adv. Math. VIII.11-12. The translations from Sextus and . Philodemus are our own. 2. Ibid. 13. See above, 139-140. 3. See above, 127. b Loc. cit. 245. 4. Ibid. 275-276.
The definition of a sign as the ‘‘proposition in a sound condition which is antecedent and reveals the conclusion’ 1πηvolves first of all an analysis of the conditions for a sound hypothetical proposition. Such a proposition has several criteria. According to the first criterion, the only unsound proposition is one in which the first term is true and the second 15 false. The Stoic table of sound propositions is as follows: p. 160 of the premisses, as in the argument:
Notes to page 159: 5. . ““If it 15 day, it 15 light.”—sound. The premiss 15 true and the conclusion 15 true. 6. . ““If the earth flies, 1t has wings.””—sound. The premiss is false and the conclusion 15 false. _ 7. . “Τ| the earth exists, 1{ flies.”—unsound. The premiss 15 true and the conclusion false. 8. . ““If the earth flies, it exists.”’—sound. The premiss 15 9. false and the conclusion true. The second criterion for a sound condition involves not the literal truth or falsity of the propositions concerned, but the nature of the relation or connection holding between them. The argument 15 sound when the conclusion follows as a consequence of the ‘““weaving together’ (συμπλοκή) or connection Τ Sextus Pyrrh. Hyp. B.113. 10. This is also the only case in symbolic logic in which the relation of material implication between propositions does not hold. It is interesting to note that the Stoics found it necessary to distinguish a loose and a strict type of implication, analogous to material and strict implication of modern symbolic logic. 11. Sextus Pyrrh. Hyp. Β.105. ͵
“If it is day, it is light,
“Itis day,
““Therefore, it is light.”” 10 The relation between the antecedent as the sign and the conclusion as the signified is one of necessary consequence, which is based on an analytic relation between the two parts of the proposition. The conclusion (the signified) 15 implicitly or potentially contained in the antecedent (the sign). This accounts for the necessary connection between them. According to the relation of necessary consequence,’?> or contraposition, as it is called in the terminology of the later Stoics, the sign and thing signified are so connected that the contradiction of the conclusion, or the signified, involves the contradiction of the antecedent or sign, as: p. 161 unperceived. This involves the validity of a proposition of the type: “If perspiration flows on the surface of the skin, ““There are imperceptible pores in the skin.” The inference here is made from an apparent fact, the appearance of perspiration, to an unperceived fact, the existence of imperceptible pores in the skin. Is the Stoic now in the realm of synthetic propositions about matters of fact and therefore involved in contingency rather than in necessity and certainty? This he flatly denies. The fact that perspiration flows reveals (is the sign of) the existence of pores on the assumption that a liquid does not flow through a solid body. The relation is then claimed to be as necessary as an a prior: one, involving an analytic relation between the two objects. The Stoic applies his test of contraposition: “If there were no pores, ““Perspiration could not flow.” Therefore, the appearance of perspiration is necessarily the sign of the existence of such pores. It need only be pointed out that without the premiss that there is a necessary connection between the two objects, the Stoic argument is not valid. In the Stoic scheme the a priori and analytic relation between concepts is used as the pattern for causal relations on the physical level. The concept of day involves the concept of light, so that the proposition “If it is day, it is light”’ 15 necessary. Accordingly, on the level of objects, the Stoics say that day is the cause of light and hence the sign of it. Thus the relation between objects is determined a prior:. Objects are divided into the two classes of the apparent and the unperceived.’ The apparent, being apprehended imme14 Sextus Pyrrh. Hyp. B.97-99; cf. the Epicurean division, above, 142— 144. p. 162 diately and by themselves, need no signs. Signs, however, are necessary η making inferences about unperceived objects. These latter are divided into three classes: p. 163 a number of different disecases. By applying the test of contraposition we find that the common sign is not valid, for . even if one disease characterized by fever were excluded, the fever might still remain. The true indicative sign must be ὶ the particular sign of its object in such a way that it refers to only one object.
II. Controversy between Stoics and Epicureans
Section titled “II. Controversy between Stoics and Epicureans”Ϊ Philodemus’ treatise On Methods of Inference provides a comprehensive account of the logical controversy between ’ Stoics and Epicureans. The Stoic position as presented here ~ is that the only valid process of inference through signification : 15 that of contraposition (ἀνασκευή). The distinction is first ; made, as we have indicated, between the common sign, which exists whether the unperceived object which it signifies exists ΐ or not, and the particular sign, which exists only when the Ῥ unperceived object exists, and which is tested by contraζ position. ’ Before discussing the Epicurean position in this controversy, let us consider further the more important arguments advanced by the Stoics against the Epicureans. The Epicurean method of analogy, the Stoics contend, breaks down if ᾽ there are unique cases within our experience, for if appearances are not completely uniform we cannot infer from what occurs in our experience to that which is unperceived.!” If there are unique cases in our experience there might also be unique cases outside our experience which would destroy the possibility of analogy. For example, the magnet is the only rock in our experience which draws iron. The unknown might contain many other peculiarities.
Notes to page 160: 12. 1t 1s day, it 15 light ““It 15 not light, ““Therefore, it is not day.” This brief account of Stoic logic indicates that for the Stoics necessary truth must be a priors and analytic. The conclusion 13. regarded as necessary when 1{ 15 seen to be included at least implicitly in the antecedent. Therefore, the Stoics should exclude all synthetic truths from a priori knowledge and consequently all necessity from truths about objects. In a proposition of the type, “Tf it is day, it is light,” day may be considered the sign of light; yet as both day and light are appearances equally evident, the inference 15 not very significant. The real issue between the Stoics and Epicureans 15 the validity of inference from appearances to the 14. 7ρ14. 113. 15. 17014. 112. 16. συνάρτησις: Ibid. 111. A. Schmekel, 1216 Positive Philosophie Vol. 1, 521-532, discusses this aspect of Stoic logic. 17. ἀνασκευή: Philod. Meth. of Inf. IV.11.
Notes to page 162: 18. . Objects that are altogether or completely unperceived, as whether the number of stars is odd or even. This class of objects 15 forever incomprehensible and unknowable because of our human finitude and the great scope of the objects. 19. . Objects unperceived at the time, that is, accidentally unperceived because of attendant circumstances. For example, the city of Athens is now not perceived by me. 20. . Objects which are unperceived by nature and must be known by means of other things which are evident. These form the class of objects signified by the “‘indicative’ sign, which by 15 very nature points out or reveals them.?® The relation between sign and signified 15 a natural and necessary one. For example, the imperceptible pores of the skin are known through the flowing of perspiration, which serves as the indicative sign. Perspiration could not flow except on the condition that there were these imperceptible pores on the surface of the skin. In similar fashion, the movements of the body are by their very nature indicative of the soul within. In the latter case the relation is distinctly a causal one; the movement of the body 15 the effect of the soul. The indicative sign can claim necessity only on the Stoic assumption that there 1s a necessary connection between certain objects, such that one can serve as the distinguishing sign of the other. The characterization of the indicative sign involves the further distinction between the general or common sign, and the particular or individual sign, a distinction attributed to the Stoics by Philodemus.’® A general or common sign is indicative of more than one object; hence it cannot serve as the basis of a valid inference. For example, fever could not be used as the sign of any certain disease, for it is a symptom of 21. Iind. 101. 22. Meth. ο Inf. I.1-19,
The Stoics maintain further that the argument from analogy is valid only in so far as it can be reduced to that of contraposition. The Epicurean inference of the mortality of all men from the mortality of men in our experience should be p. 164 stated as follows:
Notes to page 163: 23. Ibid. I.19-II.25.
““Since men in our experience are mortal,
“If there are men in other places who are similar to men in our experience in all respects, including mortality,
“They are mortal.”’ 18
This argument shows that the Stoics insist on an analytic relation as a condition for valid inference. Accordingly, they regard the analogical argument as valid only it the characteristics on which it is based belong to the essence and definition of man. Because of the wide variations occurring within our experience, the essential characteristics of things cannot be established empirically, but must be established a priors.
The Epicureans, the Stoics say, contradict their own method of analogy. Bodies in our experience are all destructible and have color; yet the Epicureans say that atoms, which are also bodies, are indestructible and colorless. The method of analogy would require that the atoms be destructible and have color.
The Stoics challenge the Epicureans again on their theory that the sun is just as large as it appears to be. From empirical observation they must hold that,
‘““All objects in our experience that reappear slowly from behind objects that eclipse them have this character either because they move slowly, or because they are very large.
““Since the sun reappears slowly, it must of necessity have one of these two characteristics.
“But it does not move slowly, since it completes the path from sunrise to sunset in twelve hours, passing through a very great distance;
“Therefore, it must be very large.”” 20 Furthermore, in regard to the degree of similarity required
for analogy, the Stoics say, the Epicureans face a dilemma:
p. 165 A. If the completely alike is the basis of the analogy, the sign and thing signified (the evident and the unperceived) would be identical, differing only in number; hence there would be no inference.
Notes to page 164: 24. 7014. II.37-III.4. 25. 701ἀ4. V.1-17. 26. Ibid. X.4-16.
Β. If the merely similar is the basis, the very difference present in the unperceived might be enough to destroy the analogy.
The Epicureans hold that when nothing opposes or conflicts with their conclusions, their analogy is valid. But, the Stoics ask, how can we be certain that there is not something already experienced, or yet to be experienced in the future, which contradicts the present conclusions? Such conclusions are at best only tentative and provisional.
In summary, the Stoics hold that the Epicureans can find in their empiricism no basis for inference from the given appearances to the large part of reality that is not immediately perceived. No argument based on the observation of the mere succession of similar occurrences or their constant conjunction can achieve necessity and certainty. -
In answer to the Stoic polemic Philodemus contends that the Stoic a priori method of inference by contraposition is in reality based upon analogy and induction, and that it derives its certainty from that basis. Our experience furnishes us with the best and only criterion for judging the things that are unperceived; for by analogy with events and objects in our experience we can infer certain facts about the existence and character of objects lying outside our experience. For example, we conclude from the mortality of all men in our experience to the mortality of all men everywhere. We need not presuppose, as the Stoics contend, that all men are like the men Π our experience in respect to mortality; but ‘““from the fact that all men in our experience are similar even 1Π respect to mortality, we infer that all men universally are liable to death, since nothing opposes the inference.”” 338
A 7014. VI.1-14; XIX.25-36.
p. 166 !
Notes to page 165: 27. [bid, ντι.38—ντιι.7. B 7υιὦ, XVI.16-23.
The Epicureans hold that since the Stoic position rests ultimately on induction from experience, it the method of analogy has no necessity or compulsion, the Stoic inference has none. In the argument, ,
“If there is motion, there is void,” motion is taken as the sign of void. The Stoic test is an α priort one; the denial of the thing signified (the void) results in the simultaneous denial of the sign (the motion). The Epicureans, on the other hand, hold that no such conclusion is possible from the a prior:t point of view until we find from observation of experience that motion does not occur without ’ void. In the words of Philodemus, ““Establishing by induction all the constant conditions for things that are moved within our experience, apart from which we see nothing moved, we judge by analogy that all objects that are moved are moved in every case under these conditions; and by this method we infer that it is not possible for motion to exist without void.” 5: Thus the abstract principle of the Stoics can be formulated only after experience justifies it through an argument based on analogy. Therefore, the Epicurean concludes, the argument of contraposition can claim no certainty if analogy has none, as the latter is the source and ultimate criterion of the former.
Philodemus says further that the Stoics should distinguish two types of inference. According to the first, if the second term is denied by hypothesis, the first term is necessarily denied also, as in the proposition,
““If there is motion, there is void.”
The Stoics contend that in this proposition by the mere nega- ὑ tion of void, motion is also removed; and therefore it is an example of contraposition.
p. 167 But there is a second type of inference, according to which it is impossible to conceive that the sign exists or is such as it is, while the thing signified does not exist, or is not such as it is. ‘‘For example,
Notes to page 166: 28. Ibid. VIII.32-IX.3. % Iind. XII.1-14,
‘Plato is a man, and Socrates is a man.’ If this is true, it is true also that, p. 168 the only stone that will draw iron does not destroy the possibility of an analogy; on the contrary, the very peculiarity of magnets provides a basis for analogy. If some magnets drew iron, and some did not, an analogical argument about magnets would be invalid. But since all magnets in our experience draw iron without exception, we can legitimately conclude that it is characteristic of all magnets, wherever they are found, to do this. Similarly, nothing hinders the generalization that the square of four always has its perimeter equal to its area, even though it differs from all other square numbers in this respect.
Notes to page 167: 29. If Socrates is not a man, neither is Plato a man;’ not because by the denial of Socrates Plato is denied along with him, but because it 15 inconceivable for Socrates not to be a man and Plato to be a man.” 2 Inconceivability, however, 30. an empirical criterion. A thing 15 inconceivable only in terms of our experience, and the argument of inconceivability 31. basically an analogical argument.?” The Stoics, Philodemus maintains, cannot avoid an appeal to inconceivability. By means of the criterion of inconceivability Philodemus answers the Stoic argument from particular signs. Philodemus accepts the distinction between particular and common signs, and he agrees that only particular signs are valid bases for inference. But he states that not every inference from a particular sign is an instance of the method of contraposition, for the method of analogy, using the test of inconceivability, 32. also able to establish particular signs.?? One of the chief Stoic objections to inductive inference was that such inference breaks down 1{ there are unique cases in our experience; for there might also be unique cases beyond experience which would destroy analogy. The Epicureans recognize that completely unique and unpredictable events would certainly render inductive reasoning and analogy extremely ineffective except in a very narrow range. They claim, however, that the Stoics have not invalidated empirical reasoning, because the Stoics have not proved the existence of any absolutely unique events. The fact that the magnet 15 % Ibid. XII.19-30. . 33. Ibid. XII.30-31; XXI.27-29. The Stoics would probably not grant this. 34. Ibid. χιν.2—21. -
Furthermore, Philodemus holds, the range of deviation among given appearances is always limited; hence we can expect a similar limited range of variation to occur outside our experience. Differences are subject to the same test of experience as similarities. For example, although within our experience men are found to vary a great deal, yet we cannot go 80 far as to conceive of men who are made of iron and who are able to go through walls as we go through air. The degree of certainty of an inference is often relative to the amount of variation observable. We can establish a fixed and certain analogical inference, for instance, regarding the actions of certain poisons; but only relative analogies can be established on the goodness or badness of foods. Yet even here the range of deviation is limited. We could never go 80 far as to conclude that there might be men who eat straw and digest it.3!
From the observation of constant similarities, the Epicurcans hold, we are able to establish the nature of things as such. From the fixed limit of variation observed in regard to human mortality, we infer that
“Men as men are mortal.” Thus the necessary truths which the Stoics considered analytic p. 169 and a priori are really established by induction from experience.’> The definitive or prescriptive level of analysis 15 secondary to the descriptive level, since the latter furnishes the material and a certain amount of the order and structure from which the former is derived and formulated. Deductive logic is subsequent to inductive logic in order of development because iit depends on the latter. The discussion of the relation of deductive and formal logic to inductive logic and empirical method is, of course, very inadequate in Philodemus. The Epicureans do not appreciate the freedom which is subsequently possible on the definitive level, and the peculiar necessity attaching to the formal system within the confines of that level.
Notes to page 168: 35. Tbid. XIV.28-XVI.1. 36. ὕρτᾷ, XX5.30-xx01.2. ’ 37. Jnd., XXV.24-XXVI.9.
It may be noted that the Epicureans realize the importance of the social factor in empirical verification. Philodemus says: “We collect not only the signs appearing to us or tested by our experience, but also the appearances taken from observation by others. Do those who have never been there doubt that Crete and Sicily are islands? And therefore we say that the method of analogy is a sound method of inference, with this condition, that no other appearance or previously demonstrated fact conflicts with the inference.”” 3 One of the Stoic charges was that the Epicureans were inconsistent in not attributing destructibility and color to atoms, since these qualities belong to all bodies in experience. In defense of the Epicurean position Philodemus maintains that ““Bodies in our experience are destructible not as bodies, but in so far as they partake of a nature opposed to the corporeal and non-resistant.”’ 34 Likewise, color is not a quality of bodies as bodies, for some bodies sometimes do not have color. Philodemus is here giving an empirical justification of the important distinction between primary and secondary qualities made first by Democ2 7ρ01ὦ. XVI.29-XVII.; ΧΧΙΧ.4—5: XXXII.21-XXXV.. , 8 7014. ΧΧΧΊΙ.14—27. % 1014. XVII.37-XVII.. p. 170 ritus. Some distinction obviously has to be made between qualities which are constant in experience and those which are inconstant and variable. Inferences between objects which are similar only in genus must be limited to those qualities which are found in all members of the genus. Color, for example, does not seem to be a generic similarity of bodies, yet tangibility and weight are such generic similarities. The latter, therefore, are qualities of bodies as bodies, and may be used in analogical inference. Lucretius’ account of the various senses and his attempt to reduce the other senses to touch indicate that the distinction between primary and secondary qualities was traditional in the Epicurean school.
Philodemus is somewhat less successful in trying to justify empirically the Epicurean view that the sun is only as large as iit appears. He iinsists that in attacking this view the Stoics use an analogical argument; hence their attack is not directed against the use of the method of analogy. Yet he insists further that analogical inference cannot apply to the sun, since the sun, like time and the soul, is unique. Being unique, it cannot be known by analogy.?” The weakness of Philodemus’ position here is obvious.
The Stoic argument that inference cannot be based on either identity or similarity forces Philodemus to define more specifically the relation of signification. The inference from any chance object to any other is obviously not permissible. In a true analogy from similarity the transition is made from one class or particular to the class or particular which is most like it, when nothing opposes such a transition. Inference should be made from a particular man to another particular man, from the class of men to the class of animals most closely related to men, from the genus of animals to the most closely related genus, and 50 on up to the most comprehensive genus. Thus
% Ibhid. XVII.3-17. p. 171 inference can be made between similar objects in so far as they are members of the same general class. Inference may be made between identical objects it there is a difference in accompanying circumstances, that is, conditions of time and space.3?
Notes to page 170: 38. De Rerum Natura I.298-304; II.408—-443. 39. T 0p. cit. IX.12-38; X.17-XI.8. 40. Ibid. XVII.17-XIX 4.
The Epicureans hold that it is not necessary to examine all appearances before making an empirical inference, but
“We must consider many homogeneous and varied appearances, so that from our experience of them and from the accounts of history concerning them we may take the inseparable constituent of each of them individually, and from these we may infer to all the others.”” #0
The number of cases necessary for a valid inference varies
with the situation. Sometimes, one instance may be suffi-
cient basis for the inference; sometimes only a few observed
instances. At other times even a large number of instances ’ fails to remove all πποργίαιηίν. ” This problem is closely re-
lated to the distinction between variable and constant proper-
ties of objects. Philodemus’ position is that induction is as
certain as the given data of experience, and as such gains
a degree of probability in proportion as it is confirmed by
experience:
““One ought not to stop with the apparent, but from the : apparent make inferences about the unperceived; nor mistrust the facts proved through apparent objects according to analogy, but trust them just as one trusts the facts from which the inference is made.”” 4
III. The Sceptic Position
Section titled “III. The Sceptic Position”The works of Sextus Empiricus reveal that the Empirical Sceptics also participated in the controversy on the validity of inference from signs. The second book of Sextus’ attack 3 7ρτα, XXII.2-28. 40 7014. XX.35-XXI.. Cf. J. S. Mill’s Method of Agreement, System of Logic (London, Longmans, Green, 1906), 253 {. % 0p. cit. XXVI.32-39, ) 2 Ibid. Frag. 11. , p. 172 on the logicians expresses the views of the Sceptics on this problem. This book contains a rigorous polemic against both the Stoic and the Epicurean treatment of signs; and at the same time it reveals Sextus’ own position, namely, a positive empiricism based on a sceptical approach.
Though Sextus attacks both Epicureans and Stoics, he considers the Stoics his arch opponents. Sextus objects not to the method of the Epicureans, but to their attempt to use that method as a basis of a dogmatic metaphysics. Sextus holds that a consistent empirical method leads, not to negative scepticism at one extreme, nor to dogmatic metaphysics at the other, but to phenomenalism. Sextus’ method, like the Epicurean, 15 based on an empirical theory of signs. Yet he goes further than the Epicureans, in that he rejects all use of indicative signs (1.e., particular signs), and uses in their stead admonitive signs, which have their basis entirely within an empirical theory of meaning. His purpose seems to be primarily epistemological, to determine the limits and legitimate objects of our inquiry and knowledge.
The dogmatists, Sextus points out, assert that objects unperceived by nature, as well as those accidentally unperceived at the time, are known through the medium of signs. Accordingly, Sextus differentiates two kinds of signs corresponding to
the two classes of objects signified. The admonitive sign designates things unperceived at the time or through attendant circumstances; the indicative sign designates things unperceived by nature. The admonitive sign may be defined as ‘‘an object which has been observed along with another object (the signified) at some time in the past, and which, recurring when that other object is not perceived, leads us to the recollection of the object which accompanied it, now not evidently experi- p. 173 enced.” ¥ For example, we say that smoke is the sign of fire; for we have observed by direct experience in the past their conjunction on many occasions, so that now, on seeing the one, namely, the smoke, we immediately recall the other, the fire, which is not itself visible. In the same way a scar is the sign of a wound. The relation between sign and thing signified may sometimes be a causal one, as in the case of smoke and fire; yet frequently admonitive signs are related only arbitrarily to the things they signify, as in the case of words and signals of various kinds. Sextus avoids the terms cause and effect, in order to maintain a strictly empirical explanation, and to avoid the assumption of a necessary connection between sign and thing signified.
Notes to page 172: 41. Sextus Adv. Math. VIII.141-299, Schmekel (Die Positive Philosophie I.350-395) discusses Sextus’ criticisms of the dogmatists. For a fuller discussion of Sextus’ own position 566 E. De Lacy, ‘“ Meaning and Methodology in Hellenistic Philosophy,” Philos. Rev. XLVII (1938), 406—409. 42. Adv. Math. ντII.151—155.
The indicative sign designates objects unperceived by nature, that is, things-in-themselves, beyond phenomena. This type of sign-relation cannot be constructed on the basis of experience, since the object signified is not experienced and so not capable of being observed along with anything that appears. The indicative sign must be necessarily indicative of what it signifies, and known a priors and apart from experience.*’
Sextus accepts the admonitive sign but rejects the indicative sign. The admonitive sign is valid because it has its basis in daily experience and is necessary for the development of any art or science, as the means of generalizing beyond the moment and individual. The indicative sign, on the contrary, 15 fashioned by the dogmatic philosophers and rational physicians to furnish evidence to them of the nature of things-in-themselves. The Empirical Sceptic does not intend to contest the
% 7014. 152. p. 174 common conceptions of men based on experience, nor to render life chaotic by denying that there are any signs at all. The removal of all signs would conflict with our daily experiences. We actually do know fire from smoke, a wound from a scar, and that death will result from a wound in the heart. Sextus admits, then, the validity of the admonitive sign, which life requires; but he rejects the indicative sign as contrary to experience and therefore meaningless.
Notes to page 173: 43. JTbid. 154. 44. See the discussion of the Stoic sign, above, 158. Sextus, like Philodemus, fails to see how definitions and forms of reasoning retain a certain form of necessity within a formal system. He does recognize a type of analytic or tautological proof, which is irrefutable, but he does not feel that it is significant. 45. 0p. cit. 156.
Pushing his analysis further, Sextus points out that a sign belongs to the class of relatives. A sign must always be the sign of something. There are four possible ways of considering the sign and the thing signified:
A. An appearance may be the sign of another appearance.
Β. An unperceived object, of another unperceived object.
C. An appearance, of an unperceived object.
D. An unperceived object, of an appearance.
Clearly in order to be effective, a sign must be limited to 4. and C. Either one appearance is the sign of another, as a shadow is the sign of a body, or an appearance is the sign of something unperceived, as a blush is the sign of shame.
Or again, signs must be known either by perception or by reason. The Epicureans hold that the sign is perceived, while the Stoics hold that the sign is intelligible, and grasped only by thought. To the Epicurean view Sextus retorts that signs as sensible are subject to the disagreement and relativity of sense perception.> Ἐ indicative signs are sensible they should affect all people alike, barbarians and Greeks, artists and laymen.” That this is not the case is shown by the disagreement among physicians about the causes of the same symptoms. Fire, as we perceive it, has various powers in respect to different materials. It melts wax but hardens p. 175 clay and consumes wood. Likewise the sign as sensible appears to indicate different objects to different persons and to the same person on different occasions. Such relativity 15 admittedly the case with admonitive signs. Α signal indicates to enemies an attack, to friends a safe return. In the case of the admonitive sign we can agree among ourselves that a certain signal is to signify a certain thing. But there can be no such arbitrary agreement in the case of indicative signs. An indicative sign must by its very nature be the sign of one thing, not of many. Sextus concludes, then, that indicative signs cannot be established by perception.
Notes to page 174: 46. 1014. 157-158. 47. Ibid. 171—175. 48. Thid. 177. 49. Itnd. 183. 50. Ibid. 187-188.
Sextus treats at greater length the Stoic view that signs are known by reason. The intelligible sign of the Stoics was defined as ‘‘the proposition in a sound condition which is antecedent and reveals the conclusion.” % Such a sign, Sextus finds, is involved in a paradox of inference. Either the conclusion is included in the premisses and is evident, and therefore not revealed by the premisses; or it is not implied by them, is not evident, and is not necessarily true. The relation of logical consequence which exists between the conclusion and the premisses cannot be tested. The conclusion would have to be known first; yet the conclusion supposedly requires the premisses to establish it. The proposition,
“If it is day, it is light,” cannot be a real sign, since the antecedent does not reveal the conclusion as a new piece of knowledge deduced from it. There is a necessary connection between the two, but light 15 as evident as day, and 80 15 not revealed by day.’” If, on the other hand, the thing signified is not apparent, as in the proposition, “If there is motion, there is void,” 5 Ttrd. 192. 5 7014. 200-202. % See above, 158. 57 ΟΡ. cit. 252-268. p. 176 the necessary consequence cannot be determined. A sound proposition with a true antecedent and conclusion can only be tested by knowing the conclusion, which would then not be revealed by the antecedent.
The implications of this argument are apparent. Necessity depends on an analytic relation between antecedent and conclusion. All logically necessary propositions for Sextus are then analytic. The Stoics are right in so far as they hold that all a priort truths are analytic. Sextus, however, asserts that such truth is not inference. Inference requires the statement of a new fact not already contained in the premisses. But in 50 far as the conclusion is not contained in the premisses, the inference is not necessary. The Stoic position was that certain synthetic truths can be established a priorz, and thus have the necessity attaching to analytic truths.
A further criticism, which Sextus has to offer against the Stoic definition of the sign as a proposition, and of dialectic as semiotic, 15 that the Stoics limit signification to the formal level exclusively.’ This restriction would eliminate a large part of the field of symbolism. On the human level, there 15 the practical use of signs by the farmer and the seaman, who are unversed in dialectic. Farmers and seamen do not rely on an absolutely certain science (demonstrative knowledge), but upon signs which indicate to them what to expect in the future on the basis of their past experience. Their art or science is based on predictions and the verification of these by the appearance of the events predicted. Here Sextus shows his sympathy with the empirical method developed in the practical arts and sciences.
Furthermore, Sextus would not exclude the use of signs from the animal level. Animals use signs although they are incapable of forming propositions. They follow signs associated with certain facts or objects which they have previously experienced in conjunction with these signs. Even the Stoics p. 177 admit that animals have ‘‘expressive’’ reason, the power of speech, by which they communicate with each other by means of signs.
Notes to page 176: 51. [014. 269—271. 52. See above, Chap. IV.
In his short section on induction, Sextus indicates that he realizes the difficulties of inductive reasoning, as well as those of deductive reasoning. Induction consists in the inference from particulars to a general rule. If only some of the particulars are investigated, the inference is uncertain, as there might be a conflicting case among the cases left unexamined. If all the particulars are to be examined, the task is an impossible one.
In spite of his criticisms of the Stoics and Epicureans, Sextus’ outlook is not entirely negative. In some ways he shows a striking similarity to a positivistic view. His insistence on the validity of the admonitive sign, which has its basis in the observation of the constant conjunction of events within experience, together with the refutation of the indicative sign, which claims to give knowledge of objects and events outside experience, results in the athrmation of a phenomenalistic position over and above his initial scepticism. The essence of positivism is the combination of a negative scepticism in regard to metaphysical knowledge with the assertion of a positive empiricism in regard to knowledge of phenomena. The positivist recognizes the impossibility of gaining absolute knowledge of things, gives up the search for the origin and destiny of the universe and the inner causes of phenomena, and restricts himself to phenomena and the observation of their laws of succession. He limits science to the systematic coordination of phenomena and the knowledge of their uniformities, which are termed laws. These laws are not absolute but are subject to constant revision upon the discovery of new facts.
p. 178 Sextus does not limit himself scrupulously to the mere observation of phenomena, but attempts, in accordance with his profession, to formulate some general rules. These general rules are based on the method of inference from similar to similar. The principles of science result from the association of phenomena and the extension of empirical method beyond the immediate experience. Thus, in the constant reproduction of the same series of phenomena the Empirical Sceptics find the means of foreseeing the return of an event, and establish an empirical equivalent for the principle of causation.
Notes to page 177: 53. Op. cit. 275-276. The Stoics distinguished expressive reason, the power of communication through speech, shared by animals and men, from the combining and synthetic reason belonging to men alone. 54. Pyrrh. Hyp. B.204. ;
Here in germ are some of the basic issues of empiricism and a theory of signs. The positivistic emphasis indicates the recognition of the applicability of scientific method to the problems of philosophy. The emphasis on the epistemological problem as basic is another advance over previous schools. The recognition of an empirical theory and domain of meaning
results in the critical consideration of hitherto unquestioned
philosophical concepts, such as ‘“*substance,” “‘causality,”” and “universality.” The resulting relativistic perspective allows for the freeing of philosophy from the absolutistic and deterministic views which dominated Greek thought. With the Hellenistic period of disintegration of old systems and ideals appear for the first time a critical temper and a scientific approach to philosophic 1ssues. Lastly, the interest in signs and signification results in a new approach to logic, epistemology, and science. As the consideration of signs and symbols is in the forefront of modern empiricism, it is interesting to note the prominence of a similar speculation in a period which is like the present in many other respects.
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