Duty Without Pleasure: An Epicurean Analysis Of Cicero's On Duties
The Book That Taught Europe Its Duties Was Written To Shut Out Epicurus. It Ends Up Borrowing His Arguments.
One Of The Most Influential Anti-Epicurean Books Ever Written
Section titled “One Of The Most Influential Anti-Epicurean Books Ever Written”Cicero wrote On Duties (De Officiis) in the autumn of 44 BC, in the months after the murder of Julius Caesar and about a year before Mark Antony’s soldiers killed him. It is a letter in three books to his son Marcus, then a student at Athens. Book I explains what is morally right, Book II what is useful or “expedient,” and Book III what to do when the two seem to conflict. Cicero says he follows “chiefly the Stoics” (I.6), and especially the Stoic Panaetius of Rhodes.
Few ancient books have had a longer reach. Ambrose, bishop of Milan, rewrote it for the Christian clergy near the end of the fourth century AD. It was among the first classical books ever printed. Walter Miller, whose Loeb translation of 1913 is the one we use, collected the praise of later readers in his introduction: Petrarch said “it is not a Pagan philosopher but a Christian apostle who is speaking,” and Frederick the Great called it “the best work on morals that has been or can be written.” Much of what later readers took to be simple common sense about duty, that the good must be done for its own sake, that the honourable always comes before the useful, that pleasure is at best a seasoning to life, comes from this book.
Nevertheless Epicureans have good reason to read it. On Duties is the most practical statement of the moral system that Epicurus opposed, and it is written against him from its first pages to its last. It is also, in places, a witness for Epicurus. Cicero cannot argue for his own positions without using arguments that rest on Epicurus’ standard, and he concedes several of Epicurus’ main points outright. This article goes through the book and gathers those parts that bear on Epicurean philosophy. The full text, with an outline and a list of the relevant passages, is on our page Cicero, On Duties (Miller).
Shut Out At The Door
Section titled “Shut Out At The Door”In On Ends and On the Nature of the Gods Cicero at least gives Epicurus a speaker, Torquatus or Velleius, before attacking him. On Duties is not a dialogue. Cicero speaks in his own voice from beginning to end, and the Epicureans get no reply.
He also rules them out of the discussion before it starts. “There are some schools that distort all notions of duty by the theories they propose touching the supreme good and the supreme evil. For he who posits the supreme good as having no connection with virtue and measures it not by a moral standard but by his own interests — if he should be consistent and not rather at times over-ruled by his better nature, he could value neither friendship nor justice nor generosity; and brave he surely cannot possibly be that counts pain the supreme evil, nor temperate he that holds pleasure to be the supreme good” (I.5). Only the Stoics, the Academics, and the Peripatetics, he says, have the right to teach ethics (I.6).
He gives no argument for this exclusion. The truths, he says, “are so self-evident that the subject does not call for discussion,” and he has argued them elsewhere. But the charge itself is false on its face. Epicurus did not hold a supreme good “having no connection with virtue.” He held that the virtues are bound up with the pleasant life and cannot be separated from it: “it is not possible to live pleasantly without living prudently and honorably and justly, (nor, again, to live a life of prudence, honor, and justice) without living pleasantly. For the virtues are by nature bound up with the pleasant life” (Letter to Menoeceus 132). Cicero knew this. In On Ends he lets Torquatus say it in almost the same words: “Epicurus, the man whom you denounce as a voluptuary, cries aloud that no one can live pleasantly without living wisely, honourably and justly, and no one wisely, honourably and justly without living pleasantly” (On Ends I.57).
The question between Cicero and Epicurus was never whether a good man is just, brave, and temperate. Both said he is. The question was why. Cicero answers that the virtues are worth seeking for their own sake. Epicurus answered that they are worth seeking because they produce the pleasant life, which is the goal that nature sets for every living thing. That is a real disagreement, and it deserves an argument from both sides. On Duties gives only one.
An Axiom In Place Of Evidence
Section titled “An Axiom In Place Of Evidence”Cicero comes closest to stating his reasoning in Book III, and what he offers is a request. “As mathematicians make a practice of not demonstrating every proposition, but require that certain axioms be assumed as true, in order more easily to explain their meaning, so, my dear Cicero, I ask you to assume with me, if you can, that nothing is worth the seeking for its own sake except what is morally right” (III.33). Miller’s note on the passage is blunt: “With this he waves aside, without even the honour of mentioning them, the Epicureans, Cyrenaics, etc.”
This is the heart of the matter. Cicero’s whole system rests on a premise that he asks his son to accept the way a student of geometry accepts that a line has no width. Epicurus refused to build on such foundations. He held that the good is not assumed but shown, by what every living creature feels. Torquatus puts the Epicurean method directly: “Every animal, as soon as it is born, seeks for pleasure, and delights in it as the Chief Good, while it recoils from pain as the Chief Evil … Hence Epicurus refuses to admit any necessity for argument or discussion to prove that pleasure is desirable and pain to be avoided. These facts, he thinks, are perceived by the senses, as that fire is hot, snow white, honey sweet” (On Ends I.30). Epicurus himself: “we recognize pleasure as the first good innate in us, and from pleasure we begin every act of choice and avoidance, and to pleasure we return again, using the feeling as the standard by which we judge every good” (Letter to Menoeceus 129).
Cicero’s position is stranger still because of the school he claimed. In Book II he defends himself as a member of the New Academy, which holds “that nothing can be known for certain,” and says that “some things are probable, others improbable” (II.7). In Book III he adds that “our New Academy allows us wide liberty, so that it is within my right to defend any theory that presents itself to me as most probable” (III.20). Yet the same author lays down “fixed, invariable, natural rules of duty” (I.6), says that “no more pernicious doctrine than this could be introduced into human life” than the separation of the useful from the right (II.9), and calls those who weigh a known wrong “wicked and ungodly” (III.37). A man who holds that nothing can be known has no ground for that kind of certainty. He can only borrow it, and in On Duties Cicero borrows it from the Stoics. Epicurus had answered the skeptic long before: “If you fight against all sensations, you will have no standard by which to judge even those of them which you say are false” (Principal Doctrine 23).
”Nature” As A Moral Authority
Section titled “”Nature” As A Moral Authority”Cicero appeals to nature on nearly every page. “If we follow Nature as our guide, we shall never go astray” (I.100). Wrongdoing cannot be expedient because “Nature demands right and harmony and consistency and abhors their opposites” (III.35). “Nature is the source of right” (III.72). There is a “Reason which is in Nature, which is the law of gods and men” (III.23).
Epicurus also took nature as the guide, but the two men mean different things by the word. For Cicero, following the Stoics, nature is a mind with purposes and moral demands. It “has assigned the rôles of steadfastness, temperance, self-control” (I.98), it has hidden certain parts of the body as a lesson in modesty (I.126–127), and “everything that the earth produces is created for man’s use” (I.22). For Epicurus nature has no plan and no opinions. It is atoms and void, and the world was not made for anyone. Lucretius states it plainly: “not by design did the first-beginnings of things place themselves each in their order with foreseeing mind” (Lucretius I.1021). Because nature has no designs, it has no reason to deceive us, and it speaks to us through the faculties it has given us: the senses, the preconceptions (prolepseis, “preconcepts”), and the feelings of pleasure and pain.
That is why the Epicurean appeal to nature can be checked and Cicero’s cannot. When Torquatus says that nature tells every animal to seek pleasure, anyone can watch an infant and see whether it is so. When Cicero says that nature “demands right and harmony and consistency,” there is nothing to watch. The voice of nature in On Duties is the voice of Stoic doctrine, and it says what the Stoics had already decided it should say.
Pleasure As The Pleasure Of Beasts
Section titled “Pleasure As The Pleasure Of Beasts”In On Duties pleasure appears almost always as “sensual pleasure,” the pleasure of eating, drinking, and sex, and almost always as an enemy. “It is essential to every inquiry about duty that we keep before our eyes how far superior man is by nature to cattle and other beasts: they have no thought except for sensual pleasure and this they are impelled by every instinct to seek … From this we see that sensual pleasure is quite unworthy of the dignity of man and that we ought to despise it and cast it from us” (I.105–106). Sensual pleasure is “a most seductive mistress” that “turns the hearts of the greater part of humanity away from virtue” (II.37). Health is kept “by forgoing sensual pleasures” (II.86). Hercules at the crossroads must choose between “the path of Pleasure and the path of Virtue” (I.118). At the very end, “to make the most generous admission we can in favour of pleasure,” Cicero grants only that “it may contribute something that possibly gives some spice to life, but certainly nothing that is really expedient” (III.120).
This is not Epicurus’ pleasure. Epicurus counted every pleasure as good, of the body and of the mind, and held that the mind’s pleasures reach further than the body’s because the mind holds the past and the future as well as the present (On Ends I.55). He also rejected the life of mere indulgence in plain words: “it is not continuous drinkings and revelings, nor the satisfaction of lusts, nor the enjoyment of fish and other luxuries of the wealthy table, which produce a pleasant life, but sober reasoning” (Letter to Menoeceus 132). In the Epicurean sense, pleasure takes in every experience we find desirable: the company of friends, a good meal, a long conversation, and the study of nature, and equally the thrill of climbing a mountain, sailing into a storm, building a business, or winning a hard contest. To set “pleasure” against “virtue,” as Cicero does with Hercules, is to define pleasure so narrowly that no Epicurean would recognize it, and then to defeat the definition.
Cicero cannot keep to his own narrow definition. In the same passage where he sends sensual pleasure to the beasts, he says that man “is captivated by the pleasure of seeing and hearing” (I.105). When he defends his own turn to philosophy, he recommends it by its pleasure: “if we are looking for mental enjoyment and relaxation, what pleasure can be compared with the pursuits of those who are always studying out something that will tend toward and effectively promote a good and happy life?” (II.6). He calls agriculture the best of all occupations because none is “more profitable, none more delightful” (I.151). He calls the desire to know “the secrets or wonders of creation” “indispensable to a happy life” (I.13). Every one of these is an Epicurean argument: a thing is recommended because it brings delight. Cicero only calls it pleasure when he wants to condemn it.
The Calculator Of Duty
Section titled “The Calculator Of Duty”Cicero’s method in practice is closer to Epicurus than his theory admits. He tells his son that we must “become good calculators of duty, able by adding and subtracting to strike a balance correctly and find out just how much is due to each individual” (I.59). He adds two questions to Panaetius’ scheme: which of two right acts is better, and which of two useful things is more useful (I.10). He compares advantages directly: health against wealth, “good health … to sensual pleasure, strength to agility,” glory to riches (II.88).
This is the language of Epicurus’ own method. “By a scale of comparison and by the consideration of advantages and disadvantages we must form our judgment on all these matters” (Letter to Menoeceus 130). Torquatus puts it as a rule of conduct: “in certain circumstances and owing to the claims of duty or the obligations of business it will frequently occur that pleasures have to be repudiated and annoyances accepted. The wise man therefore always holds in these matters to this principle of selection: he rejects pleasures to secure other greater pleasures, or else he endures pains to avoid worse pains” (On Ends I.33).
Notice that Torquatus speaks of “the claims of duty.” The Epicureans did not reject duty. They rejected the idea that duty is a good in itself, cut off from what it does for human lives. For Epicurus a duty is a choice that the weighing of pleasures and pains shows to be right, and that is exactly the kind of weighing Cicero asks his son to learn. The difference is that Epicurus said what the scale measures. Cicero asks for a calculator and never says what the numbers stand for.
Duty That Changes With Circumstances
Section titled “Duty That Changes With Circumstances”The Stoic picture of duty is fixed and unchanging, and Cicero opens with “fixed, invariable, natural rules of duty” (I.6). But when he comes to cases, his rules bend. “Occasions often arise, when those duties which seem most becoming to the just man … undergo a change and take on a contrary aspect. It may, for example, not be a duty to restore a trust or to fulfil a promise … When these are modified under changed circumstances, moral duty also undergoes a change and it does not always remain the same” (I.31). A promise to appear in court may be broken if one’s son falls dangerously ill (I.32). A sword left in trust should not be returned to a man gone mad (III.95). Book III ends its discussion of justice with a sentence that Epicurus could have written: “to keep a promise, to abide by an agreement, to restore a trust may, with a change of expediency, cease to be morally right” (III.95).
This is the Epicurean account of justice. Epicurus held that justice “never is anything in itself, but in the dealings of men with one another, in any place whatever, and at any time, it is a kind of compact not to harm or be harmed” (Principal Doctrine 33). When circumstances change so that a rule no longer serves the mutual advantage for which it was made, it is no longer just (Principal Doctrines 37–38). Cicero reaches the same conclusion case by case, but he cannot state the principle that explains it, because his principle is that the right is fixed by nature and never changes. The only way he can explain why a promise stops binding is by appeal to “a change of expediency,” which is to say, to the advantage that Epicurus had made the measure of justice from the start.
Society, Property, And The Origin Of Justice
Section titled “Society, Property, And The Origin Of Justice”The same tension runs through Cicero’s account of society. In Book I he denies the Epicurean account outright: “it is not true, as certain people maintain, that the bonds of union in human society were instituted in order to provide for the needs of daily life” (I.158). Even with all our wants supplied by “some magic wand,” he says, a man would seek company. He does not name the “certain people,” but the view he rejects is the one that Lucretius gives in Book V, where men first form friendships and compacts “not to harm or be harmed” because they need each other’s protection (Lucretius V.1011–1027).
In Book II, though, Cicero tells nearly the same story himself. Kings were first chosen because “the masses in their helplessness were oppressed by the strong” and “appealed for protection to some one man who was conspicuous for his virtue.” When just kings failed, “laws were invented, to speak to all men at all times in one and the same voice,” because “what people have always sought is equality of rights before the law” (II.41–42). And again: “although it was by Nature’s guidance that men were drawn together into communities, it was in the hope of safeguarding their possessions that they sought the protection of cities” (II.73). This is very close to Lucretius’ account of the first kings and the first laws (Lucretius V.1105–1160), and to Epicurus’ statement that “the justice which arises from nature is a pledge of mutual advantage, to restrain men from harming one another, and save them from being harmed” (Principal Doctrine 31).
Cicero still insists that justice must be cultivated “for its own sake (for otherwise it would not be justice)” (II.42). And in Book III he points beyond the laws of men to “the universal law,” drawn “from the excellent models which Nature and Truth afford” (III.69). But he admits in the same breath that “we possess no substantial, life-like image of true Law and genuine Justice; a mere outline sketch is all that we enjoy.” This is the Platonic argument: a standard set outside this world, which no one has seen, against which every real law is measured and found wanting. Epicurus held that we know justice the way we know everything else, through real examples set against each other: this agreement that keeps the peace against that one that breeds fear and violence. Justice that no one has ever seen is not a standard. It is a hope dressed as a rule.
Why Justice Pays: Cicero Argues Like An Epicurean
Section titled “Why Justice Pays: Cicero Argues Like An Epicurean”The most striking feature of On Duties, read from the Epicurean side, is Book II. Cicero sets out to show that justice and the other virtues are expedient, and every argument he gives is an argument from advantage.
Justice wins men’s confidence: “justice combined with practical wisdom will command all the confidence we can desire” (II.34). Justice is needed even in business, and “not even those who live by wickedness and crime can get on without some small element of justice. For if a robber takes anything by force or by fraud from another member of the gang, he loses his standing even in a band of robbers” (II.40). Power held by fear, he says, never lasts: “Whom they fear they hate. And whom one hates, one hopes to see him dead” (II.23). Tyrants live in terror. The elder Dionysius had his hair singed with a coal for fear of the barber’s razor, and Alexander of Pherae sent guards to search his wife’s chests before he went to her room, and was murdered by her anyway (II.25). In Book III Cicero asks of Caesar: “can occasions for worry, anxiety, fear by day and by night, and a life all beset with plots and perils be of advantage to anybody?” (III.84).
Every one of these arguments says the same thing: injustice is bad for the man who commits it because it fills his life with fear and danger, and justice is good for him because it brings him safety, trust, and friends. That is Epicurus’ argument. Torquatus makes it in On Ends: justice “always brings some benefit, partly owing to its essentially tranquillizing influence upon the mind, partly because of the hope that it warrants of a never-failing supply of the things that uncorrupted nature really needs,” while “Unrighteousness, when firmly rooted in the heart, causes restlessness by the mere fact of its presence” (On Ends I.50, I.53). Epicurus states it in the Principal Doctrines: “Injustice is not an evil in itself, but only in consequence of the fear which attaches to the apprehension of being unable to escape those appointed to punish such actions” (Principal Doctrine 34), and the wrongdoer can never “be confident that he will escape detection, even if, at present, he escapes a thousand times” (Principal Doctrine 35). Epicurus did not turn this into a universal rule, as Cicero does when he says that “no power is strong enough to be lasting if it labours under the weight of fear” (II.26). He judged by results. Men who seek fame and power for the sake of safety “have obtained the good which nature craves” if their lives are in fact safe, “but if it is not safe, they do not possess that for which they strove at first by the instinct of nature” (Principal Doctrine 7). Nothing in human affairs happens by necessity, so the answer depends on the case. Cicero’s tyrants are examples of men for whom power did not bring safety, not proof that it never can.
Then, in the last pages of Book III, Cicero turns on Epicurus and says that justice “totters or rather, I should say, lies already prostrate” in his system, because Epicureans value justice “only for the sake of sensual pleasure or personal advantage” (III.118). But personal advantage is exactly what Cicero spent Book II proving that justice provides. If justice were truly valued only for its own sake, Book II would be unnecessary. Cicero wrote it because he knew that his readers, like everyone else, want to know what justice will do for their lives. Epicurus gave that question an honest answer. Cicero gave the same answer and then denied that it counted.
The Grain Merchant Of Rhodes: Stricter Than The Christian Moralists
Section titled “The Grain Merchant Of Rhodes: Stricter Than The Christian Moralists”The best-known case in On Duties is the grain merchant of Rhodes (III.50–57). Rhodes is in famine, and grain sells at a very high price. An honest merchant arrives from Alexandria with a cargo of grain, and he knows that other ships loaded with grain have sailed behind him and will arrive soon. Must he tell the Rhodians, or may he keep quiet and sell at the famine price? Cicero answers by setting two Stoic teachers against each other. The first is Diogenes of Babylon, head of the Stoic school at Athens in the second century BC and one of the three philosophers Athens sent as ambassadors to Rome in 155 BC. He is not Diogenes the Cynic, nor Diogenes Laertius, whose Lives preserve Epicurus’ letters, nor the Epicurean Diogenes of Oinoanda. Diogenes of Babylon says the merchant must not lie, but need not volunteer what he knows: “It is one thing to conceal … not to reveal is quite a different thing” (III.52). The second is his pupil and successor, Antipater of Tarsus, who says that the bonds of fellowship among men require the merchant to tell everything he knows. Cicero adds a second case, a man selling a house that he alone knows is unhealthy, infested, and built of rotten timber (III.54), and gives his verdict for Antipater: “I think, then, that it was the duty of that grain-dealer not to keep back the facts from the Rhodians, and of this vendor of the house to deal in the same way with his purchaser” (III.57).
It is often said that Cicero’s answer here is stricter than the answer of later Christian moralists, and on this case the record bears it out. Thomas Aquinas took up the same example in the Summa Theologica, a seller who carries wheat “to a place where wheat fetches a high price, knowing that many will come after him carrying wheat,” and he took the side of Diogenes of Babylon, the Stoic who said the merchant may keep quiet: “the seller, since he sells his goods at the price actually offered him, does not seem to act contrary to justice through not stating what is going to happen. If however he were to do so, or if he lowered his price, it would be exceedingly virtuous on his part: although he does not seem to be bound to do this as a debt of justice” (Summa Theologica II-II, q. 77, a. 3, reply to objection 4). Grotius, Pufendorf, and the French jurist Pothier also dissented from Cicero. Pothier granted that good faith requires disclosure, but held that the contract still stands, because, as Kent summarizes him, a stricter rule “would unduly restrict the freedom of commerce.”
The American jurist James Kent, Chancellor of New York and author of the Commentaries on American Law, noticed the oddity. After listing the writers who rejected Cicero’s answer, he wrote: “It is a little singular, however, that some of the best ethical writers under the Christian dispensation, should complain of the moral lessons of Cicero as being too austere in their texture, and too sublime in speculation, for actual use.” Kent was no admirer of pagan religion. In the same note he says that Cicero would have been “struck with awe, humiliation and reverence” had he known the scriptures of Judea. Yet on the merchant of Rhodes he had to concede that the pagan held the stricter line, and he agreed with Pothier that some of Cicero’s rules are “of too severe and elevated a character for practical application, or the cognizance of human tribunals.” The common law, Kent wrote, “affords to every one reasonable protection against fraud in dealing, but it does not go to the romantic length of giving indemnity against the consequences of indolence and folly” (Kent, Commentaries on American Law, vol. 2, 1827, Lecture 39, “Of the duty of mutual disclosure”). Not every Christian writer took the lenient side. Kent notes that the Anglican Thomas Rutherforth agreed with Cicero. But the leading theologian of the medieval Church and the leading jurists of early modern Europe did not.
How would an Epicurean analyze the case?
First, look at how Cicero actually decides it. He does not settle the case by appeal to moral rectitude as a good in itself. Antipater argues from the bonds of human fellowship, the shared interest of the merchant and the city he trades with (III.52–53). And Cicero’s own last word is an argument from the merchant’s advantage. The man who hides the truth for profit would be called “shifty, sly, artful, shrewd, underhand, cunning, one grown old in fraud and subtlety. Is it not inexpedient to subject oneself to all these terms of reproach and many more besides?” (III.57). The question that closes the case is what the deed will do to the man who does it. That is an Epicurean question.
Second, ask what the merchant will gain and what he will lose. Epicurus held that justice is “a kind of compact not to harm or be harmed” (Principal Doctrine 33), and that no one who breaks it can be confident of escaping detection (Principal Doctrine 35). In this case the merchant cannot escape detection for even a week. The other ships are already on the sea. When they dock, every buyer in Rhodes will know that he sold them grain at famine prices while he knew relief was coming, and he will be known in that port, where he must trade again, as the man who profited from a starving city. Against that loss he sets a few days of high prices on one cargo. Epicurus also taught that “the wealth demanded by nature is both limited and easily procured; that demanded by idle imaginings stretches on to infinity” (Principal Doctrine 15). The wise merchant does not need the last coin that a famine can squeeze from his neighbors, and he gains far more from the trust of the city than he would from the sale. On the facts of this case, the Epicurean weighing of pleasures and pains comes out where Cicero came out, and for clearer reasons.
Third, notice why the authorities disagree. Cicero, Aquinas, Grotius, Pufendorf, Pothier, and Kent were all trying to state a single rule for every sale in every place. But each of them, when he gives his reasons, appeals to consequences. Aquinas distinguishes a present defect from a future fall in price. Pothier worries about “the freedom of commerce.” Kent says the common law “reconciles the claims of convenience with the duties of good faith, to every extent compatible with the interests of commerce,” and that in ordinary markets men “deal with each other at arm’s length,” each relying on his own knowledge. These are arguments from advantage, the advantage of a whole community of buyers and sellers. Epicurus had already explained why such arguments give different answers in different places: “In its general aspect, justice is the same for all, for it is a kind of mutual advantage in the dealings of men with one another; but with reference to the individual peculiarities of a country, or any other circumstances, the same thing does not turn out to be just for all” (Principal Doctrine 36). In a market where everyone understands that each party relies on his own information, silence about tomorrow’s prices may break no agreement at all. In a city facing famine, where the buyers are desperate and the seller alone knows that relief is near, the same silence harms people who had every reason to expect fair dealing. The general concept of justice stays the same. What it requires depends on the facts.
Fourth, notice what the comparison shows. The pagan who wrote that the right must be sought for its own sake reached the stricter answer, and he defended it at the end by asking what fraud does to the man who commits it. The Christian theologian, whose moral law was said to come from God, reached the more lenient answer by a fine distinction between present defects and future prices. Neither a standard set outside this world nor a theory of virtue for its own sake settled the case. What settles it, for Epicurus, is the question every one of these writers was really asking: what will this act do to the life of the man who does it, and to the people he lives among?
The Ring Of Gyges
Section titled “The Ring Of Gyges”Cicero’s arguments for justice in Book II, and his verdict on the grain merchant, all point to what wrongdoing costs: a bad name, lost trust, hatred, and fear. That raises an obvious question, and it is a danger to Cicero’s whole position. What if a man could do wrong and pay none of those costs, because no one would ever find out? If justice is good because of what it brings, then a wrong that could never be discovered would seem to pay. Cicero claims that the right is good in itself, whatever it brings, so he must deny this, and he tries to do it with Plato’s story of the ring of Gyges, which made its wearer invisible (III.38). Gyges used the ring to seduce the queen, murder the king, and take his throne. Cicero then puts the question to his readers: if you could never be found out, “would you do it?” A good man, he says, would not, “for good men aim to secure not secrecy but the right.” He complains that “certain philosophers, who are not at all vicious but who are not very discerning, declare that the story related by Plato is fictitious and imaginary,” and insists that they answer the question as if it were possible (III.39).
Cicero does not name these philosophers, but the Epicurean answer to his question is clear, and it is not an evasion. Epicurus built his account of justice on the world as it is, and in the world as it is there is no ring. No wrongdoer can be certain of escaping detection, and that uncertainty stays with him “up to the time of death” (Principal Doctrine 35). The man who does wrong in secret trades a real and lasting fear for a small gain, and the Epicurean weighing of pleasures and pains condemns the trade. Cicero’s question asks us to judge conduct in a world that does not exist, by a standard that has no connection to the lives we actually live. Epicurus asked us to judge conduct in this world, where the costs of injustice are real. His answer is the more useful one for anyone who is not wearing a magic ring.
Gods Who Are Never Angry
Section titled “Gods Who Are Never Angry”One of the most remarkable passages in On Duties comes in the debate over Regulus, who returned to Carthage and torture to keep an oath sworn to the enemy. The objectors ask what an oath means if no one fears the anger of Jupiter, and they state a principle that Cicero accepts: “it is the universally accepted view of all philosophers that God is never angry, never hurtful. This is the doctrine not only of those who teach that God is Himself free from troubling cares and that He imposes no trouble upon others, but also of those who believe that God is ever working and ever directing His world” (III.102). Miller’s notes identify the first group as the Epicureans and the second as the Stoics. Cicero then states as his own view that the question “no longer concerns the wrath of the gods (for there is no such thing)” (III.104).
This is Epicurus’ first Principal Doctrine: “The blessed and immortal nature knows no trouble itself, nor causes trouble to any other, so that it is never constrained by anger or favor. For all such things exist only in the weak.” Cicero not only grants it but calls it the view of “all philosophers.” In Book II he goes further and admits that “people think that the gods bring us no harm” (II.12). And he grounds the oath not in divine punishment but in “the obligations of justice and good faith” (III.104), which is to say, in an agreement between men.
The concession matters. For centuries after Cicero, moral teaching in Europe rested on fear of an angry god who punishes wrongdoing. On Duties became one of the foundations of that teaching, and yet its author says plainly that no philosopher believed in divine anger, and that an oath binds because of what we owe each other. On this point the book stands with Epicurus.
Public Life, Retirement, And The Life Of Pleasure
Section titled “Public Life, Retirement, And The Life Of Pleasure”Cicero returns again and again to the choice between public life and retirement. He grants that many of “the most famous and by far the foremost philosophers” withdrew from public life in search of calm, and that they wanted “to suffer no want, to be subject to no authority, to enjoy their liberty, that is, in its essence, to live just as they please” (I.69–70). He admits that “the life of retirement is easier and safer and at the same time less burdensome or troublesome to others,” but holds that public life “is more profitable to mankind” (I.70). Those who scorn office without good reason, he says, “seem to dread the toil and trouble” (I.71). In Book III he sets Hercules, who underwent “the greatest toil and trouble for the sake of aiding or saving the world,” against the man who chooses “to live in seclusion, not only free from all care, but revelling in pleasures” (III.25).
The charge is the familiar one that Epicureans withdraw from the world to avoid effort. Epicurus did advise caution about public life. Diogenes Laertius reports that the wise man will not “take part in public life” (DL X.119), and Epicurus taught that the surest protection from men comes from “a quiet life, and retirement from the world” (Principal Doctrine 14). But that advice was a judgment about advantage in particular circumstances, the same kind of weighing Cicero praises in his “calculators of duty.” It was never a fear of effort or a blanket prohibition. Epicurus held that we accept pains when greater pleasures follow (Letter to Menoeceus 129), and the life he lived, teaching, writing his thirty-seven books On Nature, keeping a community of friends together through war and famine, was not a life of idleness.
History supplies a sharper answer. Cicero wrote On Duties while celebrating the killing of Caesar. He calls tyrannicide the most noble of deeds (III.19), says that “all that pestilent and abominable race should be exterminated from human society” (III.32), and condemns the man “who was ambitious to be king of the Roman People and master of the whole world” (III.83). One of the leaders of the men who killed Caesar was Gaius Cassius Longinus, an Epicurean. A year before the assassination Cassius had written to Cicero defending his school: “it is hard to convince men that ‘the good is to be chosen for its own sake’; but that pleasure and tranquillity of mind is acquired by virtue, justice, and the good is both true and demonstrable,” and “those also whom you call ‘pleasure-lovers’ are lovers of what is good and lovers of justice, and cultivate and keep all the virtues” (Cassius to Cicero, January 45 BC). Cicero’s ideal of the man who risks everything to free his country was carried out in part by a follower of Epicurus. Whatever Cicero says about Epicureans who flee from toil and danger, one of the men who took on the labor of Hercules in 44 BC was an Epicurean.
The Stoic Sage And The Semblance Of Virtue
Section titled “The Stoic Sage And The Semblance Of Virtue”Book III also shows the Stoic all-or-nothing scheme at work. Perfect duty, the Stoics held, belongs only to the perfectly wise man. Everyone else has only “mean duties,” “a sort of second-grade moral goodness” (III.15). “No one of them was wise in the sense in which we wish to have ‘wise’ understood; neither were Marcus Cato and Gaius Laelius wise, though they were so considered and were surnamed ‘the wise.’ Not even the famous Seven were ‘wise.’ But because of their constant observance of ‘mean’ duties they bore a certain semblance and likeness to wise men” (III.16).
Miller’s note on the first book explains the root of this: “the Stoics did not admit that there were any degrees of right or wrong.” By that standard every real human being falls short, and the best men in Roman history have only a “semblance” of virtue. Cicero himself feels the pull of the other view, and tells his son that “we every-day people” must keep “such progress as we have made in the direction of virtue” (III.17). But progress has no clear meaning in a scheme where the only real goal is perfection and everything short of it is the same failure.
Epicurus rejected the scheme, though he kept the idea of a goal. He said that “one wise man is not wiser than another” (DL X.121), but he meant the goal, not the people pursuing it. Wise men aim at the same end, the pleasant life, and that end has the same limit for every one of them, so no one has a higher wisdom to aim at than anyone else. Real men stand at different distances from that goal, and for Epicurus the distances are real. “Faults are not all of equal gravity” (DL X.122), one man has come further than another, and the man who has come most of the way lives better than the man who has barely begun. The goal gives direction to the effort. It is not a perfect state outside this world against which every real life counts as nothing. The full argument is in our articles One Wise Man Is Not Wiser Than Another and Almost Is Not Nothing.
The Final Attack
Section titled “The Final Attack”On Duties ends with its only direct attack on Epicurus by name (III.116–120). The Cyrenaics and the Annicerians are out of date, Cicero says, but “Epicurus has come into vogue — an advocate and supporter of practically the same doctrine. Against such a philosophy we must fight it out ‘with horse and foot,’ as the saying is.” He quotes Metrodorus, that “not only expediency but happiness in life depends wholly upon a sound physical constitution and the reasonable expectation that it will always remain sound” (III.117), and makes four charges.
Wisdom. “What position will wisdom occupy in that system? The position of collector of pleasures from every possible source? What a sorry state of servitude for a virtue.” This is a description, not a refutation. Epicurus did hold that wisdom serves the pleasant life, and he ranked prudence above philosophy itself because it does: “the greatest good is prudence. Wherefore prudence is a more precious thing even than philosophy” (Letter to Menoeceus 132). Calling that “servitude” assumes the very thing in question, that wisdom ought to serve nothing beyond itself.
Courage. “However many passages there are in which Epicurus speaks right manfully of pain, we must nevertheless consider not what he says, but what it is consistent for a man to say who has defined the good in terms of pleasure and evil in terms of pain.” This is an argument that refuses to hear the evidence. Cicero admits that Epicurus spoke bravely about pain in “many passages,” and then says we should ignore them in favor of what Cicero thinks Epicurus ought to have said. Epicurus’ view of courage was consistent with his principles: “courage does not come by nature, but by a calculation of advantage” (DL X.122), and the wise man faces pain because he knows that “pain does not last continuously in the flesh” (Principal Doctrine 4) and that enduring some pains brings greater pleasures. Epicurus showed it on his last day, when he wrote, in severe pain, of “this truly happy day of my life” (DL X.22).
Temperance. “In many passages he has a great deal to say about temperance and self-control; but ‘the water will not run,’ as they say. For how can he commend self-control and yet posit pleasure as the supreme good?” Again Cicero admits the evidence, “many passages,” and dismisses it. The answer is in Torquatus: temperance “warns us to be guided by reason in what we desire and avoid,” because men who lack it “incur serious disease, or loss of fortune, or disgrace” for “a pleasure at once small in amount and unnecessary” (On Ends I.47). Self-control is the tool by which a man gets the greater pleasures of life instead of the lesser ones.
Justice and friendship. “Justice totters or rather, I should say, lies already prostrate; so also with all those virtues which are discernible in social life and the fellowship of human society. For neither goodness nor generosity nor courtesy can exist, any more than friendship can, if they are not sought of and for themselves” (III.118). On justice, see above: Cicero’s own Book II proves that justice pays in exactly the way Epicurus said it does. On friendship, Epicurus held that “of all the things which wisdom acquires to produce the blessedness of the complete life, far the greatest is the possession of friendship” (Principal Doctrine 27). Torquatus explains that friendship begins in need but grows “into an affection strong enough to make us love our friends for their own sake, even though no practical advantage accrues from their friendship,” as familiarity endears to us places, horses, and games (On Ends I.69), and that “friendship is the most trustworthy preserver and also creator of pleasure alike for our friends and for ourselves” (I.67). Cicero himself, in Book II, puts the devotion of friends first among the things every man needs from others (II.30).
What is most telling is Cicero’s own summary of the Epicurean reply. The Epicureans, he says, “shift and turn as best they can, and not without cleverness. They admit wisdom into their system as the knowledge that provides pleasures and banishes pain; they clear the way for fortitude also in some way to fit in with their doctrines, when they teach that it is a rational means for looking with indifference upon death and for enduring pain. They bring even temperance in … for they hold that the height of pleasure is found in the absence of pain” (III.118). Part of this summary is close to Epicurus, and part of it bends his doctrine. Wisdom as the knowledge that brings pleasure and removes pain is near to what Epicurus taught. But the last clause shows how Cicero reads the Epicurean limit of pleasure, and the reading is wrong. He brings temperance in by treating “the absence of pain” as a small, quiet state, so that the temperate man is simply one who wants little and is content not to hurt. That is not what Epicurus meant. “The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful” (Principal Doctrine 3). The removal of pain is the limit of pleasure, the edge that pleasure reaches in any experience where nothing painful is mixed in. It is a concept that describes the fullness of pleasure, not an empty middle state, and not a condition that a man enters and settles into. Nor does temperance serve that limit by teaching us to want less. It serves pleasure by choosing the greater pleasures over the lesser ones, and by refusing the small, unnecessary pleasures that bring “serious disease, or loss of fortune, or disgrace” (On Ends I.47). Even with this distortion, Cicero’s summary shows that the Epicureans had a reasoned account of every virtue. His only answer to it is that the virtues must be sought for their own sake, the premise he asked his son, a few pages earlier, to assume without proof.
What The Book Shows
Section titled “What The Book Shows”On Duties was meant to settle the question of how a man should live without any help from Epicurus. It shuts the Epicureans out in its first pages and attacks them by name in its last. Read with care, it shows something else.
It shows that the Stoic foundation of duty is an assumption, offered as a mathematician offers an axiom. It shows that Cicero’s “pleasure” is the pleasure of beasts, while the pleasures he actually recommends, of study, of seeing and hearing, of farming, of friends, are Epicurean pleasures under other names. It shows that when Cicero comes to real cases, duty changes with circumstances, promises stop binding “with a change of expediency,” and the right answer comes from adding and subtracting. It shows that his best arguments for justice are arguments from advantage: the trust it wins, the friends it keeps, the fear it spares us, the misery of the tyrant who rules by terror. It shows him holding a stricter standard of honest dealing than Thomas Aquinas, in the case of the grain merchant of Rhodes, and defending it in the end by what fraud does to the man who commits it. It shows him admitting that gods are never angry and that oaths bind because of what men owe each other. And it shows him summarizing the Epicurean account of the virtues fairly, and answering it only by repeating his assumption.
Epicurus did not need the assumption. He started from what every living creature feels, and from that starting point he could explain why a good man keeps his promises, why he changes course when circumstances change, why justice pays, why tyrants live in fear, why friends matter more than wealth, and why the active life of effort and risk is part of the best life when the pleasures it brings outweigh the pains. The standard is the same for all of these, and it is a standard anyone can check. Cicero’s “duty” needs a standard that no one has seen, “a mere outline sketch.” Epicurus’ pleasure needs only the evidence of our own lives.
The book that taught Europe its duties, in the end, is one of the better witnesses that Epicurus was right about why we have them.