Skip to content

Twins, Eggs, and Duplicate Worlds - How Epicurus Deals With Identical Things

Twins, Eggs, and Duplicate Worlds - How Epicurus Deals With Identical Things

Suppose you see a man across the street and greet him as your friend Publius. It turns out to be Quintus, his identical twin. Were your eyes deceived? Did your senses lie to you? And if they could lie to you once, why should you trust them ever again?

This is one of the oldest problems in the theory of knowledge. In the ancient world it was fought out between the Stoics and the Academic skeptics, and Cicero preserves the battle in the second book of his Academic Questions. The Stoics lost that fight, and they lost it because of a mistake Epicurus never made.

The Epicurean answer has two parts. First, Epicurean physics takes a middle position between the Stoics and Democritus. Because the kinds of atoms are limited, every kind of thing recurs and what nature can produce is limited. Simple things may be exactly alike, but Epicurus did not teach, as Democritus did, that other worlds hold exact doubles of us living the same lives. Second, whether or not identical things exist, they do no damage at all to the Epicurean view that all sensations are true. To see why, we need to look first at what the Stoics needed, and why they could not get it.

The Stoics Needed Every Thing To Be Unique

Section titled “The Stoics Needed Every Thing To Be Unique”

The founder of Stoicism, Zeno, held that knowledge rests on a special kind of impression, which the Stoics called “kataleptic,” or “grasping.” To qualify, an impression had to come from something that really exists, it had to match that thing exactly, and it had to be of such a kind that it could not come from anything else. That last condition was the heart of the theory. A true impression had to carry its own mark of truth, a stamp that no false impression could ever have.

This only works if no two things in the world are ever exactly alike. If two things could be truly identical, then an impression of one could not be told apart from an impression of the other, and the mark of truth would fail.

So the Stoics insisted that every single thing in nature has its own unique character. They meant this literally. Cicero reports their claim that “there is not a single hair or a single grain in every respect like another hair or grain” (Academic Questions 2.85). Seneca tells us where this uniqueness was supposed to come from:

“And among the other reasons for marvelling at the genius of the Divine Creator is, I believe, this, — that amid all this abundance there is no repetition; even seemingly similar things are, on comparison, unlike. God has created all the great number of leaves that we behold: each, however, is stamped with its special pattern.” (Seneca, Moral Letters 113.16)

The Stoic theory of knowledge therefore depended on a claim about the divine order of the world. Every thing is unique because the Creator made it so, and our ability to know anything depends on that uniqueness.

The Academic skeptics saw the weakness and went straight at it. They pointed to twins such as the famous Servilii brothers, whom strangers could not tell apart. They pointed to eggs, to bees, to a hundred impressions of the same seal ring in wax. Cicero adds the case of the sculptor Lysippus:

“Tell me, could not Lysippus, using the same brass, the same composition of metals, the same atmosphere, water, and all other appliances, have made a hundred Alexanders exactly alike? How then could you distinguish between them?” (Academic Questions 2.85)

They even turned atomist physics against the Stoics. Democritus taught that there are countless worlds, and that some of them are so perfectly alike that there is no difference between them at all, “and so also are men.” If there can be countless identical copies of Catulus in other worlds, the skeptics asked, why not a second Catulus in this one? (Academic Questions 2.55)

The Stoic spokesman in Cicero’s dialogue is Lucullus, presenting the views of Antiochus. He answers in the only way the Stoic theory allows. He rejects Democritus outright: “you are bringing me to the arguments of Democritus, with whom I do not agree.” He repeats that “everything has its own separate property.” He argues that a mother can tell her twins apart, and that the poultry-keepers of Delos could tell which hen laid which egg. And he admits that where the wise man truly cannot tell two things apart, he must withhold judgment (Academic Questions 2.56-57).

Then he makes the admission that shows how much is at stake. He will not give up the uniqueness of the true impression “one finger’s breadth, as they say, lest I should throw everything into confusion” (Academic Questions 2.58). For the Stoic, a single true duplicate would bring down the whole structure of knowledge.

Cicero’s reply goes to the core of the matter. Even if the Stoics were right that no two things are exactly alike, “it has nothing in the world to do with the question whether the things which are seen do not differ at all in any part, or whether they cannot be distinguished from another even though they do differ” (Academic Questions 2.85). A difference no one can see is no help to someone trying to judge what he sees.

On the terms the Stoics themselves had set, this reply is decisive. The Stoics had made the impression itself responsible for certifying its own truth. Once two impressions can look the same, that certificate is worthless.

Epicurean Physics: Limited Kinds Of Atoms, Recurring Types, And No Doubles Of Us

Section titled “Epicurean Physics: Limited Kinds Of Atoms, Recurring Types, And No Doubles Of Us”

Epicurus started from different premises, and they lead to a different answer than either the Stoics or Democritus gave.

The kinds of atoms are limited. Democritus held that the shapes of atoms are infinite in number. Epicurus argued against him that the atoms come in a limited number of kinds: their shapes are “not quite infinite, but only incomprehensible in number,” while “in each shape the atoms are quite infinite in number” (Letter to Herodotus 42). Lucretius proves both points at length (On The Nature of Things 2.478-568). David Sedley stresses how much Epicurus cared about this correction: “we know that Epicurus went to considerable lengths to argue against Democritus’s thesis that there are infinitely many types of atom. … Although the number of atomic types is ‘unimaginably’ large, it is not actually infinite” (Sedley, Creationism and Its Critics in Antiquity, 2007, pp. 161-162).

So what is possible is limited, and every kind of thing recurs. A limited alphabet of atoms means a limited range of things that can be built from them. Nature has fixed limits: “a fixed limit to things marks the extreme on either side” (2.507-521). At the same time, the supply of atoms has no limit, and the universe is unlimited in space and eternal in time, so “there are infinite worlds both like and unlike this world of ours” (Letter to Herodotus 45). Epicurus says that the atoms able to make a world “have not been used up either on one world or on a limited number of worlds, nor again on all the worlds which are alike” (Letter to Herodotus 45). Lucretius says the same thing:

“This there is too that in the universe there is nothing single, nothing born unique and growing unique and alone, but it is always of some tribe, and there are many things in the same race. … Wherefore you must confess in the same way that sky and earth and sun, moon, sea, and all else that exists, are not unique, but rather of number numberless.” (On The Nature of Things 2.1077-1086)

Velleius, the Epicurean speaker in Cicero’s On the Nature of the Gods, gives this principle its name. Epicurus called it isonomia, or “uniform distribution,” and it means that “in the sum of things everything has its exact match and counterpart” (On the Nature of the Gods 1.50). Our article The Power of Infinity explains why limited kinds of atoms and isonomia together guarantee that worlds like ours form again and again without any designer.

Notice what recurs in these passages: the kind. Every man has fellow men, every sun has fellow suns, every world has worlds “like” it. That is not the same as saying that every individual has an exact copy.

Exact doubles of worlds and men were Democritus’ doctrine, not Epicurus’. It was Democritus whom the skeptics cited when they argued that other worlds are “perfectly and absolutely” equal to ours, “and the same of men,” so that there could be countless copies of Catulus (Academic Questions 2.55). When Cicero mocks the idea of a “countless host of men, of the same names and rank, and exploits, and talents, and appearances, and ages, arguing on the same subjects” in other worlds, he is describing the view of Democritus, whom he has just named (Academic Questions 2.125). Sedley points out that Epicurus did not follow him: “by contrast with Democritus and, in due course, the Stoics as well …, Epicurus seems not to have spoken of two worlds being perfect doublets of each other, down to the minute detail of containing identical inhabitants with the same names, histories etc.” (Sedley, p. 164).

The reason is the swerve, and free will. Democritus and the Stoics leaned toward determinism, the doctrine that the same starting conditions must produce the same events, human actions included. Identical worlds with identical histories are that doctrine written large. Epicurus rejected it. He held that of the things that happen, “some happen by necessity and some by chance, and some are within our control” (Letter to Menoeceus 133), and he introduced the swerve of atoms, which Lucretius ties directly to “this free will for living things all over the earth” (On The Nature of Things 2.251-260). As Sedley puts it, “even if world A at some given moment were atomically indistinguishable from world B at some given moment, nothing would follow about those two worlds and their inhabitants also having identical histories” (p. 165). He adds that because Epicurus “is not a Democritean reductionist,” “even two worlds with identical atomic histories might not contain psychologically indistinguishable people” (p. 165 n. 61). A man is shaped in part by his own choices: “however much training gives some of them an equal culture, yet it leaves those first traces of the nature of the mind of each,” and yet reason can reduce those traces so far “that nothing hinders us from living a life worthy of the gods” (On The Nature of Things 3.307-322).

Lucretius does say that the very atoms of which we are now made have probably been in their present order at some time in the endless past:

“For when you look back over all the lapse of immeasurable time that now is gone, and think how manifold are the motions of matter, you could easily believe this too, that these same seeds, whereof we now are made, have often been placed in the same order as they are now.” (On The Nature of Things 3.854-858)

But he says it in order to deny that such a repetition would be us, as the next section shows. A momentary arrangement of the same atoms is not a person living the same life.

What about simple things? Two eggs, two coins struck from the same die, or two grains of sand may be alike in every way the senses can detect, and nothing in Epicurean physics forbids it. Lucretius himself observes that in ordinary experience “you will not find that every grain is like its fellows” (2.371-372), and he uses that variety as evidence for the variety of atomic shapes. Close likeness among simple things is common, exact likeness may happen, and neither troubles the Epicurean in the least.

So the Epicurean answer to the question “Are any two things exactly alike?” is neither the Stoic “never” nor Democritus’ “everywhere, down to men”:

  • Kinds recur throughout the infinite universe, because the kinds of atoms are limited and the atoms of each kind are unlimited.
  • What is possible is limited, for the same reason.
  • Simple concrete things may be alike in every way we can perceive.
  • Living beings with minds are individuals, shaped in part by their own free choices. Epicurus did not teach that they have exact doubles living the same lives.

Most important, Epicurus’ theory of knowledge did not depend on any of these answers. The Stoics needed every hair and grain to be unique. Epicurus needed nothing of the kind, and the skeptics’ twins and eggs could not touch him. The two sections that follow explain why.

First Answer: An Identical Thing Is Not The Same Thing

Section titled “First Answer: An Identical Thing Is Not The Same Thing”

The first reason is that identical in structure does not mean the same individual.

Lucretius makes this point right before saying that our atoms have probably been in their present order before:

“Nor, if time should gather together our substance after our decease and bring it back again as it is now placed, if once more the light of life should be vouchsafed to us, yet, even were that done, it would not concern us at all, when once the remembrance of our former selves were snapped in twain.” (On The Nature of Things 3.847-851)

The point here is very strong. Even the same atoms in the same order would not be us, because the chain of memory and life has been broken. If that is true of the same atoms, it is even more true of a look-alike made from different atoms in another place or another world. What makes a thing the particular thing it is includes its own history, its own place, and its own continuous existence. Even a man who looked exactly like Publius would still be a different man.

This is why Epicurean physics has no confusion about identity. Two things can be alike in every part and still be two things.

Second Answer: Identical Sensations Are Still True Sensations

Section titled “Second Answer: Identical Sensations Are Still True Sensations”

The second reason goes deeper, and it is the one that answers the skeptics.

Cicero lists the four premises the Academics used to prove that nothing can be known. The first was “that some perceptions are false.” Cicero then tells the Stoic Lucullus: “Epicurus does not admit the first, but you, with whom we are now arguing, admit that one too” (Academic Questions 2.83).

That single sentence explains the whole outcome. The twins argument works only against someone who believes that a sensation can be false, and who therefore needs a mark to tell the true sensations from the false ones. The Stoics believed this. Epicurus did not.

For Epicurus, a sensation is a report of what actually reaches the sense organ. When you see Quintus across the street, the image that reaches your eyes really does come from a man who looks exactly like Publius. Your eyes report that accurately. There is nothing false in the sensation. The sensation never said “this is Publius.” That statement came from your mind. It was an opinion added to the sensation.

Lucretius draws exactly this line when he discusses a moving shadow. The eyes report where there is light and where there is shade. But “whether it is the same shadow which was here, that now passes there,” the eyes cannot say: “this the reasoning of the mind alone must needs determine, nor can the eyes know the nature of things. Do not then be prone to fasten on the eyes this fault in the mind” (On The Nature of Things 4.379-386). Whether a thing is the same thing is a question for judgment. It is never a question the sensation claims to answer.

And judgment has its own test. Epicurus taught that an opinion must be held as “awaiting confirmation” until further evidence confirms it or contradicts it. He warned that if we confuse the opinion with the sensation itself, “you will confound all other sensations as well with the same groundless opinion, so that you will reject every standard of judgment” (Principal Doctrine 24). Notice that Epicurus and Lucullus both fear the same thing, the confounding of everything. But they locate the danger in opposite places. Lucullus thought the danger came from admitting a single duplicate. Epicurus saw that it came from mixing up what the senses report with what the mind adds.

So the man who mistakes Quintus for Publius has made an error of opinion, not of sensation. He corrects it the ordinary way. He walks closer, hears the voice, asks a question, or learns that Publius is out of town. Further evidence either confirms the first opinion or contradicts it. The mother who can tell her twins apart, and the poultry-keeper who knows his eggs, are not reading a divine mark stamped into each impression. They are using experience to form better judgments. Epicurus has no quarrel with them.

The Stoics built their theory of knowledge on a guarantee they could not deliver. They needed every impression of a real thing to carry a unique stamp, and they needed the world to be built so that this stamp was always present. When the skeptics showed that two things can look the same, the Stoics had nowhere to retreat except to deny the plain facts about twins and statues, or to suspend judgment in exactly the cases where the skeptics had pressed them.

Epicurus never made that bet. He did not need the world to be made of unique things. He did not need a Creator to stamp every leaf with its own pattern. He needed only what nature actually provides: senses that report what reaches them, and a mind able to test its opinions against more evidence. Because he expected nothing more from the senses than they can give, the twins argument cannot touch him.

This is not a dusty dispute. Modern technology can now produce images and sounds that cannot be told apart from the real thing. Anyone who believes that knowledge depends on a self-certifying mark is in the same trap as the Stoics. The Epicurean is not. He knows that his senses report truly what reaches them, that sameness and identity are matters for judgment, and that judgment is settled by gathering more evidence.

The universe contains twins, eggs, and countless worlds like ours. None of that makes knowledge impossible. It only means that a reasonable person must keep his opinions open to confirmation.